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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1918.

ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.[1]

JAMES H. TUFTS.

IS THERE, can there be, any ethics of international relations? Or must we recognize that as regards actual conditions, ethical theories are as hopelessly in conflict as warring nations, and that as regards the future, the best that ethics can offer is a choice between radically different views of human responsibilities, standards, and values?

Such conflict seems to deny the basal presuppositions of ethics. If there can be no genuine moral principle that does not hold good for all rational beings, if consequences of happiness or well being for all rationals must be reckoned with, if good and bad are properties of things independent of opinion, or if good is the transcendent and eternal—on any of these ethical theories right and good should not be determined by national frontiers. Yet apart from recriminations as to specific acts which seem to one antagonist either intrinsically good or else entirely justifiable as means, whereas to the other they appear so utterly abhorrent as to condemn any end which incorporates them, there are no doubt fundamental differences in moral attitude. As in the historic battles between national religions, or as with such issues as split Loyalist and Puritan in England, North

[1] This and the two following papers by Professors Hocking and Overstreet opened the Discussion on Ethics and International Relations before the American Philosophical Association at its Princeton meeting December 27-28, 1917. They are published together in accordance with the vote of the Association.

and South in our Civil War, great causes are more or less masked under particular occasions; the names under which men fight do not by any means always show what are the real principles which contend for victory.

I propose to outline certain of the more typical of the issues, combining to some extent the two methods of approach: psychological explanation of what is, and consideration of what ought to be. The questions may be conveniently grouped under the heads of responsibility, justice, and ultimate values.

I.

Can Nations be Regarded as Moral Agents?

"International conflicts are not so much moral events as they are the clashing of social forces."[2]

"The author seems to be quite unaware that he is being guilty of an unpardonable confusion of thought. All ethical considerations are completely alien to the state, and the state must therefore resolutely keep them at arm's length."[3]

The first of these quotations would suspend ethical prosecutions in war time in view of the disagreements of juries, and substitute the activity of sociology which raises no question of responsibility, but merely traces forces at work.

The second would demur absolutely to any ethical judgments upon states. The private citizen cannot try the government. The state knows neither right nor wrong, justice nor mercy. Whether one view the state as above morality, as *ex-lex*, like the God of certain scholastics, or place it in a distinct compartment—"politics is politics," just as "business is business"—the practical outcome is the same. All ethicists are hereby solemnly suspended from their occupations so far as states are concerned. Let them consider private morals, or the absolute good. But when the state kills or makes alive, covenants or breaks cove-

[2] Professor H. C. Warren, International Journal of Ethics, March, 1917.

[3] Review by Professor Eulenberg of Leipsic, of Jerusalem's, *Der Krieg im Licht der Socialtheorie*, in *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft u. Socialpolitik*, July, 1916, p. 317.

nants, seizes or defends, the proper attitude for philosophy is "*nicht sich ärgern, nur bewundern.*"

Professor Warren's attention was challenged by the disagreement of moral judgments pronounced not only by the warring nations of Europe, but also by psychologists and philosophers of this country before we entered the war. One of Professor Warren's inferences may be provisionally accepted: "The nations which are brought into conflict by clashing ideals are not governed by the same ethical standards." But are we thereby forced to conclude that there is "no alternative open but to judge it from a wholly non-ethical standpoint"? True enough that most, if not all, civilized nations in the past, and even in the not very remote past, have broken agreements and invaded smaller states, and in this country we know how radically sincere men in North and South differed on the ethics of slavery. All this is in point against certain ethical attitudes which presuppose universal intuitions or inevitable logic, or an absolutely unquestionable scale of values with its possibility for conclusive weighing of consequences. But the important question is, Will the world gain, or shall we as thinkers gain, by abdicating all moral jurisdiction?

The half truth in the contention is that as yet social forces are imperfectly understood and imperfectly controlled. As Professor Dewey said in substance at the twenty-fifth anniversary exercise of the American Psychological Association, one great reason for the ills under which politics and society suffer is that our social sciences have not kept pace with our physical sciences. We have tools of production and weapons of destruction, but not the means for their control in the interest of human welfare.

But two things ought to be said further: First, the forces which issue in individual action are likewise imperfectly understood, and with some men and women, very imperfectly controlled. Yet we pursue a steady policy of holding the individual responsible for acts which cause injury to his fellows. To "shoot up" a continent is an act for which the plea of "social forces" cannot be accepted as a

bar to ethical judgments. If the philosophers hold their peace, the dead must cry out. The jury may stay out long for the evidence; it may find various degrees of murder; but the old verdict of death by the act of God will not satisfy. And in the second place, control over social forces is not entirely lacking. Bismarck did not think so. He informed Crispi as to the methods of guiding public opinion. He himself gave a brilliant example of ability to make public opinion in two countries demand war. Is it to be presumed that both instruction and example have been forgotten or neglected? There is much to indicate that no such logical inconsistency or practical *non sequitur* as praise of his methods and failure to follow them has been committed.

What can we say to the more absolute demurrer of Eulenberg? In its extreme form it refutes itself. For if there is anything essential to the existence of a modern state, it is the loyalty of its citizens; and loyalty in its highest, most enduring form demands ethical approval. When the state consisted of an absolute monarch, or an absolute few, governed solely by greed for power and gain, secure by its resources of armor, or cavalry, or castles, as against the great mass of subject peoples or individuals, no ethical pretense was needed for conquest or plunder. But now the state finds that even for such wars, moral justification is necessary strategy. It must make its wars appear wars of self defense, as Bismarck taught. It still uses the political maxims cited by Kant in his *Essay on Perpetual Peace*, "*fac et excusa*," "*si fecisti, nega*"; but it does make excuses, it does make denials; it may even prepare the way for outrages by fictitious reports of similar outrages on the part of the enemy; it finds it wise to disguise annexation under the camouflage of "self-determination." Now the militarist or Macchiavellian may for a time succeed in playing the shrewd game of gaining ethical support for a non-ethical state; but the philosopher, at least, ought not to be privy to such a logical sleight-of-hand, and the common people are likely to be increasingly suspicious.

It is in a modified form that the theory of no jurisdiction is more plausible. Ethics has a relation to international relations, the theory asserts, but the ethics which applies is not the ethics of individual life; the clash in ethical judgments is due to confusion between standards for the individual and standards for nation or state.[4] If the state is a supreme and transcendent entity; if in it all individual good culminates and all obligation is fulfilled; if it is the embodiment of reason, God on earth, then obviously the safety of the state *is* the supreme law. How shall mortal man be more just than his maker? So runs the thought of Hegel and essentially of Rümelin. Supplemented by the doctrines that history is the march of God and that the superiority of a given state proves it the representative of reason, the incarnation of the *Idee*, it sufficiently explains why those who hold such a doctrine must clash in judgments with those who do not. The infallible state denies the right of private judgment. Morally, as legally, the state can do no wrong. Englishmen and Americans, Münsterberg explains, are too hedonistic and egoistic in their ethics to apprehend such a superindividual object of loyalty.

It would doubtless be futile for the American to discuss this view if he is incapable of understanding it, but the query must be raised, whether at any rate any concrete particular state as yet fills the specifications of absolute reason. Granting that mankind—when mankind shall have progressed in wisdom, sympathy, and good will—organized for living nobly and well, may claim the loyalty of all men, does this give any particular state the right to trample on human life, pervert truth, poison good faith, and practice ruthless frightfulness under the plea of necessity? I may pass over further discussion of the dangers to human values in an abstract idealistic deification of the state, as they have been so admirably set forth in Professor Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*.

But a more downright and plausible form of removing

[4] Lord Lytton's Glasgow address, 1888.

nations from moral control while seeming to maintain an ethical standard is that of Treitschke. Starting plausibly with a maxim of Kant, it ends with complete justification for *Machtpolitik*—the politics of Power. The state is a collective personality. Every personality must be treated as an end, not as a means only. Man and every personality "attains the highest perfection possible when he has developed the most essential part of himself. When we apply this standard to the state and remember that its very personality is power, we see its highest moral duty is to uphold that power . . . the injunction to assert itself remains always absolute. Weakness must always be condemned as the most disastrous and despicable of crimes, the unforgivable sin of politics."[5]

If we admit this absolute right of self assertion, no other justification for any act by the state is pertinent. The measure of ruthlessness is solely its success in increasing or maintaining power. The only refutation it can admit is failure. If other persons are not in sympathy with this idea, then their resentment may turn strength into weakness and thus prove the immorality of a specific act of ruthlessness. Likewise for a state to conquer what it cannot assimilate is immoral, for it displays weakness.

International law faces the doctrine in the following form: Aside from those provisions based upon treaties, there are other provisions which are in the nature of usages initiated or practiced by certain states, and accepted or at least tolerated by others. Such was the doctrine of "continuous voyage" put forth by the United States government during the Civil War. The German government desires to introduce a doctrine of "war zones." If we say that international law is anything that a power can carry through with the acquiescence of other powers, the question recurs: Shall other powers allow the power in question to "get away with it" or shall they resist? If it is an absolute duty of power *A* to assert itself, and an equally absolute

[5] *Politics*, Vol. 1, p. 94 ff.

duty of power *B* to assert itself, are we not confronted with a contradiction which must at least awaken a doubt as to the absolute morality of power?

On this basis we might have an internal limit of power set by the ability to assimilate diverse elements into one national whole. Just as there is a point at which the superior efficiency of great corporations becomes doubtful, so a world-capturing policy in an empire may develop weakness.

If now proceeding from this absolute duty of self assertion we should attempt to forecast the ethics of international relations, we might at first sight suppose world domination the logical expression of any power strong enough to carry through such an aim—but too complete dominance would mean peace and this would be fatal to another militarist value—war. For Treitschke the logical outcome is, first, pluralism: "The state is power, precisely in order to assert itself against other equally independent powers"—and then war: "The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations." The same view of war as the "best and noblest form of the struggle for existence," in the words of Schmidt, "the main factor in true, genuine *Kultur*" according to Nippold; "A holy thing," "The holiest thing on earth" according to Sombart; is apparently shared by many besides Bernhardi.

It cannot be said that this scheme of power and conflict is absolutely non-ethical. Its scale of values places the heroic at the head, or it considers struggle as nature's, and therefore as man's, highest law.[6] As to the first point of view, I do not see how one can demonstrate by argument the values of other virtues to be superior to those of war. I can only wonder whether those who have actually been close enough to the trenches and the empty homes to take in the full experience of such a war as this, will still regard it as the best life. If so, I fear no arguments from pure reason will have consideration. I can only say in the words

[6] Compare Professor Vernon Kellogg's account of his conversations with the biologist in "Headquarters Nights," *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917.

of Lincoln, "I should think that any one who likes this sort of thing would be very much pleased with it."

As for the second point, that since conflict is nature's law, it should also be man's, I reply that the very essence of ethical life according to pragmatist, idealist and at least one realist, is the possibility of at least partial control by intelligence instead of by trial and error, partial freedom from blind necessity, partial massing of forces against a reluctant cosmos.

One great task of ethics in relation to international relations, is to discover and point out how far intelligent methods of co-operation may supersede conflict as an international process. Münsterberg draws the analogy between war and prevalent methods of industrial competition, and uses it to justify war. But we have learned in the economic world to discriminate between a competition directed toward the conquest of nature which stimulates invention and thereby improves the condition of all, and a competition toward conquest of competitors, which substitutes brutality for ideas and profits only the winner.

Power is indeed by tradition the essence of the state. It was in military operations that the enormous power of human association and organization on a large scale first emerged. Political organizations followed military lines. The cruder processes of violence were at first largely met and controlled by blood and iron. And as a whole, Europe has never been able to co-operate. The colonies in this country nearly fell into the same slough of despond. Fortunately, they decided to co-operate, by trade, canals, railways, migrations, postal service, instead of competing by tariffs and maintaining armies. Economic power, only in the last century exercised on a scale comparable to political power, has been likewise proceeding wastefully, but we are now facing the elemental problem of economic supply of human needs more directly. Shall we go back to the older wasteful process?

I conclude that the doctrine of the state as naked power issues in an ethics of power which doubtless has claimed

admiration, but which when universalized, so to speak, becomes too horrible a thing for most men to tolerate, and which even in its own test of power ignores the greater power of co-operation and good will as compared with conflict. For co-operation and good will never are evoked by power as power.

True it is that state and nation have peculiar tasks, peculiar responsibilities. They have been defenders of liberty and order, arbiters of justice, bonds of unity, preservers of culture, and agencies for common welfare of large groupings of men, though also agencies for strife and tyranny. True likewise that it is difficult for the individual, especially if he be of a different nation, to judge these adequately and fairly. Yet if the world is to remain tolerable for man no single group or organization, whether it call itself "state" or by less pretentious name, can claim exemption from moral responsibility. It is by international responsibility, ecumenical conscience and international guarantees that the great interests, of which nations have in the past been the necessary trustees and defenders, must be increasingly maintained.

II.

Conflicting Standards of Justice.

A second issue, more or less clearly emerging between the warring groups, is, What is the standard for justice? Stationary nations, or those which have already obtained what they want, are naturally insistent on the rights of the existing status. Those which are in process of rapid growth, or which have not reached territory adequate for their wants, would use for their measure of justice their need of expansion.

Several aspects of this issue have emerged in the present war. (a) Treaties versus needs of the situation when conditions change. (b) The right to areas of the earth, based on occupancy, or past conquest, as versus claims based on the need of a growing population, or the merits of superior civilization. (c) Established rules for land and

sea warfare, designed to mitigate injury to non-combatants, as versus the changes necessary if a new invention such as the submarine is to be used with a maximun of result.

The question of treaties was well discussed by Mill, who took the ground that no government had the right to bind a people indefinitely. Treaties, he urged, should be for limited periods. It is noteworthy that the principle of the Dartmouth College case has been more and more strictly construed and limited by our courts in the interest of preserving freedom of action on the part of the public. Ethics must, however, distinguish between needs that commend themselves internationally, and needs that are egoistic. If the purpose is aggression, a nation can hardly command international sanction until this aggression is able to prove its claim.

The question of the right to occupy or control areas now sparsely occupied, or unimproved, is one that Americans decided in their own case on one basis when dealing with Indians, and on another when dealing with individual land ownership. Broadly speaking, the right of the whites to the territory controlled by the United States rests less on any treaties with the Indians than on the fact that under the civilization of the whites the land supports a hundred millions and may support many more, whereas under the Indian, and even Spanish control, it was far less fruitful. On the one hand, individual Indians ought to have been treated with consideration and humanity; on the other, it can not be said that the collective units, the tribes, ought to be preserved forever in their original status of exclusive occupancy of the whole continent. The case is analogous in part to the introduction of machinery. Individual workers ought not to bear the burden of readjustment, but society cannot refuse to accept inventions on the ground that some men will lose their employment in tasks for which they have acquired special skill.

Applying this principle to international affairs, and beginning with an extreme case, no small group of men can equitably possess or control indefinitely a great area, if it

is thereby kept from contributing to human well being. But as civilization advances attachment to the soil increases, and the web of human relations grows stronger and more intricate. The case of actual occupants becomes stronger before the test of satisfying human needs, as well as in sentiment and legal title. Just here exchange of goods without surrender of soil has provided a solution. Just as it is no longer necessary to own an Epictetus in order to read his book, or to be lord over a villein in order to get the aid of the tiller of the soil, so it is increasingly unnecessary for a nation to own mines or forests or soil in order to obtain heat and metal, wool and wheat. This principle, however, must be carried farther. We have heard chiefly of an international court. My colleague, Dean Hall, urges that it is equally important and probably more important to set up an international legislature which shall have power to provide on the one hand for access to raw materials or such exchange as may secure them, and on the other, for suitable markets. Servia ought to have had more than one market. Germany makes splendid uses of iron; she ought to have iron without going about to get it by conquest. It is easy to see difficulties. Shall France be required by an international legislature to furnish iron wherewith Essen may forge weapons for the conquest of France? On the other hand, can such an international legislature prevent Germany from using the iron as it pleases when once it is in possession of it? Yet who can doubt that the path of progress must lie along the direction of providing for all legitimate needs by other than the crude method of ownership of men or dominion over the earth?

The most difficult obstacle in the way of a non-political method of providing for needs is the seeming diminution of political prestige. Will it answer to let England govern a district while Germany has the trade, or vice versa? Such was often the situation before the war. We get on harmoniously with Canada on this basis, yet the appeal to political interests when the reciprocity treaty was under consideration and the overturn of the Canadian govern-

ment on this issue shows how easily such a question becomes delicate.

III.

Ultimate Values—Aristocracy vs. Democracy.

The third great issue which divides the contending groups is that of aristocracy versus democracy as a political and social order. Not that all the inhabitants of the Central Powers are Junkers, not that all British, French, and Americans are democratic in ideals and sympathies. But the dominating agencies in the first group, from the Hohenzollerns who have refused power offered by popular voice in order to hold it more securely when achieved by blood and iron, to their ecclesiastical and academic supporters, believe in direction by the few, discipline for the many. They maintain or accept the militarist scheme of subordination of civil to military power. The dominating forces in the opposing group are increasingly democratic and have no disposition to allow military forces the decisive word in national policy.

The psychology of Germany has been acutely analyzed by Veblen in his "Nature of Peace," as that of a feudal state. The religious ideas which come to us in such phrases as "the German God," or in the recent language of the emperor, "The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely rely," belong naturally with the feudal stage of society. A feudal morality finds in loyalty to a superior complete satisfaction and sufficient ethical sanction for any act. Bismarck's morals seem to have been of this sort, although sometimes in Prussia's interest he might resist the monarch. And on its other side, feudal morality is the *Herrenmoral* of a ruling class. It is not necessary to charge Nietzsche with bringing on the war, but he certainly thought he was advocating (1) a *Herrenmoral*, and (2) a morality the reverse of the general morality of Christendom. A class which believes in its divine right to govern will naturally find such a morality of masters convenient. And if a people believes

its own culture so superior to that of other peoples as to make international law impossible,[7] it will easily accept so much of superior class morality as to make explicable collisions with codes of inferior cultures.

But let us look away from historic reasons why men are so, and consider in barest outline some of the values claimed for aristocracy and democracy respectively.

If we are to have increasing unity, increasing organization, shall it be along the line of superior-inferior class rule, that is, of empire, or along the line of self direction and equality? When I call this a question of ultimate values, I do not mean that none of the values have any common denominator, but that although some have, others apparently have not. Let us notice some of the issues which are arguable. They turn largely on whether we stake our case on what is, or on what may be, on nature or on intelligence, on mechanism or on consciousness.

(1) There is first the question of efficiency. This is based in part on specialization of function. If men are in fact different in both kind and degree of ability, is it not obvious that some should rule and others be ruled? From Plato and Aristotle to the present day, this has seemed to many axiomatic. A second closely related argument is, that democracy will refuse to use experts. It is a "cult of incompetence," as Faguet puts it. A representative of a group is chosen by the group, and therefore is below the level of the group who choose him; he sits in a group and therefore when in parliament sinks below his own level—such is the social psychology of Christensen.

The democrat replies: Admitting there are differences between men, the great question is, do we propose to *crystalize* these or to encourage the emergence of new powers? A class system takes the first course. Its machinery, social, political, educational, is all based on the theory that nature has said the last word. Democracy believes in experimenting with human nature, in taking chances, that

[7] Kohler declares English, French, Russians, Italians, and Americans as impossible members of any international law association. They have no "living conscience."

new powers may unfold. While it relies mainly on bringing on the whole mass, it sometimes finds genius coming out of Nazareth. It admits a good deal of lost motion, but it is willing to pay the price.

And as to the cult of incompetence, democracy urges that this is a relic of the time when office meant dominance. No one objects to the expert surgeon or the competent musician. Undoubtedly the legislator or judge or executive must have authority as well as expertness, but with a genuinely democratic conception of government it is at least plausible that suspicion of the expert as official may decrease. Early democracy in America, fresh from the recollection of old world governments, was actuated by fear of governmental usurpation of power. Its system of checks and balances was intended as Professor McLaughlin has put it, to provide a government that could not "do things." Now that we demand increasingly for our complex conditions a government that *can* do things, the need of the expert is increasingly apparent. There is likely to be less suspicion of his ability.

(2) Aristocracy claims that specialization of function not only means efficiency, but also individual liberty and culture. It asserts that liberty and democracy are inherently contradictory. It will have naught of the herd, of the mish-mash and its control. There is undoubtedly an individuality of the aristocratic type. It seeks intellectual, æsthetic, or economic distinction. And in past ages with inadequate production very likely culture could flourish only by building upon the submerged foundations of slaves, villeins, artisans, or some other exploited class. In the language of Nietzsche, "we children of the future . . . ponder over the need of a new order of things, even of a new slavery—for every strengthening and elevation of the type 'man' also involves a new form of slavery."

But is not this merely another illustration of the disposition of the aristocratic theory to fall back upon what has been, upon nature as versus creative intelligence? It is by no means certain that individuality requires class aris-

tocracy. There is certainly in intellectual development as such, no necessary dependence upon comparative superiority. If there is an aristocratic art which expresses rare and unique experiences of a few gifted souls, there is certainly also a democratic art which sounds chords of common emotion. If there is a type of individuality which increases its values by being different from others, there is another which seeks them through contacts, and defines its own ideals by comparison with those of equals, as Professor Fite has well pointed out.

(3) We come finally to a comparison in which there is no apparent common denominator. The final issue between aristocracy and democracy is the relative value of power over another, as compared with free association among equals. I do not see that the partisan of aristocracy can demonstrate his case to the advocate of democracy, or vice versa. There can be no question of the reality and urge of the will to power. There is little doubt that to many natures the consciousness of power over other human beings is more satisfying even than that of power over nature. This consciousness of power is enormously increased by membership in a military or other ruling class. A *Herrenmoral* will seem to such a class the expression of the eternal fitness of things. "To demand of strength that it should *not* manifest itself as strength,—that it should *not* be a will for overcoming, for overthrowing, for mastery, a thirst for enemies, for struggles and triumphs, is as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should manifest itself as strength."

The democrat, however, on his side urges that equality is satisfying to those who live it. Friendship is good, and friendship rests on equality. The religious ideal of equality before God, the implication of equality before the law, the give and take of scholarship in pursuit of truth bespeak a democratic value that is real. It is the appeal of the finer institutions which man is building; it is more and more gaining ground.

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SOVEREIGNTY AND MORAL OBLIGATION.

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THEORIES in politics are originally the defences men make for their conduct toward other men. One can saw wood without a theory of sawmanship; one can deal with his friends without a theory of friendship; but one can hardly conduct an elaborate business operation without what is called a "policy." The increase of what we call mere physical quantities in any practical undertaking will eventually conscript thought, general principles, for its mastery and for expounding it to both co-operators and critics. It is partly for this reason that while politics is the most practical branch of philosophy, it is also the most philosophical branch of practice, the branch in which men have been most governed—sometimes ridden—by their theories. And for the same reason, this will always be the case.

The theory of sovereignty has done more than its share of practical damage; but the fault has rarely been that of the thinker. For if the sovereign is the most logical entity that political theory has created, it is unquestionably the most illogically used,—by the politicians. It was Bismarck, presumably a practical statesman, who fought and lost his *Kulturkampf* in pursuit of an ideal of state sovereignty, which certainly he himself did little to create. And critics of sovereignty at the present moment are prone to take such extracts of historical experience as this Bismarckian episode as pertinent comment on the fallacy of the conception.[1] What such an episode might show—as nearly as history can show anything—would be that Bismarck's conception did not work in Bismarck's hands; and quite possibly (among other inviting hypotheses) because it did not correspond to fact. This procedure is

[1] See, for example, the notable series of essays in Harold J. Laski's The Problem of Sovereignty, 1917.

instructive; but it promises fewer positive results than to ask *what it is in human relations that has given this concept a foothold.* For the notion of sovereignty was not drawn gratuitously from the clouds; it was designed to clarify some fact found at work within political experience.

In the present paper, I propose to follow this second and more empirical method; but it may tend to clear the air, and to bring about theoretical co-operation (nowhere so needful as in political theory), if we begin by excluding certain historical conceptions of sovereignty as neither actual nor expressive of any working ideal.

I.

First, the sovereign foreshadowed rather than defined in Aristotle's political theory, the subject which, prior to the human individual, pursues the *all-inclusive end*, neatly embracing and superseding the purposes of all personal and family and village life,—this sovereign does not exist in human society. Already in Aristotle's time the simple hierarchy of existing purposes in the ideally self-sufficient community had been visibly ruptured by widespread commercial, and incipient religious, groupings.

Second, the sovereign of Hobbes, whose prior will creates the conditions under which alone morality is possible, does not exist. The conditions under which moral obligation exists are not made by any human institution. If I refrain on moral grounds from breaking the furniture of a person whose taste in furniture I disapprove, it is not primarily because I have set over myself a power which renders it imprudent to act in this way; it is rather because he and I alike prefer to live in a world where freedom of choice in certain matters is respected, and because he and I are capable of recognizing in one another *that* preference, though not the choice of furniture, as a common good and a common bond. It requires no institution to create this situation, and the obligation that goes with it; and further, no institution could create it,—though it might easily precipitate itself in the shape of an institution.

Third, the sovereign commonly though erroneously, attributed to Hegel, the quasi-absolute, subject or spirit in whom all individuals together with their rights are mere momenta, does not exist in human society. Indeed, this sovereign, as a sort of synthesis of the sovereigns of Hobbes and Aristotle, may be said to be doubly non-existent. But the particular feature of his non-existence which I should like to emphasize is his individual personality. And this point is so vital to the whole matter that I ask leave to give it more than a passing comment.

II.

First, as to its implications: It might reasonably be supposed that only a person could be a subject of moral obligation; and that, accordingly, if one judges that states are fictitious, rather than real persons, he thereby resigns the notion that states can have any but fictitious moral duties. Only a being with a soul can sin or repent of sin; and while we hardly expect states to be moved by the fear of future punishment, inasmuch as it is the avowed intention of states to live on earth forever, we might well wish them to be accessible to the more immediate sentiments of interpersonal regard and interest in the general human future. But these are, to our observation, the sentiments (now and then) of statesmen, not of states; and the difficulty which the statesman has in making his own individual conscience the guide of his political action is chiefly the difficulty of knowing what precisely the character of that being may be in whose name he acts. A doubt of real identity between the being which under one administration makes promises, signs treaties, incurs debts, etc., and the being which under another administration has to fulfil these undertakings, can hardly fail to perplex the problem of obligation.

In the case of the individual, there is always an empirical difference between the person who promises and the person who has to fulfil, a difference which may or may not be relevant to the subject matter of the promise; but his interest in being, and being taken for, a morally responsible

entity is enough to override in most cases such differences. In the case of the state there are similar obvious motives for a wish, on the part of the statesmen, that the state be considered responsible; and this major expediency may likewise override not alone the fact of change of administration with whatever psychological discontinuity that may imply, or even of revolution, but also a strong feeling that the original promise was iniquitous, or that history has so far altered the circumstances as to reverse the original meaning of the engagement. But if the state is a fictitious or pragmatic entity to be treated *as if* responsible, for certain abstract purposes, it would seem the duty of the statesman to recognize that the limit of those abstract purposes is also the limit of possible obligation. He would have to subordinate his conscience to his deductive faculty, not because his conscience is in error, but because it fails to apply. The state can do no wrong; not because the will of the state defines what is right, but because there is here no moral subject.

If, in spite of these considerations, critics attack the idea of the real, over-individual, personality of the state on the ground that politics must come within the domain of moral judgment, one would be inclined at first to say that the force of the argument—if it has any force—is in the opposite direction. The postulate of responsibility would apparently lead us to regard the state as a real subject in the sense, at least of Gierke's *Genossenschaft* or of Royce's Community.

But however powerful our conviction that states must have duties, I doubt whether an argument regarding the nature of the state can be built on that postulate. If a view of the state can be built of objective material, by the aid of psychological conceptions empirically valid, I should judge that nearly all would prefer it. And it seems to me that such a view is attainable.

III.

Suppose we think of an instinct as a course of behavior inseparable from a group of environing objects with which

that behavior deals,—as the food-getting activities are inseparable from the food-objects and their habitat. The food-getting creature tends to regard this entire group of objects as *his own* in only a somewhat more attenuated sense than that in which he regards his tools or weapons as his own, because they form part of one of his *vital circuits*. Similarly the "self" of an author extends itself over the materials of his writing and the characters of his book; they are part of his life in the very literal sense that if he is deprived of them his functions are interrupted, much as they are interrupted if you deprive him of an eye or a finger. Through their relations to him these objects may be said, in more than a purely fictitious sense, to be alive, and to acquire at times a sort of personality.



Individual vital circuit and coincident vital circuits, showing tendency to quasi-individuality of the circuit.

But a vital circuit of this sort need not necessarily be exclusive to one individual and his wish. A group with the same hunting ground, a gang of workmen on the same job, stockholders in the same business, have vital circuits partly coincident. In such cases the common portion tends to assume an autonomy of its own; and the life of such a quasi-individual entity, I repeat, is not a pure fiction: if you cut this circuit, it bleeds.

If two individuals have the same need, they need not on

that account have any vital circuit in common. But if in a school of nine boys there is a unanimous wish to form a baseball nine; and if there is in the aggregation one bat, one ball, one mask, one mit, etc., the prophetic eye may see nine vital circuits falling into a coincidence shaped by fate, each of which includes beside the common material property the persons of the other eight. In similar fashion, a wholly universal need may bring men together in apparently fortuitous groupings determined by the accidental presence of a *set of objects* available and necessary for a common vital circuit. In this way the theory of "vital circuits" will differ from that of "social groups" in general.

And it is in this way, I believe, that we may conceive the universal need for an ordered and reliable social existence calling into being—no universal state—but those curiously irregular and curiously tenacious entities called national states. Let it be granted that among the deeper needs of human nature, call them instinctive or not, are the needs for self-knowledge, for cumulative experience and experimentation, for making long plans, for a calculable to-morrow and a calculable permanence, for a set of traditions to cherish and test in application, and for that kind of power which consists in the possibility, by persuading one's neighbors, of putting one's ideas into lasting effect. And let it be granted that the *material conditions* for satisfying these needs are peculiar, not to be made or unmade by any social contract entered into by any group you please of men-in-general or by the group of all-men. If, then, a vital circuit satisfying this composite "political" need is once formed, it will tend to persist; it will include present, past, and future members, and not the present only; its identity will not essentially alter with the shifting of personnel; it will have a real and verifiable life, a character, a reputation; and it will have problems of relations to other such circuits determined by its own character. But the veritable consciences concerned in these transactions will always be the consciences of the individuals whose vital circuit the state is. These consciences will be able to act

under the postulate of identity because the needs concerned and their data, the vital circuits, coincide.

IV.

We may now put the question, In such an entity, what are the facts which would evoke, and so give meaning to, such a notion as that of sovereignty?

First, *finality of decision.* If men are to act together at all, there must be some way, formal or informal, of arriving at a decision; there is a definite office, whether or not a definite officer, determining what shall be done, and how it shall be done. This circumstance has nothing to say about how much consultation with everybody shall have preceded the decision; nor how much the decider will defer to the judgment of the more important, more thoughtful, more powerful or authoritative members or interests—it being taken as an axiom that such differences of power will always exist. He who leads must always to this extent follow; but this does not destroy the office of leadership. The function itself is as inevitable, and hence as unanimously willed, as the existence of the common undertaking; it occupies the same place in the physiology of the vital circuit as the function of decision after deliberation in the individual mind,—a simple corollary of the will to exist as an identifiable subject. It is the existence of a supreme court, a chief executive, an authoritative foreign office, which marks the "sovereign" state; and the function retains its meaning no matter what interest, at any time, may be the most powerful within the community.

Second, *the psychological priority of the political interest.* If the will to act together politically were as easily abandonable as the will to take a summer trip together, leadership in the state would have the same limited finality as leadership in any other social enterprise. A genuine "general will" to take such a trip might conceivably be reduced to zero in the course of a discussion of ways and means which failed to develop any acceptable concrete plan, and hence any leader. If the political enterprise were of this nature,

the state would be in precarious competition for our loyalty with the interests represented by recreation, industry, religion, professional fraternity, etc. It is some such picture of the position of the state that the guild socialists of England and their followers in this country are framing. Every wave has its own crest, but there is no crest of the ocean: the political interest, as one interest among many, must take its chances with the rest.

But while the old concentric picture of social structure has become visibly obsolete with the dominance of world-wide "liberty of association," it remains true that the state is on a different psychological plane than other groups; and the crux of the contemporary problem of sovereignty lies in defining this difference.

The state does not *include* the end of religion, commerce, industry. It is not quite the case that it *provides the conditions* which make them possible. But if we regard all shifting social groupings, and all variation of power between groups, as experimental,—not shifting for its own sake, but shifting for the sake of finding a right adjustment,—this *interest in the meaning of the process* would presuppose a mind surveying the whole story, formulating and preserving its results, making the competing ingredients gradually self-conscious and skilful in the guidance of their own efforts. One type of experiment would be more inevitable than any effort at summer trips, or trades unions, or chambers of commerce, namely the experiment of adjusting all these special experiments to one another. This supervisory mind, of long memory, with its adjusting or law-making functions, is the state; and the interest in wholeness and proportion which it expresses is psychologically inevitable, whatever the careers of the interests reflected upon, and whether or not the vital circuits of those interests lie wholly within its own borders.

After all it is the *man* who is distributed abroad among his various competing vital circuits, and his unique interest in the state is among other things his unique interest in not being torn asunder by their conflict. It is his interest in

being *himself* that makes the will of the state imperative upon him, as no interests therein reflected upon are imperative. In this sense also, the state is sovereign.

V.

The political sovereign is now defined as the will which finally decides that a particular experiment shall exist (together with all deeds involved in carrying it out),—an indispensable experiment in co-ordinating all other social experiments. It is an identical, and irrevocable, element in the will of every member of the state, treated as a single and independent person.

We have not said, however, that there is nothing left over in the individual citizen's will beside this particular experiment, and what it surveys. For any one who makes a decision has something left over; at least, the knowledge that other experiments were possible, and in our case, the knowledge that other experiments exist.

His relation to these other experiments would be a moral relation, in precisely the sense defined in section I, above. The mutual respect for freedom of choice in experiment-making would be the common good that creates the common bond and the mutual obligation. And so far, the moral relations of sovereign states would be precisely analogous to those of sovereign persons. We do not, as a fact, wholly respect the freedom of choice of children and other wards; we wholly respect that freedom only in mature persons. And so the world naturally divides itself into sovereign and part-sovereign states *on the basis of maturity*. States are recognized as sovereign precisely because they are morally responsible,—the very reverse of supposing them sovereign because they are above moral obligation.

VI.

But there is still a third empirical element in our conception of sovereignty which threatens to spoil the simple purity of this picture.

The attempt to apply principles of personal justice and

the "rights of man" to national states always meets resistance and, I believe, a justified resistance. There are two types of justice in vogue in the world, each of which promises highly unsatisfactory results as applied to inter-state relations. The justice of *legality* naturally tends to perpetuate the *status quo:* a juridical decision would have kept Austria in control of Italy, and these colonies under the control of Britain. The justice of *equity*, however, would not preserve the *status quo:* on the contrary, it would work miracles,—such miracles as none would wish to see performed. It would argue as follows. Britain has an empire; I also should have an empire. Thus Germany has argued, with great plausibility. But let the argument run its course. Let Sweden and Switzerland and Montenegro also have empires; for what is fair for one is fair for another in terms of the "equal rights of states." Or obversely, that which does not work all around is not true anywhere, and we ask Britain to surrender her claims to empire and redistribute the world among all nations in such wise as to give all an equal share in every good thing. The absurdity of these proposals creates a presumption that these two types of justice do not fit the international situation, and that the morality appropriate to persons cannot be translated forthwith into a code for nation states.

I believe, in fact, that the morality of *comparison* based on the presupposition of equality, has a very restricted application to states; and that states are frequently right in refusing to defer to a plea based on this kind of justice. If so, there enters into the notion of their sovereignty an element of self-determination based on the *uniqueness of states*, as opposed to their comparableness. For while human nature that needs the state is the same everywhere, the geographical and other objects that enter into these vital circuits are surprisingly various, crooked, and dissimilar. The entire ordering of life, about which theme the political experiment plays, must be different in the Soudan and in Siberia; in empty America and in crowded Holland; in portless Switzerland, and in sea-girt Britain. The

important thing would be that states should get rid of the supposed necessity of imitating in everything the states they regard as big and prosperous, and find rather the specific conditions for their own peculiar life. They would then speak, not of their "rights," but of their "vital interests"; and they would have grave doubts about the arbitrability of these interests, precisely because they are—and of right ought to be—unique.

VII.

In falling again into the language of "right" while rejecting it, we come to the final point of our argument. This third empirical element of sovereignty, the incomparableness and hence apparent non-arguableness of vital interests, is not opposed to the application of moral concepts to states,—it merely demands *another kind* of moral concept. And the hope for the future peace of the world seems to me to lie in recognizing this fact.

We are naturally inclined, at times, to fall back, as does Professor Philip Marshall Brown, in his book on International Realities, from the idea of "right" to that of "interest" as applied to states, because of the visible inadequacies above noted. We are inclined to judge, as he judges,—that the security of the people must still be the supreme law; that (as he declares with Lorimer) "no state puts its conscience or judgment in the keeping of any other," inasmuch as there is no competent common superior, no competent public opinion of the world, no extant "family of nations composed of peoples possessing common standards of right and wrong, common conceptions of rights and obligations," no available world court of arbitrators "free from all national and racial prejudices, detached from the atmosphere of world politics, and blessed with transcendent wisdom" such that they should be allowed "to judge the acts of England in Egypt, France in Morocco, Russia in Persia, and the United States in Mexico and Colombia."[2] It is surely better to face these conditions, as Professor

[2] International Realities, pp. 52, etc.

Brown faces them, recognizing the limited application of the ethical factor while demanding for it its due place, than to bring the entire plea for international compunction into disrepute, perpetuating the kind of contempt felt for it in the German high command and elsewhere, by insisting on applying it where only culpable blindness to fact could suppose it capable of being applied.

In view of all this, it is still noteworthy that when Professor Brown quotes Lorimer, he finds himself speaking of a *conscience* which every state holds at least over itself in these matters; and while it is doubtless true that no state dare put its conscience in the keeping of any other one state, any more than any person dare put his conscience in the keeping of any other person, it is still an open question whether any state can prevent its actions, so far as they actually affect the interests of other states, and come increasingly to the knowledge of the world, from being judged by the consciences of *all other states*, or can insulate its own judgment from that outer judgment in proportion as that outer judgment approaches a *free consensus*. The point is, as I see it, that the conscience of the world does not necessarily limit itself to the lines of either legality or equity; that it is *capable of making the valid distinction* between the comparable and the incomparable concerns of different states. This is what we are likely to despair of, but, as I believe, without sufficient ground.

For after all, the third kind of justice we need is no other than the familiar justice of the family, which in giving gifts to children does not feel obliged to make the gift to A identical with the gift to B for equity's sake; or the familiar state of mind of the traveler, who travels only because he finds interest and beauty, not in the similarities, but in the peculiarities of every land. It exists, to some extent, in the mind of everyone who, confronted with the question, Do you wish the annihilation of Germany, or of any other enemy state, answers with a distinct No.

The state of mind required to bring a public conscience into these awkward, non-justiciable, individual problems,

is thus neither unknown nor inaccessible.[1] But it is very doubtful whether it yet exists *in sufficient volume* to justify any state in entrusting its interests to the keeping of international conscience.

But this, indeed, is a question of condition, not of theory, and can only be solved by making the test, and running thereby the risk of loss, even of martyrdom. And a martyrdom which might be the evidence of a mistaken faith in this conscience, hence of folly, and indeed of criminal negligence on the part of a government responsible for its people, might conceivably be the opposite of folly and crime, if it were a necessary sacrifice to arouse a slumbering world-conscience into competent action. Some two thousand years ago an obscure Jew ventured to make the supreme wager, in the faith that mankind was sufficiently near a perception of brotherhood, so that his act would be caught up, as it were, by the conscience of mankind, and kept from falling to the ground as an act of madness,—preserved rather as a symbol of divine wisdom. And what this Jew ventured for the conscience of individual men; that, in our day, one small state seems to have ventured for the conscience of the states of the world. The deliberate self-sacrifice of Belgium may well be the test case,—either an act of profound political guilt, or an act big with a powerful future.

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[1] Cf. Josef Kohler, Moderne Rechtsprobleme, 2d Ed., 1913, §41. "Allein auch hier (speaking of exactly these problems) ist die Möglichkeit nicht ausgeschlossen, dass sich allmählich gewisse Grundsätze der Ausgleichung entwickeln, und dass die Lösung solcher völkerschaftlichen Probleme von den Nationen leidenschaftslos übernommen wird. Heutzutage ist nur das eine wesentlich, dieses Problem scharf ins Auge zu fassen, und unter Berücksichtigung der geschichtlichen Erfahrung, über die Grundsätze solcher Ausgleichung nachzusinnen: tun wir dies, dann wird der Gedanke uns nie verlassen, dass der Friedensengel einst auch hier erscheinen wird."

ETHICAL CLARIFICATIONS THROUGH THE WAR.

HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET.

THE war has wrought important changes in many regions of our life. Has it effected any clarification, modification or extension of our ethical attitudes? It is doubtless too early to expect the radical moral revaluing which, as it has come with every wide-reaching human crisis, must inevitably come as a result of this most unprecedented of wars. We are still too partisan in the conflict, still too quivering with our indignations and hates to be either creative or receptive of a moral insight which is completely "above the battle." In default of that greater achievement—which may indeed mean for our particular age what the revolutionary insight of the Nazarene meant for his—we can to-day only trace out, haltingly at best, certain directions of new moral conviction which seem to converge upon some more adequate view of our common human life.

I.

If we attempt to analyze out those factors in the antebellum situation which lent themselves peculiarly to the fomenting of war, we find them, I think, to have lain chiefly in four points of stress—economic, cultural, political and "temperamental." Of these points of stress little need be said in elucidation, as the three years and a half of war have instructed us more than sufficiently. Let me describe them simply for the purpose of indicating with precision what I mean.

By the economic point of stress I mean, in the first place, to refer to a typical situation which had developed strikingly in the few decades preceding the war. Economic-enterprise, which, during the early nineteenth century, had been confined mainly within national limits, had, in the latter half of the century, grown to such dimensions that it overleaped national boundaries. In all the strongly

developed countries—creditor nations, as they came to be called—surplus capital sought fields of investment in foreign lands, and particularly in those backward lands where rich natural resources were undeveloped and where labor was cheap. A peculiar form of economic competition developed out of this situation. One might have supposed, for example, especially in view of the *laissez faire* economics of the nineteenth century, that a land like Morocco or Mesopotamia or Syria would have been considered an investment field open to all comers—a free field and no favor. As a matter of fact, it was quite otherwise. A new factor, of signal importance for the peace of the world, was introduced into the competitive situation. Following Lord Palmerston's historic speech of 1850, the principle came into rapid acceptance that investments made by the citizens of any nation outside that nation were to be backed by the diplomacy and, if need be, by the military force of that nation.

The result was that during the decades immediately preceding the war, Europe presented the spectacle of a number of capitalistic groups in the several states eagerly competing for investment privileges in the backward countries and dying empires and supported in each case by their respective Foreign Offices. It was the spectacle, in short, of economic or capitalistic competition operating in the guise of political or national competition.

Here was the crux of the situation. The competition of capitalists for franchise privileges within a city or a state, for example, involves no possibility of warlike conflict. The situation is wholly economic. Were it, on the other hand, the custom for each city to back its citizens in their investment ventures in other cities, it is obvious that armed conflicts might easily develop. Thus suppose, for example, a group of Albany citizens to organize for the purpose of capturing the trolley franchises in Hackensack; and a group of Boston citizens to organize for the same purpose. It is quite clear that if the mayor and council of Albany felt it patriotically incumbent upon them to back Albany capitalists,

and with force of arms if need be, war might easily develop between the two cities. As a matter of fact, war has been completely eliminated from the list of possibilities by the simple device of keeping an economic situation wholly free of admixture with political powers and ambitions.

What, however, was peculiarly unfortunate about this situation as it developed in the years preceding the war was that the several nations were engaged in the very questionable business of securing special or monopolistic privileges for their capitalist citizens. Thus France was intent upon monopolizing Morocco for her own capitalist group. Germany was bent likewise upon monopolizing Morocco for her own capitalist group. There was no thought that investment fields should be open to the free competition of capital from all over the world. Each nation, in brief, sought to "corner" certain rich markets for her own investors.

What was curious about the moral attitude of the past decades was that this economic-political situation was accepted almost, if not wholly, without question. Most of us who were busy dreaming about Hague Conferences and disarmament—"*Die Waffen Nieder*"—knew practically nothing about the matter; or if we knew of it, we accepted it—as we accept land-rent and interest nowadays—as part of the necessary mechanism of world development. Within our home lands indeed, we had begun to be peculiarly sensitive to the immorality of economic monopoly and economic special privilege. We had begun to see them for what they were—factors making for the diminution of life possibilities. But of these wider and nationally supported forms of monopolistic special privilege, we saw nothing save that they were ways in which surplus capital was put productively to use in lands beyond our ken. Now and then came tales of the misuse of life—Congo atrocities, Mexican peonage, Putomayo murders, and so on. We roused ourselves for a moment to the human appeal of the situation; but when the human values were recognized, or were said to have been recog-

nized, we lapsed again into our indifference. For the most part, we saw nothing more deeply in need of correction.

I suppose that that day is nearly over. An increasing number of us know that Morocco, Kiaou Chiou, Turkey, Mesopotamia, Syria, Korea, and so on, stand for the attempt of capitalistic groups, supported by the diplomacy of their nations, to monopolize special portions of the earth. And we know particularly that because of such nationally supported monopolization and the competition for it, whole peoples are hypnotized, on various "patriotic" pretexts, into war. We are learning, then, nowadays, to be triply indignant; first, at the principle and the fact of the monopolization itself; second, at its masquerading in patriotic guise; third, at its outcome in wars between whole peoples.[1]

What our awakened moral understanding will demand will be the Open Door so far as all investment enterprise is concerned. Such an Open Door will be secured in the first place by clearly affirming the principle that economic competition of any and all sorts is to be recognized as economic solely, and not political; that the governmental backing of special groups of capitalists is hereafter to be regarded as an intolerable menace to the peace of the world.

And yet we shall not go far if we mean by this simply that the foreign investor is to bear the risks of his investment. The development of backward countries by capitalistic investment is, at the present stage of our economic life, of signal value for the advance of the world. It would be unfair to ask that, in performing this service, the investor bear all the risks that are present in uncivilized or only partly civilized countries.

The solution, unquestionably, lies in the direction of internationalizing the foreign investment situation. We have already developed the type of machinery which is requisite for such an accomplishment. The International

[1] *Cf.* H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold* (London); F. C. Howe, *Why War* (New York); Walter Lippman, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (New York).

Postal Union organizes the interests of postal communication from an international point of view. The International Sanitation Commission organizes the interests of sanitation from an international point of view. It is not in the least utopian to look forward to the creation of an International Trade Commission whose especial function it will be to guarantee three things: (1) that all investment fields are kept freely open to investors all over the world (investment-free-trade, so to speak); (2) that investors are protected against unscrupulous or violent actions on the part of the natives of the countries in which the investments are made; (3) that the natives of these same countries are protected against unscrupulous exploitation on the part of investors.

Such internationalization of the foreign-investment situation would remove the chief and captain of the causes of war. It is important that we realize that the quarrels over the Moroccos and the Algerias, the Mesopotamias and the Turkestans are fundamentally quarrels over economic opportunities. Once the economic opportunities are thoroughly internationalized, the quarrels cease as effectually as they long since have ceased between cities or states within a nation.

We have dwelt at length upon this particular phase of the economic situation because, while perhaps most crucial of all, it is least understood. Of the other phases we may speak more briefly. The principle of "free ports" is becoming so widely accepted and has on the face of it so much in its favor that little argument need be spent in its support. It is perhaps sufficient to point out that the monopolization by any particular group (nation) of so priceless a natural advantage as a harbor is of a piece with all other monopolizations of natural resources, and must sooner or later go the way that they must go. In the case of the monopolization of ports the situation is all the more serious because, by the mere accident of geographical position, certain groups are able effectively to inhibit the life of other groups not so fortunately situated. The ob-

vious solution is the neutralization of all ports access to which is essential to inland peoples.

Finally, the whole logic of recent events points us away from the entire system of nationalistic tariff barriers and discriminations to a system in which, as far as possible, trade shall move freely and uninterruptedly from land to land. There will of course remain the problem of adjusting to each other the different standards of living and occupation in the several countries of the world. Such problems, however, are to be solved internationally, in terms of the real human situation, not, as in the past, in terms of financial greeds masquerading in the garb of "national welfare."

From the point of view of an international ethics, the economic situation, then, would seem to be clear. If the end of life is the fullness of life, a fullness to be attained in large measure by bringing into human use—through production, manufacture and commerce—the potentialities of nature, all devices which in any wise hinder the process of mastering and utilizing nature—tariff walls, monopolies of investments, monopolies of ports, monopolies of raw materials, special privileges of one sort and another, favored nation treaties, etc., are in direct contravention of the fundamental end of life. The principle of the economic Open Door must then be a decisive and continuing moral insight of the future.

II.

The second point of stress was the cultural. Living in a world of plural cultures, the peoples of the world had not adequately known how to adjust themselves to such a situation. The pressure towards a monistic intolerance was constant. In the earlier centuries, this monistic fervor had displayed itself in the overmastering desire to compel all persons upon whom a group could lay its hands to believe in that group's particular god in that group's particular way. In the years preceding the war, it had displayed itself in the overmastering desire to compel all persons

upon whom a national group could lay its hands to speak that nation's language and to wear that nation's particular garb of social and political institutions. The various national groups were all, in a measure, alike in this. We in America, for example, had felt ourselves ordained of history to bring trousers and baseball and the American school text-book to the natives of the Philippine Islands. The Russian autocracy had felt equally called upon, in the name of Christian civilization, to induce the wretched Jew to leave his wretched ways. The Turk had looked pityingly upon the unmohammedanized Armenian; the Englishman upon the unsanitary Hindoo. The German had set himself, with all the conscientious pedantry and bureaucratic inflexibility of a professor in uniform, to woo the Pole and the Alsatian to the supposedly more civilized ways of the Fatherland.

It is a question, of course, just how unpolluted, in all these cases, the motives were. One suspects that the "cleaning up" of the Hindoo was more than an object of æsthetic rapture to the Englishman; that the trousering of the Filipino was not unconnected with thoughts of American world trade; precisely as the introduction of teutonic gutturals into the schools of Alsace and Lorraine was not altogether distantly related to iron ore and coal deposits. Indeed, the economic we have with us always, even while we are most piously unburdening ourselves at the shrine of civilization!

And yet there is no doubt that there was in the motives a sincere desire to grant to civilizations that were really (or were supposed to be) less mature a measure of culture and scientific mastery that were actually beneficial. Unfortunately, however, this true quality in the motives was overlain with other qualities less admirable, and in particular with the invincible egotism which seems to infect all strong political groups, the group egotism, I mean, which believes its own way of life to be the truly superior one. The Britisher is fully as strong in his persuasion that he is the authentic bearer of the white man's burden as is

the German in his conviction that *Deutschtum* is to be the salvation of the world. Nor is the American distinguished in this respect by a large sense of modesty. If it is suggested to the American that the Filipino civilization, being ethnologically nearer the Japanese than the American, should be developed by the energetic and resourceful Nipponese, he flames up with outraged patriotism.

Apparently the truth of the situation lies not in the *laissez faire* extreme of permitting each group to live its life in what manner, good or bad, it will. Undoubtedly there are backward civilizations that need the helping hand of more mature civilizations. But with equal certainty the truth does not lie in the other extreme of permitting each group, strong in its own conceit, and strong enough to impose its egotistic will upon other groups, to play the self-imposed part of civilizer of the world. The truth of the situation lies rather in the recognition that civilization standards must somehow be internationalized standards. England has much to offer to backward countries; so have France, Germany, America. And doubtless—perhaps even more so—so have the militarily weak nations, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Norway, and others.

Here, doubtless, will be the fundamental task and the really novel opportunity of a world league of nations. Where an international Council of Conciliation, say, sitting in permanent session, is composed of Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, Belgians, Chinese, Japanese, Swiss, Dutch, Brazilians, Mexicans, and so on, there will be hope at last that the problem of backward civilizations will be approached from a point of view that is international. There will be hope that the imposition of civilization standards will be the imposition not of standards—like language, clothing, social customs, and so on, that are particularistic and localistic, but of standards, like sanitation, security, justice, education, that are universal in their scope and validity. The task of an international league of states, in short, will be to see to it that in each backward country there is such social and technical organization that orderly

opportunity is given for the development of the group's inherent genius.

This more generous attitude has already found its expression in the widely repeated slogan: the free development of all nationalities. One may venture to believe that the slogan is too exclusively political in its expression, implying, as it does, that free development may properly obtain only where there is a separate and independent political life. It should rather read: the free or autonomous development of all groups. It should not be necessary that the Russian Jew construct for himself a new Zion in order that freedom of development for his group be realized; or that the Finns be a separate nation, or the Irish, or the Alsatians. In fact, the tendency is doubtless away from independent, sovereign nationalities. It should be enough that throughout the world there is no group existing which, for any reason whatever, suffers political, civil, educational, social, or religious disabilities; no group which is compelled, in despite of its immanent genius, to adapt itself to ways of life and standards other than its own.[2]

Doubtless our still partly civilized world has far to go before such a generous pluralism of life is realized; but it has already gone a far distance in reaching, as in large measure it has, the conviction of free development above expressed. This, again, is an expression of the Open Door principle—the open door to all group possibilities, to the intimate genius of the group, its insights and loyalties. It is the repudiation of our group conceits, our moral monopolies, our cultural interlocking directorates, our fervid convictions of missions to make the world over according to our own particular *Kultur*. It is a free scope for all authentic life.[3]

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[1] *Cf.* Hobson, J. A., *Towards International Government*, pp. 123 *seq.*

[2] Brailsford has summed the matter up concisely in one of the articles which he proposes for his League of Nations: "The signatory powers, convinced that the interests of peace require the free cultural development, irrespective of political allegiance, of all the races of Europe, hereby declare that they will not, in their European territories, impose any political or civil disabilities,

A further expression of this attitude is the conviction which, among us in America at least, has assumed the character of a social axiom, the conviction, namely, that the conquest of any people or land is fundamentally unjustified. Defense—that we can still tolerate. But forcible aggression, for the sake of taking lands or peoples to a nation's self, that is henceforth to have no place within the world of decent human relations.

All this of which we have been speaking as the outcome of the three and a half years of war is indeed but part of a large, typical movement of modern times, the movement to liberate life. It is of a piece with the earlier, more quietly conducted movements for free education, for the liberation of the child worker, for the removal of occupational and political disabilities of women, for the elimination of commercial prostitution, for the protection of the laborer and the enhancement of his status, for the self government of dependencies. It marks but another stage, in short, in the emergence of a generous, democratic belief in all life and a willingness to guard it against the oppressions and suppressions of the still lingering despotisms of the world.

III.

So much for the economic and the cultural points of stress. The third point of stress which we indicated was the political. Perhaps the most striking characteristic

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on the ground of race or religion; and farther, that in their European territories they will accord to every race reasonable facilities and rights for the use of its language, for the development of schools in which the language is the chief medium of instruction, for every form of association consistent with the order of the State, and for free exercise of its religion." (*League of Nations*, p. 130.)

Brailsford speaks here only of European peoples; but obviously, however difficult the actual administration may be, the principle must be applied to all groups throughout the world. If, for example, there is to be an economic development of the backward places of the world, such development must not spell tragedy for the inhabitants thereof; if, as is doubtless true, peoples are still to be held in tutelage, the tutelage must not mean the superposition of an alien culture, but simply the organization of an orderly opportunity for the development of the inherent group traits.

of nineteenth and early twentieth century states was the claim which each made to a finality of rights and powers. Each was a sovereign state, a kingly power, as it were, indivisible and imprescriptible. Now it is obvious that where the life of each state is a completely enclosed whole, where there are no influences and interests passing from state to state, such a plurality of sovereignties is wholly conceivable. Where, on the other hand, states interpenetrate, where vital social factors—commercial, industrial, scientific, artistic—overleap national boundaries, such a plurality of sovereignties not only goes counter to the truth of the situation but involves an endless clash of jurisdictions.

As a matter of fact, the theory of the sovereign state had its inception in the days when, with practically no intercommunication and intertransportation, states were to all intents and purposes, selfcontained wholes. But as we are well aware, the period of such strictly national economy is long since past. We live to-day in a period of international economy. States are, in literal fact, and in all kinds of ways, dependent upon each other. For a state to presume to live an isolated life and to manage its affairs in terms of its internal powers, would be for that state to eliminate itself from the course of civilized advance. Certain factors in the life of peoples, indeed, have shown themselves to be so typically international, that states, despite their jealously maintained theory, have been compelled to depart from their independence of sovereignty and to unite in a supernational community of jurisdiction.

Postal service is a case in point. A person in England wishes to communicate with a person in Rumania. His letter must pass through a half dozen sovereign territories before it reaches its destination. How intolerable the situation was when, in each country, the postal service was a separate independency, operating as to rules, rates, etc., in entire indifference to all other postal independencies, is easily conceivable. It was not a utopian dream then that established the International Postal Union. It was

the recognition of a sheer fact, the fact, namely, that communication is a function which, in its nature, is inevitably international. Sooner or later this fact would have had to be recognized. Sooner or later the independent sovereign states would have had to realize that here was a function in the life of all of them which required a jurisdiction above their separate jurisdictions, the jurisdiction, namely, of all of them, in federated union.

The same is true of health and sanitation. A ship from Hong Kong lands at San Francisco with bubonic rats in its hold. Not all the elaborated theories of the political scientists as to the sovereign independence of the United States will prevent those same rats from escaping to land and infecting sovereign Americans with their disease. That diseases are communicable is, in short, a fact which overleaps all artificial or natural boundaries of states and demands an administration supernational in power and comprehension. The International Sanitary Union is such a supernational administration, and in so far, is, like the Postal Union, a living witness to the fact that national states can in nowise be regarded as final in their jurisdictions.

One might run through the list of the international jurisdictions that have grown up out of the very necessities of the case: the International Telegraphic Union; the International Radiographic Union; the International Union of Railway Freight Transportation; the International Automobile Conference; the International Association of Navigation Congresses; the International Metric Union; the Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs; the International Opium Commission; the International Fisheries Police; the International Conference for the Repression of the White Slave Trade, and so on. The list is too long to set down here in its completeness.[4] What one realizes as one glances over such a list is that the matters in concern are each and all matters that, by the very necessity of the

[4] *Cf.* Reinsch, P. S., *Public International Unions* (Boston); Woolf, L. S., *International Government* (New York); La Fontaine, Henri, *The Great Solution*, chap. v. (Boston).

situation, require an international administration. And as one realizes that the above international unions and others are, or before the war were, successfully operating, one realizes how utterly antiquated and barren is the political theory of the "sovereign" state.

To-day a further extension of the development above indicated is in process. Each of the above international unions or commissions, it will be noted, deals with a specific matter that is international in character. Each matter is of a kind that involves conflicts of interest—often very serious conflicts of interest—between states. In each case there is provided, very specifically, the permanent body whose function it is to adjust conflicts of interest. Now there are types of matters which are clearly international in character and which frequently involve serious conflicts of interest between states which nevertheless have not yet been provided with an adjusting body, permanent in character and with specifically defined powers of decision and administration. One such matter, for example, is the interpretation of treaties. A treaty is a bilateral or multilateral affair. Obviously the interpretation of a treaty can no more be left to each of the states in question than the interpretation of a contract can, in civil law, be left to each party to the contract. The function of treaty interpretation must, by its very nature, be supernational. In a timid way, such a supernational interpretative body had been developed before the war in the Hague Court. But, effective as this tribunal was in a great many cases, it failed in the crucial events, because its function was not recognized as one which states were under solemn obligation to recognize and employ.

Doubtless the great advance which will be made after this war will be the frank recognition on all hands that such matters as the following: the interpretation of treaties; the responsibility for acts occasioning loss to other states; boundary rights; reparation for injuries done by the citizens of one state upon the citizens of another; recovery of contract claims by one state from another—justiciable

matters, in short—require a supernational body for adjudication and that reference to such a body shall be compulsory on the part of every state in the world.

Again, there are non-justiciable matters that are essentially international in character, issues, for example, that affect the territorial integrity of nations; that affect their "honor," welfare, growth, expansion,—issues, in short, like that of Alsace and Lorraine, Italy and the Trentino, Serbia and the Adriatic, and so on. They are the type of issues that are continually arising in this changing world of ours and that are the most constant source of the irritations that eventuate in war. Obviously again they are issues which by their very nature demand a supernational body of inquiry and adjustment—not, in this case, a Court, but rather a Council of Inquiry and Conciliation, an international body, in short, whose permanent function it shall be, first, to be alive to all conditions and controversies which threaten to endanger the friendly relations between states; and second, by all amicable methods, to bring about their adjustment. Here, too, as in the case of the International Court, the submission, to say the least, of all matters in dispute will be an obligation upon the nations of the world. Should such a Council be established and also such a Court as above mentioned, there will then be two new international administrative bodies to take their place by the side of the Postal Union, the Sanitary Commission, and so on; and the states, in their turn, will just in so far recognize and give effect to a specific limitation upon their sovereign independence of action.

In view of all this, then, we are enabled nowadays to take a bit less seriously the doctrine of "sovereignty." Mankind will not much longer suffer itself to be checked and hindered in its international growth by this antiquated theory of the "repellent individualism"[5] of states. A state is not, Hegelianwise, the last word of the spirit. It is but a member of the larger human community, and as

[5] Brailsford's phrase. See also Burns, C. D., *The Morality of Nations*, p. 111 (London).

such has co-operative obligations and obediences as truly as rights and powers.[6]

Perhaps I speak too precipitately. There are still diplomatists and near-statesmen among us, who, like the gibbering sprites of Homer, talk of ancient things forgotten. They will indeed hinder in some measure the formation of a collective or federated will of the nations; but they will be as helpless as old King Canute to stem the tide of new moral realization which is sweeping in upon our older individualistic political thought.[7]

With the doctrine of sovereignty there was bound up, in moral logic, the doctrine of neutrality. If nations are "repellent individuals," they have a perfect right to pronounce whether they will or will not suffer themselves to be their brother's keeper. They have a perfect right, in short, to agree with Lucretius: "It is sweet, when on the great sea the winds trouble the waters, to behold from land another's distress; not that it is a pleasure and delight that any should be afflicted, but because it is sweet to see from what evils you yourself are exempt." With the coming into its own of the doctrine that all nations are fundamentally interrelated, no such attitude of neutrality is longer possible. The doctrine of neutrality, then, goes into the discard, making room for the ethically more tolerable doctrine of a common responsibility.

In all this, it is again the philosophy of the Open Door which is the animating spirit. There must be no barriers set up by this group and that which hinder the free circulation and the free development of life. There must be no exclusive group rights and prerogatives; no irresponsibilities unique and unreachable. The state is to be

[6] *Cf.* McIver, R. M., *Community, A Sociological Study*, p. 28 (Macmillan). It is not true, in other words, as Alpheus Snow has recently expressed it, that "the only limitation that can be placed upon a State is self-limitation" (*International Legislation and Administration* in *The Foreign Relations of the United States:* Academy of Political Science). That is but the shadow of the old fetish falling darkly upon our reason. The state is subject to the limitations placed upon it by the will of a collective humanity.

[7] *Cf.* Duguit, L., *Les transformations du lois publique; passim.*

the servant, not the master of life; and the states in their co-operative fellowship are to be ministers to a common welfare. At last, in short, after ages of experimentation, the idea begins to dawn in politics, that the fundamental welfare of each state is indisseverably bound up with the free co-operative fellowship of all.

IV.

We have reviewed three points of stress between nations —the economic, the cultural and the political. The fourth point of stress I have called, for want of a better term, the temperamental. The word of condemnation to-day is for Prussianism. By Prussianism we understand a temper, an attitude, a way of regarding things and of getting things accomplished. It is the temper which is the opposite of the urbane, the conciliative, the generous. It is the attitude of arrogant superiority, which accomplishes its ends drastically, with a brutal frankness, with an unconcealed scorn of the weak and the supposedly inferior. It is the temper which scoffs at kindliness and consideration as emotions that belong to a degenerate humanitarianism. It is all for *Macht und Tüchtigkeit*, for the "iron" virtues, the virtues of the "unbending soul." It believes in the refreshing, soul strengthening joy of hatred (*Schadenfreude*).

I am not sure that Boutroux is correct when he reports[8] that the German language has no equivalent for *générosité*, as the French has no equivalent for *Schadenfreude*. None the less, it is true that among the Prussian people (and Prussia has directed the character education of Germany) group generosity, the spirit of mutual give and take, of sympathetic live and let live among the nations is far less in evidence than the spirit of arrogant national self-assertion, of blustering self-commendation, of threats and suspicions and hatred. Above all, in its national ideals, Prussianism is the attitude bred of the belief that a nation, to gain for itself, must take it out of other nations or groups. It has no conception of that finer, and, in the long run, more

[8] Emile Boutroux, *Philosophy and War* (New York).

successful way of national life, which gains for itself in and through the gain of others. Prussianism, therefore, is the rule of drastic might; the rule of "blood and iron." It develops the military skills as the skills which, in highest measure, are meet for a virile nation.

It is true indeed that not all Prussianism is in Prussia. We are growing the habit of detecting Prussianism in all sorts of places—in the business office, in the school, in the college, in the family, on public boards, in the seats of various authority. We are learning to detect the temperament that compels, that forces, that "lays down the law," that is regardless of personal consequences, that holds to its own superior wisdom, that suffers no criticism, that allows for no free development in others, that is drastic and *schnarrend*. We are learning to contrast with it the temperament that attracts, that persuades, that enlists co-operation, that gives large freedom, that believes itself fallible, that encourages independence of judgment and action.

Our ethical systems since the Reformation have laid large stress upon duty as the cornerstone of the ethical life. It is a question whether the war will not once and for all have changed the point of emphasis, taking us back at once to a more pagan point of view, and forward to a point of view more really Christian. We have the astounding spectacle of a whole people profoundly and indeed heroically actuated by a sense of duty and yet making itself intolerable in the society of nations. It is a question whether our future ethics will not lay far more stress than ever before upon the qualities which enable persons to "get across" to each other, the "clubbable," the "sportsmanlike" qualities. Our moral principles, in short, have had altogether too much of the dull gray and the forbidding black of the Puritan scheme of life. It may be that the war will have brought us to value more nearly at their real worth the qualities which have their root not so much in duty as in creative joy; not so much in a literal justice as in generosity; not so much in self-sacrifice as in the give and take of sympathetic co-operation. For the latter are the democratic

qualities. The world that is fighting for democracy must in the end be fighting for the livable and the lovable qualities that make a democratic community of life possible.

But our insight goes even farther. It is beginning slowly to dawn upon us that Prussianism is but the more spectacular, more dramatically terrible expression of an evil that has long been with us. Both—Prussianism and "profiteering"—are ways of life that are ruthless in their suppressions, ruthless in their seeking of their own ends at the expense of victims. Both work with the instruments of force. Both are antagonistic to free and generous co-operation. Both strive for monopolization of privilege by the pitiless elimination of rivals. *Spurlos versenkt* is a phrase that has its sinister reality in the field of competitive business as truly as in the murderous field of Prussian diplomacy.

Apparently the fight to-day is not only a fight between nations. It is already beginning visibly to cut across national boundaries. The Russian Revolution, which, from its beginning, was economic in its character—and particularly the Bolshevist development of the Revolution; the rise to clear and even threatening expression of the British Labor Party; the rumblings of labor discontent in Italy; the increasingly serious labor crises in Germany and Austria, seem to point to the fact that a new type of cleavage is being established. It is the cleavage between owners and productive workers. Apparently the time is approaching—the war, in a measure, still operates to confuse this issue—when a new type of rulership is to be established. Social rulership in the past and the present, has, in the main, been based upon property. The social rulership of the future, apparently, is to be based upon productivity.[1]

This, one may readily believe, is to be the next real advance in the world. The economics of the nineteenth

[1] Note the significant statements to this effect recently made by Mr. Schwab and President Eliot. See also the striking book by Charles Ferguson, *The Great News* (Kennerley)—published in England under the more informing title *Creative Finance*.

century was indeed an economics of enterprise, but it was also an economics of parasitism. For all that it glorified and encouraged new productive activity, for all that it brought to the front energetic and resourceful captains of industry, it permitted, in the first place, the landholder to remain; it permitted him—non-productive in his land-holding capacity—to take toll of productive industry; it permitted him, so that he might secure for himself an even greater toll, to keep his lands out of productive use. Again, it permitted the capitalist speculator to flourish, the man who, non-productive in that capacity, made a generous livelihood out of the manipulation of the symbols of other men's production. Again, it developed the monopolizer, the interlocking director, the secret rebater, the wage slaver, the sweatshop driver, the hirer of children—one and all men who gained their financial rewards not by the productive energy which they put into life but by the productive energy which they were clever enough to take out of the lives of others.

Feudalism passed out not only because it was inhuman, but because it was economically a failure. The capitalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, one may readily believe, is itself on the point of passing out, not simply because it is, in large measure, inhuman, but because, in a very real sense, it too is an economic failure. It is too heavily loaded with the non-productive taker of toll to live vigorously into a successful future. The economics of the future, when it comes to its own, will doubtless be an economics of the workers solely, the workers with brain and with brawn. Such, at any rate, would seem to be the pointing of these ominous stirrings in the ranks of labor all over the world.[10]

[10] "The Labor Party refuses absolutely to believe that the British people will permanently tolerate any reconstruction or perpetuation of the disorganization, waste and inefficiency involved in the abandonment of British industry to a jostling crowd of separate private employers, with their minds bent, not on the service of the community, but—by the very law of their being—only on the utmost possible profiteering." A Report on Reconstruction by the Sub Committee of the British Labor Party. Published in the *New Republic*, Feb. 16, 1918.

V.

Let us now draw the threads together. The ethics of a truly reconstructed world of nations must, if we judge aright, be the ethics of the Open Door—the ethics, first, of the economic Open Door as between nations, of free trade, free markets, free investment opportunities; it must, in the second place, be the ethics of the cultural Open Door as between nations and groups within nations, the ethics, in short, of free development of all authentic life in the light of standards increasingly internationalized; in the third place, it must be the ethics of the political Open Door, the recognition, in short, that there is a jurisdiction above that of the separate states, that jealous independence is to give way to a generous and effective leaguing of nations in co-operative rights and obligations; finally, it must be the ethics of the Open Door so far as all use and abuse of life is concerned. It must be the ethics of a frank willingness to let all life, big and little, have its full opportunity of productive satisfaction.

Something of all this, one may firmly believe, will be realized as the immediate outcome of the war. However far removed and difficult the fuller accomplishment may be, it is certain that that way lies the hope of a sanely reconstructed world.

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONALISM.[1]

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT.

THE air continues to be full of projects for the prevention of future wars. All advocates of such plans are convinced that some closer union of nations is requisite, for the future, than in the past has been effected through the imperfect co-operation of the "concert of Europe" under the leadership of the "great powers," for the maintenance of the "balance of power." President Wilson insists that within the program of the world's peace must be included "a general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike";[2] while Mr. Lloyd-George seems to go somewhat further in saying that one of the "three conditions of a just and lasting peace" for which the British are fighting is "the creation of an international organization to limit armaments and diminish the probability of war."[3] It seems now to be generally assumed, with the Hague court as a precedent, that some sort of court or tribunal will adjudicate disputes between nations, and that a league of national governments will enforce its decisions through military and naval power. What President Eliot said of Europe three years ago perhaps most of us to-day would agree is true of the world as a whole, now that a general European war had been seen to involve all the continents of the earth: "There can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation of the European states is established, capable of making public contracts intended to be kept, and backed by an overwhelming international force subject to the order

[1] An earlier draft of this paper was read at a session of the American Philosophical Association at Princeton last December. In revision the writer has tried to make his main thesis clearer by adapting his exposition to the general drift of thought that prevailed there, as well as to the course of current events.

[2] Address to Congress, January 8, 1918.

[3] Address delivered on January 5, 1918.

of an international tribunal."[4] Some proposals go further yet, and include boards of conciliation for the settlement of misunderstandings and non-justiciable disputes, while sometimes an international legislature is also proposed. All would probably agree that the ultimate ideal would be a complete international government, with full executive, legislative, and judicial functions, that would include within its scope the furtherance of all common interests that could not so well be conserved by national governments. Proposals for the immediate future go as far in the direction of this ultimate goal as is now thought to be practicable. However modest or however radical, all such proposals contemplate some kind of league or federation of nations that will afford a larger international justice; and it is usually recognized that this justice may at times, at least at first, have to be enforced upon a recalcitrant nation by military and naval power. To recognize this last implies that the federation must stand for lofty moral ideals that will so completely win the devotion of individual human citizens of all nations within the league that they will joyfully support it in times of peril, and even be willing to lay down their lives in its defence if necessary. In other words, the federation, no matter how limited or how extensive its scope, will require for its support sanctions similar to those now possessed by national governments.

It will be the chief business of this paper to consider what moral values must be included within the conception of such a federation, or association, or organization, or league, or alliance,—call it what one will—in order to induce men first to bring it into existence and afterwards to give it their loyal support. Other ethical and psychological considerations bearing on this problem will also be noticed.

One of the favorite arguments used to show the feasibility of an international justice enforced by a federation is to point out the manner in which local group morality has gradually given place to national law and justice. All disputes of any moment have passed within the jurisdiction

[4] C. W. Eliot, "*The Road Toward Peace*," p. 160.

of law courts, and no place has been left for private vengeance, blood feuds and duels. While law and justice have thus developed intensively, they have also developed extensively. Small local communities have united with one another into large nations, so that the individual citizens of each local community have justice assured to them throughout the entire land, while the rights of local governments are similarly made secure. It is merely necessary, it is urged, to carry this evolution a single step further in order to form an international federation. The argument, as thus far stated, appears to be sound. But those who advance it often seem to labor under the delusions of the "social contract" theory. For they go on to assume that to bring an international federation or league into existence and to assure its permanence, all that would be needful would be for representatives from the present national governments to assemble, and to draw up a set of treaties as a result of mutual bargaining, much in the manner that consolidations and gentlemen's agreements are formed in the modern business world. Past social evolution has gone on in no such simple and rationalistic fashion as this.

In the past, durable peace has been effected through the union of previously conflicting groups in one of two ways. (1) In the majority of cases, a union has first been achieved through forcible conquest, and later a sentiment favorable to the established order has come to the permanent support of the union. (2) In other instances, a strong sentiment was originally common to separate groups, and later led them voluntarily to seek organic union. In any event the permanent psychological support of union was a sentiment. The difference is one of priority: either force came first, and, wisely used, was successful in evoking a sentiment; or the sentiment came first, and later embodied itself in institutions.

The first type of union mentioned, the outcome of wars and conquests, has been very common. One group or nation conquered its neighbors and made them subject to its law. Later, this force became transmuted into moral

authority. This has happened again and again in the savage world and among historical civilizations. The Romans began by forcing the nations of the ancient world to submit to them, and, as their rule became more just, it gained universal respect, and the subjugated nations learned to appreciate the blessings of the *pax Romana*. Ultimately they were permitted to share in what remained of Roman citizenship. In a similar way large portions of the human race, including even the recently conquered Boers, have come to respect a *pax Brittanica*, and to be loyal to British rule. Our own government of the Philippines is another instance. Beginning with force, it has been considerate and just, and we hope that it has won the respect, if not yet the affection, of the native population. In a more brutal manner, and with less though considerable success (as German solidity in the present war testifies), Bismarck effected through blood and iron the federal union of the present German empire under Prussian domination.

An international federation effected through force of this character could at the present time be brought about only though a complete German victory in this, and perhaps several future wars. A frank pan-German might urge upon us the desirability of such an outcome in words like these: "You really ought to allow the marvellously organized Prussian military power to conquer the world and impart to all nations the blessings of a *pax Germanica*. With Prussians and their allies in mastery of the world, all other nations of course would be disarmed, and there could be no more wars. The Kaiser's law and the Kaiser's peace would then bring happiness to all nations, and the hymn of the angels, the *Gloria in Excelsis*, would become a reality. German physical might would be exercised as a just moral authority. The Imperial Supreme Court at Leipzig would render justice to the entire earth; and, as Roman jurists made real in actual law the conception of a universal Logos of which Stoic philosophers had been dreaming, so would German judges interpret and the Kaiser would put into actual force the international law

of the future. If not you, at least your descendants, properly educated in Prussianized schools, would learn to recognize and to revere the divine Idea manifest in the Teutonic government of the world."

It is hardly necessary to reply to our pan-Germanist. Like his compatriots who tried to win our sympathy for Germany three years ago and only succeeded in relieving us of our last doubts as to the complete justice of the Entente cause, he would fail to comprehend our point of view, and he would marvel at our perverse stupidity in not being convinced by his arguments.

Since, therefore, we should not desire an international federation effected in the first instance by force, only the second alternative lies open to us. A strong sentiment for an international federation must be developed among the existing nations of the world that will lead them into a voluntary union. Federations of this kind, though rarer, have come into existence in stages of development as diverse as those represented by the League of the Iroquois and our own United States of America. The prerequisite to such a federation, if it is to be more durable than a temporary coalition, is, that some deep tie must bind together the federated groups or states. On one plane of development the connecting tie might be totemism, with all its sacred meaning and mystery to the savage mind; and on a higher plane it might be a common language and traditions, and the fresh memory of a heroic struggle for liberty against a tyrannical mother country. Perhaps we may hope that after the present war the memory of a united struggle to make the world safe for democracy will furnish the basis for the ultimate development of such a sentiment.

In order to convince every one of its desirability, the common good to be achieved through internationalism would need to be comprehensive, and to embody a wealth of human values. It is doubtful whether it would suffice, even for a beginning, to make the bond of union between nations consist merely of a sort of international law court to settle disputes and so to prevent wars. The de-

cisions of such a court would have to be enforced by a league of nations. It would be hard to induce citizens of democratic states to lay down their lives to enforce the decisions of a bench of black-gowned judges upon abstract points of international law. The league would be surer of the loyal support of citizens if it were known to be affirming the rights of every nation, and of every individual in every nation, to larger and fuller lives of freedom and opportunity in a variety of directions. It would need to be clear, as a minimum, that through its membership in the league or federation every mature nation would be assured autonomy, the inviolability of its territory, and the respect of every other nation for its rights according to international law. The federation would then be clearly seen not to be usurping but to be making secure the rights now enjoyed by each individual nation. As an ultimate ideal, though not completely attainable in the immediate future, the federation would affirm the rights of the citizens of every nation to travel, to reside, and to transact business in every other country upon the same terms as the native citizens. Foreign capitalists would not be permitted to exploit a backward country while pretending to develop it; and, on the other hand, their legitimate investments would obtain international protection. An internationalism that would thus render honest development of backward countries attractive to reputable capitalists, who seek fair but not speculative returns, would confer a boon upon creditor and debtor nations alike. Internationalism should prevent all banking and transportation companies from showing the least favor to citizens of one country in preference to those of another. It should render impossible such things as "commercial wars" between countries, tariffs showing preferences for "most favored nations," and special privileges of any kind for citizens of a particular country in the territory of another country. Ultimately all national tariff barriers should be wiped out altogether, though it may be long before this can be achieved. The principle of the "open door," which our government has

claimed for China, should at once apply to all countries, both those that are independent and those that are colonies.

In numerous other ways, such as the promotion of scientific research, of the fine arts and humanities, and the diffusion of education, the international federation could carry on valuable projects too vast for individual nations to undertake. The conception of the international federation as formulated by its advocates should be made to include so many goods that every citizen of every country may be led to perceive its desirability, and to realize that if it were in existence the benefits that he would personally receive from it would be as numerous and as tangible as those that he now enjoys from his local and national governments. If possible, everyone should be brought to understand these possibilities during our lifetime. The sooner everyone comes to desire such an international federation, the more quickly its advent will be hastened.

It is to be emphasized that the federation as here conceived in no way would supplant or diminish the importance of existing national governments. On the contrary, it would be an effective instrument for assuring the well being and dignity of them. Through internationalism the legitimate aspirations of nationalism would be more fully achieved and fulfilled. Such a federation, once formed, would do much to raise the plane of national ethics. Each nation would have to respect the rights of other nations. National egotism and jingoism would appear absurd. Each nation would desire the esteem of other nations and be ashamed to break its plighted word, or to engage in a predatory imperialism at the expense of other nations.

On the other hand, no nation could selfishly refuse to assume its share of the white man's burden. For one serious obstacle to the full realization of an internationalism in which each nation would have equal rights with all others, in regard to freedom of trade, travel, emigration and immigration, is that at the present time not all nations are upon an equal level of intelligence and culture. For instance,

a coolie immigration to our Pacific coast in unrestricted numbers at the present time, or in the near future, would be a disaster to the progress of civilization in this hemisphere. To make practicable the incorporation of principles of equality in international law, like equality in intellectual and moral development must first have become an approximate fact. It is therefore the duty of the great nations to assume responsibility for the educational and economic development of backward portions of the earth, in order that the world can become prepared for an internationalism based upon the principle of equal political, social, and economic opportunities for all men. In choosing to live to itself, and selfishly refusing to accept its responsibilities, an anti-imperialistic nation might be guilty of a sin of omission only less culpable than the overt acts of an unscrupulously imperialistic nation that misused its opportunities for service in the advancement of humanity.[5]

In order to bring such a federation into existence and to assure its success and permanence it would not be enough for national governments and individual citizens to become intellectually convinced of its desirability for such reasons as have been mentioned. Still more would be necessary. The federation would require the support of a *sentiment* comparable to the patriotism now felt by the citizens for their respective nations. In the sense here intended, a "sentiment" is a permanent organization of instincts, emotions and other impulses about a definite

[5] Separate nations, in time no doubt, would be relieved of some duties that could better be performed by an international government, once the latter had achieved sufficient strength, stability, experience and general competence. *E.g.*, the international federation, if it were now in existence and had won general confidence, might be able to relieve us of the risks and expense involved in maintaining the security of the Philippines, and a stable government in Cuba. It could, with less offence than we, intervene in Mexico, if it should ever become necessary, and perhaps without intervention it might be able to assist the Mexicans to develop their natural resources and to achieve a government that would be just alike to foreigners and to the various classes of the native population. Until the advent of such a time, however, each of the "great powers," including our own, must do what it can in an honorable way to promote the advance of civilization among its more backward neighbors.

object. Love is such a sentiment. Its core, I believe, consists in tenderness habitually felt for some definite object —a wife, a child, a parent are the instances that first occur to one. Love may also be felt for truth, liberty, justice, science, God. These last objects may appear to be abstractions to the outsider, but they are vivid and concrete realities to the holder of the sentiment, and he may be ready to sacrifice his life for one of them. Not only does he habitually feel tenderness toward them, but he is angry when they are attacked, fearful when they are endangered, joyful when they prosper, self-satisfied when they are praised, ashamed when they deserve condemnation, and so on. The objects to which his stronger sentiments are attached are the greatest values in a person's life. Patriotism is such a sentiment; its core is a union of love and respect for one's nation and country. One loves and reveres his country—its people and its soil, its history and its ideals, its great heroes and its achievements, its songs and its flag.

Can a sentiment analogous to patriotism be developed for an international federation not yet in existence so strong that the common will of mankind will bring it into being? Can men be taught to feel toward humanity emotions similar to those which they now feel to those of their own kin and nation, so that they will desire some sort of organic union of the entire human race? A man upon whom I once urged the desirability of such consummation replied: "But you can't expect people to develop any particular affection for the solar system!" Well, perhaps many people to-day find it as difficult, almost, to feel emotion for the human race as for the solar system, and it will undoubtedly take a long time to foster and develop a sentimental love of humanity. But it is by no means impossible.

To be sure we are still a long way from it. As yet we do not even possess an international flag (if we except the wholly undesirable red flag of anarchists and socialists), nor have we any really suitable international songs. We should choose an international flag, and accustom ourselves to display it together with our national flag upon all

public occasions. There should be international songs dedicated to humanity, and every child should be taught to sing them. A holiday once a year should be celebrated in honor of humanity, for the fostering of international sentiment. All nations should celebrate this holiday simultaneously. One side of every coin should bear a design of Humanity. The reverse side would be sufficient for the emblem of the particular nation. Statues of Humanity should be familiar objects in all our large cities and public parks. Auguste Comte devised a calendar with each day in the year dedicated to the memory of some hero who has notably served humanity. It would be well to familiarize ourselves with such a calendar, and for the newpapers every morning to remind us whom the day commemorates. In every way possible concrete imagery must become associated with internationalism, if the latter is to become the object of a deep sentiment.[6]

Two influences in the direction of internationalism and the recognition of humanity are familiar to all of us. What progress has thus far been made in the recognition of humanity has been largely due to them. I refer to religion and to socialism.

All of the great spiritual religions have expanded beyond national and racial boundaries and have acknowledged a mission to all human beings. Christianity is a noteworthy instance. Its enthusiasm as a missionary religion and its emphasis upon the brotherhood of man are in evidence. So far as Christianity has failed in its attempted universalism, this has been due to several reasons, none of which is essential to its fundamental nature. In the case of Protestant and Eastern churches Christianity has been broken up into segments, none of which has stretched beyond national boundaries. It has therefore been easy for these confessions in times of national conflict to lapse into heno-

[6] International athletic and literary contests, like the ancient Olympic games, should come in time to attract general attention, and to make a universal appeal. They would thus help to promote mutual respect and good will, and to provide "a moral equivalent for war" as a means for the expression of national rivalries.

theism. The Church of Rome has remained international in its scope, but it has lost prestige through anti-clerical movements and for other reasons. In all of its forms organized Christianity has been too closely identified with the interests of certain classes of society, either the middle classes or the aristocracy, and so it has failed to appreciate the struggles of the humbler classes for an economic justice fundamental in their case to afford social and moral freedom and opportunity. Besides all this an "otherworldliness" still persists to some extent, and there is too much absorption in church activities of little ethical worth, and not enough attention to social and moral values of greater moment for the world in which we are living. The remedy for this "otherworldliness" would be found, if Christian workers would study sympathetically the "religion of humanity" of Auguste Comte, and adopt his enthusiasm for humanity, as it is and may become in *this* world. And for organized Christianity to eliminate all the defects I have mentioned it would merely need to concern itself with the problems of our time in the spirit of complete devotion to humanity shown by Jesus Christ in his time. And, notwithstanding all its limitations in the past, Christianity in all of its branches seems to me to deserve the credit for having done more than any other single agency to inculcate in men a sentiment for humanity. We may expect this to continue to be true of it in the future.

The other noteworthy influence in the direction of internationalism that requires to be noticed is socialism. It, too, has spread beyond national boundaries and linked men of different countries with common aspirations. It has even had an international flag and international songs. Its failures seem to me to have been chiefly two. First, it has identified itself too exclusively with a single class, the proletariat. It has often preached a "class war" against the rest of humanity. Its ideal has not been concrete and inclusive. In the second place, and as a consequence, socialistic internationalism has been thought to be antagonistic to national patriotism. It is to the credit of

the socialists that in the present war (with the deplorable exception of those in Russia) they have been patriotic, and have realized that, despite class conflicts, their fundamental loyalty is to a common good which they share with the other classes of their respective nations.[7] Socialists in the future will surely come to realize that the object of national socialism must be a synthesis of the goods of *all* classes within a nation, and that a genuine international socialism must in like manner be a synthesis of all national goods in a larger whole. Socialists will then find that their national and international ideals are in complete agreement. They will then be able to be of substantial service in the promotion of the cause of internationalism as here conceived.

The first step to the cultivation of international ideals and sentiments is to win the present war. During the progress of the war the consciousness of a common humanity is developing in our minds and in those of our allies. In entering the conflict, as we have done, not to secure an advantage for our nation at the expense of other nations, but for the sake of a common good in which all nations will share, including our present enemies, we have been actuated by the type of motives that will ultimately bring a federation of nations into existence.

Possibly I have not employed enough ethical terminology to make clear the relationship of the "humanity" and "internationalism" I have been preaching to systems of moral philosophy. In the spirit of Kant's maxim it has been claimed that humanity, whether embodied in nations or in individual citizens, is always to be treated as an end in itself. The international federation would be an attempt to make Kant's "kingdom of ends" in some measure an actuality in the affairs of nations. The point of view sets forth what Hegelians call a "concrete universal" in that

[7] In the case of the Germans, a more enlightened socialism would have perceived that the national interest is opposed to the circle about the Kaiser that has misled the nation and precipitated the war. If they only could have seen this, German socialists could have remained true patriots and yet opposed the war. But, as it is, they deserve credit for patriotism as they have understood it.

it insists that the sentiment for humanity must be a synthesis of national patriotisms, and not an abstraction from them. In this respect it is in direct antithesis to the thin-blooded cosmopolitanism (common in the eighteenth century and still extant) that deprecates national loyalties, and fails to realize that only true patriots are capable of acquiring the larger patriotism implied in deep devotion to a federated humanity. The adaptations from Hobhouse, McDougall, and Shand, are, I trust, obvious.[8] It will also be apparent that an attempt has been made to view the moral consciousness of "humanity" as a union of reason and emotion in a sentiment,[9] so that the doctrine mediates between a rationalistic ethics and an ethics based upon impulse and emotion.

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[8] L. T. Hobhouse, "Morals in Evolution"; William McDougall, "An Introduction to Social Psychology"; Alexander F. Shand, "Foundations of Character."

[9] In opposition to writers of the type of Canon Rashdall. Cf. the author's paper "Conscience as Reason and as Emotion," *Philosophical Review*, vol. XXV, pp. 676–691.

THE SOUL OF THE SLAV.

MOMČILO T. SELESCOVIĆ.

WHAT is it that distinguishes man from man? Everything; for no two things in the world are alike. That is the basis of the historical understanding. And yet nothing; for all men obey the same laws, mechanical, physiological, mental. That is the basis of the scientific understanding.

Between these answers the conception of nationality becomes obscure. The question opens out before us: What are the causes that determine a certain group of people to unite together, and fix a gulf between them and other men? What, in short, is the ultimate principle of the process, seeing that nature appears to us in the guise either of infinite irregularity or of sameness? The principle is the law of the human reason; to apprehend is to dispose in order, and divide into parts. That is the basis of the philosophical understanding.

The peculiarity of the Slavs lies in their relation to world-history—the history, that is, of the universal values which we call "culture," not the record of passing occurrences. The Westerner is the bearer of world-history and its latest expression; it is only in our own day that the Slavs are gradually entering within its sphere. And this fact necessarily leads them to conceive of world-history in a special way.

The position may be thus defined: World-history means for the Westerner his own history, for his own history is nothing else but the latest bloom or fruit of world-history.

World-history means for the Slav a foreign property which he has to make his own. The characteristic of the Slav in contrast to the Westerner is that the history of the Slav is only an affair of the past, only a preparatory history,

only a series of self-preservative acts;—if you like, not a history at all in respect of human progress or culture.

The history of a Western people, however, has value; it has grown organically out of world-history and involves it in itself. Like every organism it is the continuation of a previous development, and therefore the clue to the culture of the Westerner, the root of that culture, is to be found in his national life. Outside his own history there are no values, that is to say, no culture.

It is otherwise with the Slav. The consciousness of himself, of his distinctive character, of his membership in a nation or a race he can acquire only by culture; otherwise he would remain unreflecting, or in other words insignificant for history. If he were to commit the impossible, and surround himself with a Chinese wall, all that he could do would be to gather or create afresh the experience or the values that he has already at hand in the achievements of other peoples. His distinction would consist in having none at all, and his rôle would be that of repeating stale truths. In order, therefore, to get a self of his own, he must traverse the path already made by others. Culture, that is to say, comes first, and national character derives from it; or in other words, culture is experienced as pure culture, and not as a national trait; and the order of development, as we find it in the West, is revived.

It is only by keeping this fact before our eyes that we shall be able to understand the meaning of the word "Slav" and the new value that the Slav brings with him.

For what is meant when the Slav professes: I am a Slav?

He is assuredly honest in his profession, and speaks from genuine conviction: but be it remembered that there are two kinds of honesty, two kinds of conviction—the spontaneous and the reflective, faith and the deliberate judgement. Must they always coincide?

He is honest in calling himself a Slav because his father did the same, and he proves his honesty by staking his life

for the name's sake, and killing for the name's sake, or being killed by, the man who does not own to it.

But he is also honest, when he asks himself by what right he calls himself a Slav because his father also did. Is it because he was born in a Slavic country? because his mother tongue was Slavic? But in that case what is "Slavic" but a mere word? For that he had left behind him the state of the natural man, and become conscious of himself, and been able to reflect on the meaning of the name "Slav," he owes to civilisation, or, as we have called it, "culture," the product of foreign peoples. Its results were perhaps set before him in the schools of his own country; of their existence and their acquisition he learned, perhaps, in his own language, but those who acquired them were not of his own people.

Thus the deliberate judgement is, as it were, a light that brings into perfect clearness the faith that underlies it: it shows that the word "Slav," if referred to the past, is an empty sound, or, in other words, that the value that the Slav brings with him in contrast to the Westerner, is not historical and must not be looked for in the past.

And this is the characteristic of the Slavs as against the peoples which are also in the preliminary stage of history,—that they are conscious that theirs is only a preliminary history.

It is through the necessity of following up the course of the world's culture in order to arrive at self-consciousness and national consciousness (if his faith is not to remain merely a blind inkling), that the Slav comes to recognise that culture is the content and essence of nationhood, and that, vice versa, nationhood is nothing but a form of culture.

This is the great experience, the foundational value that the Slav brings with him. This is his release from the opposition between humanity and nationhood—a release for which the Westerner struggled in vain. For the cosmopolitanism of the Italian Renaissance, the French Revolu-

tion, and German Classicism, was morbid; it was theoretic and not related to the given circumstances in their mould of time and space; it set itself above these circumstances and remained always in the clouds, until the international romanticism all but killed it outright by glorifying the opposite extreme—nationalism.

For the Westerner culture and nationhood are originally one and the same, and on that account he always sees the character of a foreign nation as a contrast to himself.

But the Slav is enabled by his experience to transcend the opposition of culture and nationhood, of man and nation; he recognises that the relation between them is the relation of the content to the form.

And this determines the Slavic conception of national character, not as the element which separates peoples, but as the basis on which alone their intercommunion is possible. The peculiarity of the conception consists, therefore, in the idea that national characteristics are not contrasts between peoples, but conditions of internationalism.

In the West, that is to say, internationalism means the very opposite to nationalism. It appears either as a matter of the individual consciousness or as a social ideal. In the former case it takes the form of eclecticism, dilettantism, æstheticism, by which I mean that sort of moral impotence which is implied in a lack of any specific quality—in short, anti-individualism; in the latter case its shape is a vision of a future society, a social purpose, taste, or programme,—in other words a theory. In either case it is abstractive, only it moves in two opposite directions: either the individual takes up into himself the character of other people than himself, which means, if I may use the expression, the incarnation of an abstraction; or the theory is projected outward as a form of society. In the one case the internationlist will have nothing that is his own; in the other, nothing that is foreign to his own.

The historical rôle of the Slavs consists in this:—that they do not advance to manhood, in the full sense of the

word, over the ruins of individuality, but on the contrary through its development. Nationalism and internationalism cease to be opposites.

For the national character in this case does not derive from a history—there is none at hand—but merely and only from the relation of individuals to each other. It is not identical, therefore, with what is common to these individuals; on the contrary, it arises from their differences. It is only through the recognition of foreign characteristics that the Slav arrives at a recognition of his own, and only the self-consciousness of each of its members is the cause and the condition of the harmony of the whole society. Not in spite of the fact, but thanks to the fact that Slavic nationalism does not imply a tradition, but is rooted in the independence of the individual, does it lead to the social organisation, the motive of that organization being the natural need of each individual to co-operate with others; for through the very fact of being an individual, that is, a part, each has need of other parts to form a whole.

That is the character of the Slav in one aspect. Negatively, both his individualism and his morality are distinct from those of the West, in that he makes a synthesis of both. For in the West individualism and morality are opposites; the individualist being either the superman or the man with no moral principle at all.

The positive characteristic of the Slav consists in this: that on the one hand, in contrast to Western individualism, he conceives the individual not as a self-contained unity which is its own end (in which case it would deserve rather to be called universal) but as a means to society. On the other hand, however, in contrast to Western morality, he conceives society not as legalised individualism (in the legal abstract of individualism, as we should then have to call it), but as a consequence of individuality, as a mutual supplementation of each by each.

National character, then, is in this case not identical with any historical product. The mission, the meaning, and the nature of Slavic nationhood is to be a mediator.

To point out how this peculiarity of the Slavic mind is manifested in practise and theory, in the state, in art, and in philosophy is a task which may be reserved for another paper. I shall speak here of how that mind has been crystallised, and not of the manner of its operation.

The Slavic character has often been conceived by the Slavs themselves as an historical result, and attempts have been made to discover it from the past. On the analogy of Western examples the roots of Slavic national character were sought not in the mediating synthesis, but in opposition to other nationalities. Such a procedure is, of course, uninformed and merely literary; it lacks any sort of foundation, for it contradicts the facts. The whole method consists in arbitrarily transferring the principles and standards of the West to the Slavic world. The natural consequence is not only that the Slavic character is not recognized, but that it is positively effaced. By applying the same standards to both the Slavic and the Western world, you identify them, you eliminate the whole difference between them, which consists in their different relations to world-history. In this way the main fact, the postulate, the necessary starting-point is left out of mind, and the results can only be forced and arbitrary constructions.

But these constructions usually end in confusing the conception "national" with "popular," in substituting for the ideal and universal value which a people represents concrete and ephemeral phenomena from its history, in speaking of a "people" in the small and narrow sense of the contrary of the conscious individual, in understanding the people as the more or less unconsciously vegetating mass and bringing it under the category of quantity and not of quality.

That is the inevitable consequence, if you look for the character of the Slav in his past. The only characteristics you may infer from it are popular—the characteristics of the mass: popular costumes, dances, customs, sagas, and so on.

Thereby, however, you arrive at exactly the opposite of the goal you proposed: instead of some achievement of human culture, you have a raw material that is only of importance in so far as it is, or might be, stuff to work upon; for it is only in working upon it that the national element, the universal value of the nation, is reflected; and herein lies the significance of the form it is given. The raw material is known to no one but the native: for the stranger it has only the values and charm of its strangeness: that is to say, it represents no universal value and is in so far the very opposite of national. To these half-way phenomena I apply the term "popular."

In fact, nationhood does not express with the Slavs a contrast to other people. So far as the word Slav, that is to say, denotes a contrast to other peoples, it is a misleading word, a title without a meaning, for the name covers an element of quite a different nature; it means, not the conscious characteristics of the people in question, not its national traits, but its faith.

We can now understand why it is among the Slavs that nationalism assumes so passionate a rôle: it is because it is not nationalism. I mean: we understand that the contrast between the Slavs and other peoples, though it goes under the name of nationalism, is not, and cannot be, rooted in it; that the reverse is rather the case—this so-called nationalism grows out of the opposition in which other peoples put themselves to the Slavs, out of the oppression in which the Slavs found themselves for many centuries, and in fact find themselves still. We understand, therefore, that this nationalism has its roots not in the conscious judgement, but is simply that which enables a down-trodden people to preserve itself—faith.

Its character is conditioned by its origin. The Slav had no leisure to think about life in general, he had to defend his own. His faith, therefore, is not a theory of existence, but a means to its realisation. And that makes him pic-

ture the world in quite different forms and colours than the Westerner.

The Westerner sought not only the key to the solution of the cosmic riddle, but the solution itself in reason. Is it a wonder that, thus mistaking reason, he was obliged either to find the world unreasonable, or to find reason not a means, but only a hindrance to the solution? Whether he denied this world for the sake of the world beyond, or affirmed the present for the sake of the future, he has always been in a mediate relation to the world; a dream it is for him, and nothing but a dream, be it fair, or be it distressing.

The faith of the Slav is an immediate apprehension of existence. It is not a theoretical explanation of the universe, for only one explanation is possible for him, the realisation of the life-impulse. In that realisation the world here and now ceases to be a means and a preliminary, and becomes an end. The world is not denied for the sake of eternity, but affirmed. For eternity in this case is not the opposite of the present, but identical with it; it is only the present that is; the future has to be, and the past has been already.

The Westerner conceives of the present as a timeless point at which the future passes into the past. To be, on this view, is merely to seem. Reality can only be outside; that is God as the Western mind conceives Him. And the faith of the Westerner is that the world would be meaningless without that supplement.

For the Slav the world becomes meaningless as soon as he asks himself whether it has a meaning or not. For him its nature is nothing if not holy: it is the manifestation of God in time and space. That is his faith. And what is God? As God He is nowhere manifested. We only infer Him from the world: infer Him, that is, as a something that transcends our apprehension and may, therefore, just as well be called a nothing. It is only the self-contradiction of our intelligence when we ascribe a quality to this unknown, whether as explicable or inexplicable. Something and nothing in this case are only empty words, which

describe nothing but the impotence of our understanding. The word God designates either the insufficiency of man's understanding, or (which is the same thing) an object that surpasses his understanding, and of which, therefore, nothing more can be said than that it is holy, which means simply that it passes the intelligence of man.

Faith, to the Westerner, is turning from the world, denying the world he has experienced for the sake of that whose existence he has argued. And so it is either speculation,—a conceiving, not of God, but of the thinker's own self, for God is in this case nothing but a projection of his own person in eternity and infinity; or it is not a faith at all, but atheism, the most artificial, the most contradictory, the shallowest of all philosophies, believing itself to be a philosophy, but being really the lack of one, solving the eternal questions by not solving, by simply eliminating them.

The faith of the Slav does not remove the world to a pale distance, but on the contrary bestows on it colour and intensity. It is a mysticism that necessarily manifests itself —to use a word than which I can find no better—as a realism. Faith means in his case faith in himself and God, faith in mankind.

He is thus in opposition not only to speculation but to atheism. For at bottom atheism is nothing else but speculation, only in reverse; it is not thinking, but the absence of thinking; not the content of the ego, but its very void is projected in eternity and infinity. Speculation defines God in positive terms, atheism in negative. The faith of the Slav does not define Him at all. Therein consists what is called his mysticism, and what, if we have regard not to its inner nature but to its outward expression, we must call his realism. For the Slav does not deny God by not defining Him; he recognises Him only, as unintelligible, undefinable. To explain the world, therefore, he does not set up a spiritual principle instead of a mechanical; he does not see the world through principles at all, but through the phases of his own personality. What is called his mysticism,

therefore, is simply the root of his realism; it is the very opposite of abstraction.

This is the whole secret of the soul of the Slav—that it does not go beyond itself. Within itself it seeks for an explanation of itself; not outside itself.

It is backwards that the eyes of the Westerner are turned; he seeks the significance of his being in its cause. He is not his own answer, and this is for him the fundamental idea of his personality. He is not a unitary being, but divided in two, a double or a half. The mood to which he is set is discord and a longing for peace. It is from outward and not from inward opposition that the faith of the Slav is born. The world and I are conditions of one another; but the measure of man comes from man; this is the great experience that the Slav has made at his own expense. His faith, therefore, aims not at explaining the world; this problem is for him identical with that of explaining his own life. And so it is that he asks not after the cause of life, but after its end. He does not sail under the banner of metaphysic. Where metaphysic is found among the Slavs it is only childish and child-like phantasy, or else a ruthlessly logical development of western metaphysic, lifeless verbalism. The faith of the Slav issues entirely in ethics, for that only can give him an answer to the question of the end of his existence. His life is a restless dissolving of himself in the relations of man to man, and there-with the conception of the transcendental becomes converted in his mind into that of the necessary, or what is simply given. In face of this necessity his only attitude is passive and contemplative. Thus the faith of the Slav is devotion, not enquiry into ultimate things, and least of all garrulous demonstration.

The mood, therefore, to which his being is set is inward quiet, peace of mind, the deep silence of the heart; where God is there is God only, and to ask why is to utter a contradiction. The Westerner draws his conclusions the other way: he argues from the conception of the transcendental to his behaviour in this present life. The trans-

cendental becomes the active regulator of here and now: the only question is whether the transcendental be conceived as a reality outside the man, or as a fiction of the man's mind. In the one case the Westerner's motive in living is the immortality of his soul; in the other the immortality of his name. Faith, in this case, is simply a man's battle with himself, and morality is simply the opposite of egoism. For the deepest wisdom is here contradictory: the overcoming of self for the self's sake.

The faith of the Slav is not an anticipating of the transcendental, but the reaffirmation of the given reality. His actions are not determined by the consciousness of being in possession of eternal truth, but by the humility which we feel towards that which we regard as inevitable, that is to say, by furious revolt against that which we regard as arbitrary. This attitude, so contrary to the attitude of the West, includes a contrary conception of the personality. Personality is conceived as a means, not as an end. The importance of the ego lies not in its immortality, in its preservation, in its eternity, but, on the contrary, in its mortality, in its development, in its manifestation: to live and to die are only two words for one and the same thing, namely, for the restless dissolution of the self in its fruits. This view of death cancels all the import of a future life. Life and death cease to be opposites.

In short, we may put it thus: the faith of the Westerner manifests itself either as pessimism or as optimism, according as we regard its source or its tendency; it is either a contempt of earthly life or a hope of the life beyond. The faith of the Slav is something different in principle: not the valuation but the fulfilment of life. Activity is not only its expression, but also the complete gift of itself, and its ultimate import.

This puts him in opposition, firstly, to Mohammedan fatalism and Buddhist scepticism, which like two polar extremes lead to the same thing, to passivity. Secondly, it puts him in opposition to the activity of the Westerner:

for the activity of the Slav is rooted not in abstract theory, but in the concrete; it is not metaphysical or anti-metaphysical, like that of the Anglo-Saxons, but ethical; it is not an aggressive affirmation of certain values, but a judicial recognition of the given truth and critical towards itself.

All this is given, of course, in rough outlines. And since both Westerners and Slavs—at least the overwhelming majority—have the same Christian religion, they use the same words: God, Immortality of the Soul, the Beyond. But whoever can look behind the words will see that the same sound covers different meanings: the names are the same, but the foundations of the structure are different. This is clearly shown in the position and significance which the church has in the West and among the Slavs.

If you look at the church of the Slavs with western eyes, you see only that it did not grow from the home soil, but was brought over ready grown from strangers. That is true not only of the Orthodox Church but of the Catholic too, though perhaps it is more conspicuously the case with the Orthodox. It is a borrowing from Rome or from Byzantium. Not being adjusted to the new circumstances the church ceased to be a living organism, degenerated into stark and lifeless selfishness, characterlessness, empty formalism, and became a mannerism without a manner. The very opposite, that is to say, to the church of the West.

For the church of the West grew organically out of the circumstances, and is, in fact, nothing other than the necessary counterpart or counterpoise to nationality. History, culture, as we saw, are conceived by the Westerner as his national heritage. Being national, they failed to satisfy what was universal and purely human in him. This gap is filled by the church; that is her position in the West. In fact she represents the non-national, international, not to say the anti-national element. Church and nationality, therefore, according to their fundamental ideas, are, in the West, opposites.

The very reverse is the case with the Slav. His church is not a church in the Western sense. She stands not for the universally human element, not as a counterpoise to nationalism, but, on the contrary, for the affirmation of personality in face of the oppressor, for reaction and opposition to the foreign foe. (The original Christian church stood for both at once.)

This being so, we can understand that the inexpansiveness of the Slavic church, its rigidity, its petrifaction was not its deficiency, but the condition under which alone it could play its part. Its deep significance consists in the fact that it was always only an organ of national self-preservation. The formularies under which this happened were borrowed from strangers. If the church would remain true to herself, the foreign formularies must perforce remain formularies, petrify, ossify to a symbol, and shrink to a name.

We have, therefore, a twofold opposition; one between Western and Slavic conceptions of culture and of the church, and a second between Western and Slavic relations to culture and to the church. Culture in the West means the national quality, and the church means the international element. With the Slav, on the contrary, it is the church that harbours the national element and culture the international. Culture and the church supplement each other in the West, completely; with the Slav the one grows out of the other, the national being in his case, as we saw, not the opposite to the international, but its fruit.

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THE NEW ERA OF FRUITFULNESS IN ETHICAL THINKING.

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I.

IF THE content of the science of ethics is assumed to be determined by the treatises of ethicists, then the history of ethics is the history of a dualism. For practically all the work which has been done in ethics up to the present time has been done simultaneously in two fields and upon two problems. From the very first ethics has attempted on the one hand to give a causal explanation of moral phenomena, and on the other hand to propound a theory of what things are good, and what acts right.

Doubtless these two problems are indistinguishable from one another in the minds of many students of ethics. But the difficulty of distinguishing between them does not lie in an external identity. So far as their external aspects are concerned, the analysis of the moral consciousness, the examination of the moral judgment, the determination of the nature of conscience and of duty—these problems, or rather, this problem is clearly enough a different thing from the formulation of rules of conduct and the definition of a moral ideal. Formally speaking, the analysis of the moral judgment is a description of what is, while the formulation of the goal of right living is a description of what ought to be.

The reason for the assumed indistinguishability of these two problems lies beneath the surface differences in the relation which has always been supposed to exist between their answers. The fundamental postulate of ethical thinking from earliest times to the twentieth century has been the proposition that the only source of moral guidance and moral progress is the study of the phenomena of the moral judgment. The major undeclared assumption of practically all ethicists up to modern times has been the belief

that the answer to the question: "What ought I to do?" is to be found only in a theological, or metaphysical, or psychological analysis of the process to which the word "ought" refers.

As a result, however, of the gradual realization, to which ethics came at the end of the last century, of the cosmic extent and complexity of the moral problem, a grave crisis has overtaken the science. We are to-day in the process of bringing the tacit assumption of the dependence of moral doctrine upon metaphysico-psychological speculation into the light of ruthless criticism.

The magnitude of the issues of this crisis can be appreciated properly only in a historical study of ethical methodology; but such a study can only be indicated in this paper, since, if it were not limited to a mere sketch of a single period, its proportions and importance would entirely subordinate the purpose for which this interpretation of the recent history of ethics has been made. For that purpose is determined by the future rather than by the past methodology of ethics. If our suspicions of the practical efficacy of the analysis of moral consciousness should appear to be well founded, and if, during the next decade they should be heightened and justified, then that field will have to be definitely abandoned by students of morals. The attempt to reduce the life of the individual and of society to some sort of moral order,—to make life more worth living,—will begin not with a brief for the rationality of conscience or for the instinctiveness of moral reactions, but rather with a survey of the conditions of social life. To put more meaning into human existence, —to make of it a more orderly and less futile thing than it has ever been,—we shall try first to understand the meaning of the life we are now leading.

II.

The three great ethical treatises of the later nineteenth century contained little augury of the approaching crisis in ethical theory. But in so far as they carried the tra-

ditional types of ethical speculation to a higher degree of refinement than had ever been reached before, they constituted one of the important causes of the revulsion against the traditional ethics. The very barrenness of work so monumental in scope as that of Sidgwick, Green, and Martineau contributed largely to the formulation of a new ethical methodology.

Sidgwick recognizes the dual nature of ethical inquiry at the very outset of his book. "I prefer to consider Ethics as the science or study of what ought to be," he says. This is a clear statement of the problem of human welfare; if this is true, it is the business of ethics to construct a system of moral precepts which shall define the good and the right. One cannot restrain a smile on finding that the sentence following the one quoted above is the author's apology for the fact that ethics—and his book—"consist, to a great extent, of a psychological discussion as to the 'nature of the moral faculty.'"

The answer to this paradox seems to lie in Sidgwick's belief that since right conduct must consist in rigid adherence to the principles of the one true theory of morality, the discovery of which of the current "methods of ethics" is the "true" one must necessarily contribute greatly to the establishment of the precepts of moral action. The criterion of the validity of the "methods of ethics" is to be the pragmatic test of the applicability of each theory to actual practice. Thus the method of the whole book coincides with the author's belief in the efficacy of moral philosophy. Sidgwick is able to show pretty conclusive evidence that the incommensurability of pleasures is an insuperable obstacle to the application of hedonistic theories to moral practice, and that the hopeless deficiency in clearness and precision, in self-evidence, in mutual consistency, and in universality of acceptance, of "intuitive" principles of morality makes the acceptance of intuitionism impossible.

When he came to the consideration of utilitarianism, however, Sidgwick unfortunately relented and refrained

from applying his pragmatic test with unmoved scepticism. Consequently he allowed himself to be convinced that in utilitarianism, reinforced by an intuitional principle of rational benevolence, he had found the really fruitful ethical doctrine. And still Sidgwick recognized in the end the impossibility of constructing a complete system of morality, even upon the utilitarian plan. Consequences must be considered, he says. But what sort of consequences? And how should the consequences be calculated—since pleasures are incommensurable? There is no answer to these questions—nothing but the bare conviction that the thing can be done. "No doubt a thoughtful and well-instructed Utilitarian may see dimly a certain way ahead."

And so the study of "Methods of Ethics" ends as it began with the unsupported assumption that in some inexplicable way the guidance of human conduct toward the good and the right has been advanced by the decision that the moral consciousness of man works thus, and not so. The task is begun by virtue of an alleged "general agreement" that conduct is determined by principles in terms of which moral behavior is explained, and it is finished with "no doubt" that a man well-instructed in the "rational benevolence" variant of utilitarianism may somehow make some progress.

When the introduction to Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics" is examined for vestiges of the assumption of the fruitfulness of a dual methodology in ethics, its similarity to the first chapter of "Methods of Ethics" is very striking. Green, like Sidgwick, explicitly recognizes the dual task which has been traditionally assigned to ethics. "It has generally been expected of a moralist that he should explain not only how men do act (*i.e.*, in making moral judgments) but how they should act." But moral philosophy has fallen into disrepute because it has had "no interest for the imagination and no power over the heart." It has become a natural science, seeking to explain causally the facts of moral life. But in so far as ethical speculation

has been reduced to a natural science, the "practical or preceptive" part of ethics has become obsolete.[1] Thus the utilitarian, "instead of telling men of a greatest sum of pleasures which they ought to seek, and which by acting in the light of a true insight they may attain . . . will rather set himself to show how the phraseology of 'ought' and 'ought not,' the belief in a good attainable by all, the consciousness of something that should be though it is not, may according to his philosophy be accounted for." Yet with such a clear insight into the futility of one analysis of moral consciousness, Green announces his intention of embarking upon the same voyage, though in a different ship. The "Prolegomena" is to be a metaphysical analysis of the fundamental nature of the cosmos, for the purpose of determining whether there is in man's being a principle which "consists in the consciousness of a moral ideal and the determination of human action thereby."

As a matter of fact, however, the metaphysician in Green completely overtops the moralist. For he not only gives over the bulk of his book to establishing the existence of "the consciousness of a moral ideal," but when in the fourth book he brings himself down to the specifically ethical job of showing how "human action is determined thereby" his habit is too strong upon him, and his achievement turns out to be a further elaboration of his metaphysic of morals rather than the justification of that speculation by the deduction from it of precepts for right conduct. "It remains to be asked," he says at the end of the book, "By what rule effort is to be guided, which we suppose the idea of a possible human perfection thus to initiate." Unless this problem can be solved "it would seem that our theory of the basis of morality, though its adoption might save some speculative persons from that distrust of their own conscience to which Hedonism would naturally lead them, can be of no further practical value."

[1] Green saw clearly enough that to resolve this methodological paradox by abandoning "practical ethics" is essentially to abandon ethics for sociology. See p. 382 of this article.

And in the end Green gave the game away, saving himself as best he could by the reiteration of his still unjustified assumption in the form of the assertion that "we all recognize virtues which carry in themselves unfulfilled possibilities," and by the distinction, which served him in tight places several times, between motives and effects. "No theory whatever of the 'Summum Bonum,' Hedonistic or other, can avail for the settlement of (the question of what law or usage or cause of action contributes to the better-being of society), which requires analysis of facts and circumstances, not consideration of ends. But it (a theory such as this) will sufficiently direct us in regard to the kind of effects we should look for in our analysis, and so to the value we should put upon them when ascertained." How this is to be done forms no part of the theory; yet that it occurs is the justification of the whole philosophy. Thus the "Prolegomena," like the "Methods of Ethics," ends as it began with the basic assertion that moral philosophy is the source of moral wisdom still unsubstantiated by any evidence beyond that of traditional acquiescence in convenient dogma.

It would seem as though a thinker like Martineau who believed morality to consist in "a feeling that *this* is worthier than *that*," and that the exercise of this feeling "demands no reflective introspection, no ability to lay the finger on what it is in the action which excites the feeling, or even to ask the question whether it be the motive or the effect," would naturally feel little necessity for providing the world with a book on ethics, except as a piece of scientific description. One does not have to listen long to the tone of the book, however, to realize that Martineau also labored under the universal ethical misapprehension that from his exposition of the facts of the moral choice he could deduce some positive contribution to morality. Martineau did indeed actually set about the task of stabilizing the work of conscience by providing it with a set of principles (through a hundred and thirty-six pages) with reference to which the rightness and wrongness of an act may

surely be determined—after first chiding Sidgwick, Spencer and Stephen for not having had the mental stamina to precede him in this necessary work.

Martineau's achievement, however, is hardly enough to justify the conclusion that from a theory of the nature of morality, a morality may be inferred. Waiving all consideration of the compatibility of the authority of Martineau's conscience and Martineau's principles, a glance at the nature of the principles themselves is sufficient to show that they are as far as the principle of self-realization from the needs of any actual moral situation. Martineau did not realize this, as Green and Sidgwick did of their generalizations. He produces situation after situation, solving each one in imagination without the least difficulty. His conception of a moral problem, however, does more credit to his character than to his mind; there is very little reality either in the difficulties or in their solution, to the modern way of thinking.

III.

In spite of the inadequacy of the types of ethical theory which have just been criticized, the fair historian cannot pass lightly over the positive contributions of Sidgwick, Green, and Martineau. It can hardly be expected that any philosopher will solve all the problems of the cosmos, though his failure to do so must be painstakingly noted in the interest of future progress. Moreover, the unexamined postulate which has been shown to underlie this ethical work was inherited from many generations of scholars, and perhaps it was not to be expected that it would be noted and its fallacy exposed in a period such as the Victorian; for while Darwin's work was already having large effects in all fields of thought in the seventies and eighties, still the evolutionary attitude had not become habitual in the sense in which it is now. Furthermore, though the great social reconstructions which are now going on were implicitly present at that time, the traditional "common sense" morality of the race was very much less in question

then than now. These two changes—the recognition of the wide variations through various evolutionary epochs of the social background of morality, and the demands made by modern industrial society for a reconstruction of conventional morality—are largely responsible for the growing recognition of the inadequacy of the older type of ethical theory.

That moral conduct is social conduct is no new idea. It is specifically enunciated by Aristotle, who defines ethics as a "study of man in his relations to Society." In a certain sense Aristotle may be said to have been in possession of an idea of which Baldwin's principle that "all rules of action for the guidance of life must be of possible social application, even though in their origin they are announced and urged by individuals" is simply one expression. The significant thing, however, is not that Baldwin thus restated the Kantian categorical imperative in the language of sociology, but rather that the importance of recognizing the social nature of moral problems was very much emphasized in the nineties, notably in the six hundred pages of Baldwin's "Interpretations."

Furthermore it is one thing to acknowledge the existence of society as the home of the individual; it is quite another thing to maintain as Sumner was doing[2] that society constructs the individual. The serious exposition of the theory that "right" means only "compatible with the existing order of things," and that "philosophy and ethics are the products of the folkways" really represented a new attitude towards the development of society if not a wholly new conception.

The new recognition of the facts of social life, particularly of the significance of the wide discrepancies between the moral conduct of different peoples in different periods of social evolution, was perhaps a less potent awakener of ethicists from their dogmatic slumber than the growth of

[2] For though "Folkways" was not published until 1907, Sumner was teaching the doctrines which it contained very much earlier. See "Folkways," Preface.

the modern urban-industrial society. Professor Tufts considers this the chief cause of the reconstruction of ethical concepts. "If we ask what has affected most intensely the ethical thought of the period we must find an answer, not in science, but in the economic, political, and family life. The changing conditions of business and industry, the shift to urban life, the consequent changes in the family, the demands for new legislation, the controversies over judicial interpretations, the search for more effective dealing with poverty, vice and crime, last of all the issues of nationalism and internationalism, war and peace—these and others of like sort have stirred men from easy reflection."

IV.

In the face of problems such as these it would seem that the old subconscious dogma of ethics,—the supposition that what men need is a clearer exposition of moral phenomena,—must atrophy from very disuse. As a matter of fact, however, while certain men resolved the premise of the older ethics by advocating the abandonment of metaphysico-psychological speculation for the more fruitful study of actual affairs, others seized the opposite horn of the dilemma, and proceeded to make ethics a "natural science." The form which this "natural" ethics typically took was that of an attempt to account for the phenomena of social life in terms of a moral instinct. In 1887 Höffding had made a careful descriptive analysis of the moral organization of the family, the state, and "die freie Kulturgesellschaft," using as his principles of explanation "a feeling of pleasure or pain" (Lust=oder Unlustgefühl) which "when it has developed from its basis in sympathy into a consciousness of duty and justice, finally becomes the criterion of ethical judgments of pleasure and pain," and a conception of welfare (Wohlfahrt) as "the principle for the determination of the contents of ethics and for the evaluation of human conduct."

Höffding, however, wrote before the extension of the evolutionary principle to the field of morals had been con-

summated, and he therefore did not attempt to make his explanation include the development of modern out of primitive morality. This task was very boldly attacked a decade later in Sutherland's "Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct." Sutherland attempted to trace the origin of an instinct which, emerging from the parental instinct of the lower animals in the form of sympathy, had "deepened and expanded" into "the moral instinct with all its accompanying accessories, the sense of duty, the feeling of self-respect, the enthusiasm of both the tender and the manly ideal of ethic beauty." With Westermarck this moral emotion is broadened into a mere emotion of approval and disapproval, which, acting spontaneously though apparently along relatively fixed lines, determines the forms which moral and immoral practices assume in different civilizations.

While the work which has been accomplished by this type of "scientific ethics" has been of the very highest value for the sympathetic understanding of moralities foreign to our own, yet, as Green pointed out, it does not afford any basis whatever for the formulation of a positive contribution to the morality of our own day. Höffding saw this clearly enough. "There are two problems of scientific ethics to be distinguished from one another," he said. "Ethics is partly a historical, partly a philosophical science. Historical or comparative ethics seeks to set forth positive morality as it appeared at each given time among each given people. Philosophical ethics has as its problem not the description and explanation of given ethical phenomena, but evaluation itself."

Westermarck was more consistent and denied that this evaluation of current moral practices can be the business of a science. But this escape is purely verbal; it serves to make a clear distinction between the "natural science" of ethics and the practical problems of morality, but it does not explain away those problems.

Another effort to develop an expository ethics without even an attempt at a contribution to morality is that of

the rationalists. In spite of Taylor's cogent and vital demonstration that "it is an insufficient explanation of the nature and origin of moral ideals to say that they spring from the rational character of human agency," since "in order to know what kind of conduct will in the case of any individual or species conform to our principle (of economy, *i.e.*, "rationality") by securing the beneficial reaction at the least cost, it is clearly all-important to know what are the general conditions of existence which have to be met by the action of the individual or species in question," the rationalist type of ethical speculation has persisted.

Why it persists, it is hard to say. The rationalists cannot claim to have made any such contribution to knowledge as that of the moral instinct evolutionists, nor do they devote themselves to the solution of practical moral problems. Moore admits that "in order to show that any action is a duty, it is necessary to know both what are the other conditions, which will, conjointly with it, determine its effects; to know exactly what will be the effects of these conditions; and to know all the events which will be in any way affected by our action throughout an infinite future," and that failing of this perfect achievement ethics may nevertheless marshal the alternatives likely to occur to anyone and study their probable effects. Yet he does not take any steps in the direction of this type of ethical study, contenting himself with dogmatizing about the varieties of experience which are "intrinsically" good and evil. And Rashdall seems to confess that "if a Moral Philosopher be a good guide in practical difficulties, it will be rather his qualities as a man (the fact that "he must at least have accustomed himself to consider the relation of means to ends," etc.), than his scientific training that will make his opinion valuable." This amounts to a withdrawal of ethics from the sciences and its establishment as a discipline contributory to the mental development of moralists. Thus the rationalists as well as the evolutionists resolve the methodological paradox by the complete sacrifice of the practical phase of ethical thinking.

V.

The only solution of the difficulties involved in the dualism of metaphysico-psychological speculation and practical morality alternate to the abandonment of the latter lay in the direction of the complete subordination of the speculative phase of ethics to the problems involved in the quest for moral guidance. If the axiom that from the analysis of moral judgment there naturally flows a stream of moral precepts had failed in practice, that failure could hardly be said to involve more than the particular types of moral analysis which had thus far found expression. It by no means followed that no explanation of the facts of moral life could be made which would give the slightest impulse to the solution of the practical moral problems of society.

It was quite natural, therefore, that there should develop out of this methodological crisis a new conception of the problems of ethics and the duties of the ethicist, which should involve the complete abandonment of the attempt to explain moral life as due to some one factor of the human personality, and should adopt instead the notion that the phenomenon of the moral regulation of life is a function of x variables,—in which all the faculties of the individual mind and all the relationships which constitute society have a part.

This conception of the problems of ethics was forecast in 1889 by Paulsen. Accepting the view that it is the function of ethics "to show how human life as such must be fashioned to realize its purpose or end," and that the end is not pleasure, but an "objective content of life, or, since life consists solely of action, definite concrete activities," Paulsen maintained that the difference between good and bad is the difference between "the effects which modes of conduct and acts of will naturally produce upon the life of the agent and his surroundings," and that morality consists not in the discovery of some great moral principle around which conduct can be organized, but rather in "the rational organization of life." In the same year Alexander

published "The Moral Order and Progress" in which he set forth a variant of the same theory, describing the moral order as an equilibrium of the moral impulses of an individual, and of the conduct of the individual in society.

These formulations, however, have the disadvantage of being transitional; they do not cut themselves clearly away from ethical tradition, and consequently they do not fully achieve the reconstruction of ethical methodology. That reconstruction has come with the development of a new and freshly vital mode of thinking. It has been announced most clearly by the Chicago pragmatists, whose statements will for that reason be adopted in this exposition.

In 1891 Dewey definitely set out to expose the undeclared assumption which underlay the ethical speculation of the past, the axiom "which is not indeed marshalled in open array upon the battle field, but about whose presence there can be no doubt,—the idea that moral theory is something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,—the idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory of practise.' Moral theory, for example, is often regarded as an attempt to find a philosophic basis or foundation for moral activity in something beyond that activity itself." There can be no doubt, Dewey went on to say, that there is no "intrinsic connection" between moral theory of this sort and moral conduct. "The Golden Rule gives me absolutely no knowledge, of itself, what I should do." Of what use, then, is this type of theory? Of great use, since it supplies the instruments of analysis. Philosophical theories play the part of instrument makers, supplying us with new instruments of thought whenever the old become worn out. But "it is a piece of scholasticism to suppose that a moral rule has its own self-defining and self-applying content. What truth-telling, what honesty, what patience, what self-respect are change with every change of intelligence, with every added insight into the relations of men and of things. It is only the breath of intelligence blowing through such rules that keeps them from the putrefaction which awaits all barren idealities."

Moral theory, as Dewey conceives it, is just this breath of intelligence. "What, then, is moral theory? It is all one with moral insight, and moral insight is the recognition of the relationships in hand. . . . It is the analytic perception of the conditions and relations in hand in a given act,—it is the action in the idea. It is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. It is, therefore, the doing—the act itself, in its emerging. So far are we from any divorce of moral theory and practise that theory is the ideal act, and conduct is the executed insight."

As early as 1891, then, the definition of the problems of speculative ethics was being based upon the demands of the practical moral situation. It still remained, however, to make more explicit the conceptions of ethical methodology which had been thus enunciated. A decade after the writing of the paper to which reference has just been made, Dewey recast the problems of ethics in terms of the historical method. After showing that "the historical method brings under intellectual and practical control facts which utterly resist general speculation or mere introspective observation," he went on to explain that the historical method demonstrates the continuity of moral experience, and provides the means for controlling that experience. "Its assumptions are that norms and ideals, as well as unreflective customs, arose out of certain situations, in response to the demands of those situations; and that once in existence they operated with a less or greater need of success (to be determined by the study of the concrete case). We are still enaged in forming norms, in setting up ends, in conceiving obligations." "To help us see the present situation comprehensively, analytically, to put in our hands a grasp of the factors that have counted, this way or that, in the moralizing of man, that is what the historical method does for us. Moral judgments are judgments of ways to act, of deeds to do, of habits to form, of ends to cultivate. Whatever modifies the judgment, the conviction, the interpretation, the criterion, modifies conduct.

To control our judgments of conduct, our estimates of habit, deed, and purpose, is in so far forth to direct conduct itself."

The historical method, however, does not define the field of ethical inquiry. That field cannot be accurately defined in terms of any method of ethics; or rather it cannot be bounded by any special method which hypostatizes itself into an "ethical principle" and proceeds to define ethics as the exercise of that principle. It is the very essence of this interpretation of the problems of ethics that this is not such a special principle of explanation, but is a theory that the facts of moral conduct can only be understood when all the aspects of every moral situation enter into the explanation as equally relevant. The field of ethics, then, is the whole moral situation. If we are to construct an ethics which shall cover that field,

> we need to know what the social situation is in which we find ourselves required to act, so that we may know what it is right to do. We need to know what is the effect of some psychical disposition upon our way of looking at life and thereby upon our conduct. Through clearing up the social situation, through making objective to ourselves our own motives and their consequences, we build up generic propositions: statements of experience as a connection of conditions, that is, in the form of objects. Such statements are used and applied in dealing with further problems. Gradually their use becomes more and more habitual. The "theory" becomes a part of our psychical apparatus. The social situation takes on a certain form of organization. It is pre-classified as of a certain sort, as of a certain genus, and even species of this sort; the only question which remains is discrimination of the peculiar variety. Again, we get into the habit of taking into account certain sources of error in our own disposition as these affect our judgments of behavior, and thereby bring them sufficiently under control so that the need of conscious reference to their intellectual formulation diminishes. As physical science has brought about an organization of the physical world along with an organization of the practical habits of dealing with that world, so ethical science will effect an organization of the social world and a corresponding organization of the psychical habits through which the individual relates himself to it. With this clearing up of the field and organs of moral action, conscious recourse to theory will, as in physical cases, limit itself to problems of unusual perplexity and to constructions of a large degree of novelty.

This statement of Dewey's practically identifies the field of ethical speculation with that of the specific moral prob-

lem. According to this view ethics is not an abstract speculative science, engaged in establishing "laws" definitive of moral judgment. It is rather the scientific treatment of moral problems. Ethics attempts to carry out on a larger, scientific scale just those thought processes which precede a moral decision in the mind of a wise man, —a man who would understand what he is doing before he does it. It seeks to understand the significance of the forces of social convention and of individual character—impulse and habit which sway the judgment this way and that, and the larger meaning of the issues at stake in the social situation. And the goal of such a scientific study of all the discoverable phases of a moral problem is not the creation of psychological generalizations, but rather the wiser and more scientific solution of the specific moral problem by the clear exposition of its innermost meaning.

This exposition, as Dewey has demonstrated, is greatly facilitated by the employment of the historical method. One can hardly understand the full significance of the social conventions which play so large a part in every moral situation without some knowledge of the manner in which those conventions have come to be what they are. This particular historical task has been undertaken by the sociologists, who, nevertheless, have shown some tendency to content themselves with giving descriptions of the different codes which have obtained at different periods among different peoples without correlating them and exposing the continuity of their development, or if they have attempted to see the continuity of social forms they have done so at the sacrifice of a clear vision of the unity of development of all the various institutions which together constitute the social order. The former criticism is, perhaps, premature, as the research into specific civilizations must necessarily precede the attempt to construct the results of such studies into the genetic form, and the recognition of the continuity of their development. Hobhouse, for example, has done as much as anyone along the line of tracing "the evolution of the ethical consciousness

as displayed in the habits and customs, rules and principles, which have arisen in the course of human history for the regulation of human conduct." But though Hobhouse has organized a mass of material in such a way as to indicate that moral codes do grow from one another in a continuous progression, he has done little more than allege the unity of the developmental process, even in the third edition. Furthermore his characterization of that process is rather too external to suggest very clearly what the impelling forces behind the process are. On the other hand, Professor Tufts, although he has made no such extended research into the actual history of morality but has centered his attention upon the attempt to understand the nature of the evolutionary process in the field of morals, has made an extremely important suggestion for the interpretation of moral development.

Assuming the notion, of which he had been an early exponent, that mind is something which is developed in the course of societal evolution, he has gone further and described moral evolution as a process in which the moral faculty is sharpened by a growing social order, while at the same time the social structure is built up by the exercise of a developing moral consciousness. The most significant feature of Professor Tufts' statement of the nature of the development of morality is his full recognition that the gradual moralization of society through the evolution of social conventions is but one aspect of a process which includes as its other phase the development of the moral character of the individuals who compose society. Ethics deals with both of these aspects of life and conduct. "It has to study the inner process as determined by the outer conditions or as changing these outer conditions, and the outward behavior or institution as determined by the inner purpose, or as affecting the inner life."

When, therefore, Professor Tufts describes the evolution of morality as a rationalizing and socializing process he refers to the development both of social institutions and of individual character. Thus the "rationalizing process"

means the greater use of intelligence, caused by the exigencies of the satisfaction of primitive wants. At the same time this rationalization is reflected back upon the objective situation in the creation of new institutions and the attendant higher organization of group life. So with socialization: Associations formed originally as a result of fundamental instinctive needs have their effects upon the human animal, making him more dependent on a group and more fond of social life. These changes in the character of the individual find equivalent expression in the growing complexity of the social structure. The building up of a socially self-conscious individual and the building up of a complex social group are phases of the same process.

VI.

This conception of the function of ethical theory is more than a mere eclecticism. If it were no more than that—if it only substituted for the moral theories which lay particular stress upon various features of the moral life a sort of theoretical compromise in which all those features were included without any selective emphasis—then the charge might be justly made that it is as barren of practical consequences as any of the systems which it seeks to supplant. But such a charge could be brought only if it could be shown clearly that the ethical theory, relying upon the old assumption that principles for moral guidance spring naturally from the correct understanding of the moral judgment, rests its oars as soon as it has formulated its conception of moral life and evolution.

But it would be difficult to make such a demonstration; for such a cessation of effort would be in flat contradiction to this notion of the function and problems of ethical theory. The principal point of difference between this and the traditional metaphysical and psychological theories is found just at this point. The traditional ethical doctrines essayed the analysis of the moral judgment in the vague hope of discovering the "true" principle of moral conduct, assuming that a knowledge of that princi-

ple could somehow be applied to the solution of practical moral problems. This doctrine, on the contrary, maintains that the analysis of moral consciousness yields no such principle, by the mechanical application of which one can determine off hand what is right and good. It rests upon the conviction that any moral ideal which is deduced as an *a priori* formula from such metaphysical or psychological speculation is no ideal at all but only a conglomeration of words, until it has been given specific meaning in a long series of actual moral decisions each of which determines whether some particular act or policy is contained in that ideal or not. It asserts that if ethical speculation is to establish any really vital connection with the problems of living which are universally admitted to be after all the fundamental ethical problems it must take up into itself that specific and particular sort of moral speculation which precedes such actual moral decisions. For it is those decisions which determine what we think right, when all is said, and not our belief in greatest happiness principles or categorical imperatives.

Ethics can never hope to supplant the individual decision; its one claim to scientific standing must therefore depend upon its ability to contribute to moral progress by making individual moral problems its business. It must study the moral consciousness and moral evolution not as ends in themselves but only that as a result of such studies it may say with somewhat more widsom than is the mead of the common man whether particular immediately contemplated acts and policies are right or not. Consequently it must take into consideration not only motives and impulses, the good will, the moral sense, and the balanced reason, but also the whole objective setting and significance of the facts themselves. Its business is not only with faculties, but with institutions; it deals not only with men, but with events. It must achieve its results not by some metaphysical legerdemain, but by the plain hard work of mastering the essential facts.

It is clear that such work involves the concentration

upon the solution of moral difficulties of the results of all the other sciences. Physics and chemistry and geology must contribute to an understanding of the alternatives presented in the moral situation and to a comprehension of the physical results of choices that have been made. The biological sciences contribute to a clear apprehension of the implications involved in the preference and accomplishment of "life as a biological process." And the social sciences should illuminate the social structure so that the ethicist may see the influence of the social order in the individual moral process, and the incidence of the effects of the individual moral choice upon other men through the medium of social readjustment.

Out of this concrete study of as many of the aspects of human life as can be brought under scientific observation the ethicist draws his conclusion with regard to a host of disputed moral problems. And from those conclusions he creates, if he can, a practical and personal ideal—not deduced by some transcendental logic from the psychology or the metaphysics of the moral judgment, but constructed out of the materials of the accumulated moral experience of the race.

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PRODUCTIVITY AND RECONSTRUCTION.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

THE productivity of a man of a group of men or of the whole human race is as much an ethical and psychological as it is an economic fact. Indeed the social problem which we shall have to face when the war is over—unless war is a permanent institution—will depend on the resilience or revival of spirit and energy much more truly than on the recovery of the exchange or the opening markets. The "spiritual" forces available for reconstruction are of the first importance. We may, therefore, attempt to estimate the amount and quality of what we have called, for want of a better word, "productivity." In this we mean to include all the material or mental force which goes to produce or create the resources of civilised life. The term productivity is not susceptible of exact definition: for we mean by using it to connect the artist's energy or inspiration with the growth of corn and cotton. We must, however, exclude for our present purpose the storage of force in capital without neglecting to consider the material which can be worked up immediately into usable goods for the promotion of life. Undoubtedly the whole of social life will ultimately depend not only on immediate production but upon the stores which we are able to leave to our descendants. But we are considering here the immediate and urgent problem of social reconstruction with which humanity will be faced when the war is over.

The importance of the question as to the amount of productivity available is due to the confusion or deterioration of civilised life which has resulted from the war: and this can only be appreciated if we look beyond the frontiers of our own state. In the British Empire we shall have on our shoulders the payment of war-loan interest to the amount of about £200,000,000 a year. At the opposite extreme of financial stability, Turkey will have to pay in

interest to Germany and Austria as much as £20,000,000 (Turkish) a year, whereas before the war she had only an annual expenditure of £9,000,000 (Turkish). In Russia an Economic Committee has been appointed by the Revolutionary Government for developing the productive forces of Russia in order that the country may recover from the financial extravagances of the Tsar's administration. But it is not simply a question of interest on loans for war expenditure. We have to make up for some years of stagnation or retrogression in industry; and outside the economic sphere, our education, our art and, some would say, even our moral and religious activities are "run down." All this is the cost of the war and not only the belligerents will pay for it. In neutral countries also machinery is deteriorating, ships are decaying, and the population, lacking food and clothing, is gradually losing its physical energy and intellectual or emotional ability. The whole world pays, in modern times, whenever there is a war.

We put aside any estimate of the dangers from which a successful, even if destructive, war may have saved us; and we turn our attention simply to those forces, economic, intellectual and moral, which will be available for reconstruction. For this purpose we must make an estimate of our loss and gain in productive power as affected by the war. The building of the new world will depend upon the stock of imagination and of material which we shall have remaining when peace comes; but most of all it will depend on the increase of productivity. Our power, therefore, of supplying quickly "consumable commodities," our power of reorganising the management of industry and our power to reform education and invigorate life—these are the forces which will govern our reconstruction and we must make a profit and loss account of them.

The loss in the total amount of our productivity is of two kinds, material and mental. For example, we have used up stocks of raw material which will be necessary for producing articles of clothing and, on the other hand, we have been physically and psychically exhausted by our

efforts. But the calculation of our loss can be still more exact. In the first place and on the material side, we shall produce less because machinery is run down or so worn out as to be valueless; other machinery will have to be adapted to peace output and our productivity will be less than normal because of the delay necessary in making the change. Ships have suffered through lack of repairs: those which survive are slower and more worn out than they were. Buildings have deteriorated or decayed. Again, the lack of transport (railway-trucks and ships) will delay the supplying of the raw material to industry, and our machines, therefore, will not begin to produce at their full power for some time after the war. In countries like the Argentine the same difficulties will delay the supply of food and raw material being sent to Europe.

The material which is necessary for productive work will be in many cases deficient. In Germany particularly there will be such a deficiency that, for example, the great wool industry will not be able to rise to its pre-war level of production: and even if there are ships to bring supplies to France or England, there may be no supplies to bring. Industry may be hampered for some time to come by a world-deficiency of raw material. And with this we should reckon the probable diminution of food supplies which will continue after the war. For the shortage is not due simply to a lack of ships to carry wheat or meat; there is a universal diminution of the available supply which will considerably lessen our productive power. The fields in Russia have been neglected and the stock of beasts in Argentine is less: indeed the productivity of the earth in most of the western countries has seriously diminished owing to a lack of cultivation, the withdrawal of labour and deficiency of fertilisers.

We must add to all this, on the *minus* side, the mortality and disablement of the war, not among soldiers only but also in the civil population of Poland, Galicia and Armenia. The percentage of deaths from disease and from accidents in ordinary industry has steadily increased throughout the

war and in every European country. New and fatal diseases have appeared and accidents in munition-working have lessened the available supply of labour even outside Europe. The new generation has been decimated by starvation and disease in the Central Empires and parts of Russia. The birth-rate, meanwhile, has declined in almost every western country and there have been an increasing number of births of "deficients," owing to shock, semi-starvation, or overwork of the mothers.

Such are the subtractions we must allow for in our productive energy, so far as mechanism and the supply of labour are concerned. We should connect with this the deficiency of capital. It is generally agreed that all the available capital, not already tied by government action, will be required to restore industry to its old position and that there will be a lack of capital for new ventures. We have in almost all nations been eating into our reserves of stored wealth; and the fear of investors as well as the suspicions of labour may very well cause a financial deadlock after the war. For here too the problem is rather one of psychology than of pure exchange.

Again, and also on the material side, the effect of war on every state will probably be to increase the expenditure on armaments. This means that so much more capital and labour will be withdrawn from productive work in the strict sense. Great masses of material will be accumulated which may never be used and may have to be periodically "scrapped" as the devices of war become more elaborate. The activities of greater numbers of young men will be devoted to preparing for war by drill and camp-life; and women will be periodically mobilised for warlike preparations.

In the more subtle region which unites the material needs and the emotional experiences of men, we shall have to reckon on a soreness between nations which may result in tariff wars. However noble the purpose of these, their result is a lessening of productivity; for a tariff is intended to hamper the natural or economic use of material from

foreign countries; and if such material can only be had at home by a greater expenditure of energy there is so much the less productivity. But warlike feelings survive wars and men are not likely to count the cost when injuring their late enemies is possible.

The soreness left by war will be found to divide not only nations but also classes within each nation. The early enthusiasms and fellowship of all classes in a common war-service gives place to forgetfulness on the part of the rich and suspicion on the part of the poor. The irritation of each group at the actions of the other is a definite hindrance to productivity; and this irritation is growing and will not cease to grow when the war is over. In 1914 the richer classes were almost awakened to the existence of starving children, overworked women and ill-clothed and ill-housed men. Women and children have not ceased to starve: men other than soldiers still need shelter and warmth, but they are now forgotten. On the other hand, the poor and the skilled workmen in 1914 were in a good humour with those of other classes who were willing to share the same dangers and discomforts. Now, even in Germany there are murmurs and suspicions. The wealthy have become more wealthy: they do not lack food or comfort. And in France where perception is keener than elsewhere the mood of the dispossessed is not by any means acquiescent. Irritation often tending to destructive revolt is increasing everywhere; and chaos is not a good background for productive work. But Society itself may in some regions be dissolved into contending groups. Again, education involves an increase of productive power; but education has suffered more severely than any other human institution during the war. In the purely "practical" sphere we shall find that we lack the normal supply of engineers and doctors. The teachers who have been trained are fewer: the hours of schooling have been shortened. Sentimentalism has taken the place of exact knowledge of history and science: and the atmosphere of violence among adults has lessened the probability that children may respect reason and kind-

liness. We shall not see the result of this ruin perhaps for twenty years; but meantime we shall have to allow for the fact that the new generation will be less effective as producers than the last has been until 1914.

Finally, it is the nature of enthusiasm, whether in one man or in a group, to be exhausted and to die down. Violent passion, even hate for an enemy, is difficult to maintain for over three years: and enthusiastic devotion to national service has a tendency to be worn out. At its best enthusiasm is fitful. But when all one's energies have been used for long the original spark out of which they grew to flame disappears in the surrounding ashes of ordinary life. It is exhausting even to be regarded as a permanent hero or heroine. Some few may feel enthusiasm for the reconstructing of the world at large but the vast majority will probably be too tired to be seriously revolutionary. If the native human inertia of the majority is counteracted by a lack of food, even then the result may be only some violence as ineffective as the smashing of crockery. Poets, prophets and visionaries may, indeed, arise: one cannot tell. Politicians may become imaginative. But we cannot be confident of such good fortune and, for the present, the indications point to tired acquiescence as the most we can expect of our spiritual force for producing a new world.

There is, however, a credit side to the account. Not even war can altogether deform or suppress the growth of nature and the adaptability of man. The grass grows soon on the shell-torn or trampled fields; and new-born children are, for the moment, "progressives" and "pacifists": for those under two years old seem still to be interested in life rather than in the results of war. There are also various forms of productivity which remain as a reserve for humanity which have not in fact been hitherto used. In the material sphere we must allow for the uncultivated land in various parts of the world which could quickly produce food. There are also raw materials, iron or timber, which only need the application of labour in order to increase

the amount of our world-supplies. And there are, in the non-material sphere, immense reserves of labour or of genius which will not be used at all if we merely go back to our pre-war methods of organising life. But such forces would be available even if there had been no war: and we may therefore omit them from our present calculation in order to concentrate attention upon the increase of productivity which has resulted from the war.

As regards the material or economic basis of life, mechanical contrivances have been improved. The productivity of many of our old mechanisms has been immensely increased: they can produce more, and more quickly, than they could in 1914. "Automatic" processes have increased the power in the hands of labour and made it possible for a greater number of men and women to produce what was in 1914 the result of "skill." Skill, in fact, is being transferred to the machine. Both in England and in Germany the machinery or "plant" for steel producing and hydraulic rivetting has increased in quantity. The rate is greater at which "half-finished" materials can be passed on to trades which depend on them. The production of "substitute" material for such purposes as clothing may have added to our reserves of power; and some substitutes may be permanently useful. The general health and strength of labour has probably been improved. The soldiers who survive have been comparatively well fed and well clothed and probably they will be in higher spirits when they return to industry than they were before they left it. There may not, there probably will not, be more contentment; but there may be more physical and intellectual vigour among them. Many classes of working people also, at least in England and America, have been better fed and clothed since the war; as for example the coalminers and the munition workers. And all this, quite apart from newly acquired skill, involves an increased productivity. Skill is difficult to estimate, but probably great numbers of women have increased their industrial value by familiarity with machines; and the adaptability of nearly all social classes

to new kinds of work during the war will certainly result in more force for production. With this we should reckon the discovery made by many that they can "do without" what they would have regarded in 1914 as necessary. Spartan restrictions are not permanent; but it increases power if some at least are freer of inherited custom. Women's dress may be modified and "upper" classes may be less hampered by conventions. All this is gain.

Further, the percentage of unemployment in most nations has steadily decreased since the beginning of the war: but this means that there are fewer people wasting time and strength in the mere expectation of work. If we can devise any method by which the "unemployed margin" shall not be again produced after the war we shall have increased our productivity. And it is quite possible that a bold policy in at least a few states may take account of seasonal or periodic unemployment in order to utilise all available strength. As for the attitude of labour, the value of which is not calculable in terms of price, there has been less restriction of output; and, both in England and Germany, great bodies of men and women have shown enthusiasm for the work they were called on to perform. Against their willingness, which is productive, must however be set the over-strain and the over-work from which many will have suffered. The willingness which it has proved possible to devote to industrial tasks may not survive four years of war. But on the whole something has been learnt by the experience through which we have passed; and if rhetoric or passion could stir labour to an almost reckless devotion for war purposes we may hope that the rebuilding of the social world will arouse no less enthusiasm. A definite and tangible purpose must be before the mind before there is any vigorous effort but so much needs to be done that we may hope for willing co-operation. That is an asset in our account.

Again, there has been an advance in the organisation of industry. Both the financing and the managing of business are probably more flexible and therefore more produc-

tive than they were before the war. There is a clearer perception than ever before of the need of good-will in the relations of employer and employed. Autocrats and revolutionaries still exist: but the great body of civilised men are willing to assist in a reorganisation of industry.

We may, therefore, as a result of our calculation conclude that we shall have to face after the war a considerable and certain loss in our productivity and on the other hand a gain which is indefinite, the value of which it is difficult to estimate at present. We cannot yet close the account. Very much more may be lost or gained before we reach the period of reconstruction: and while some will be inclined to say that our losses will be increasingly greater, others may expect a gradual diminution of the passions which hamper the development of civilised life.

The calculation does not deal with purely natural forces. We are not merely observers but actors in the issues which are revealed by an examination of the social world: and therefore we cannot simply leave the *plus* and *minus* of productivity to cancel one another or to result in any new equilibrium which may chance to follow. The natural and healthy result of our calculation should be the putting to ourselves of the question—What ought to be done? Clearly we must increase our productivity. This appears to be an opinion common to those of the possessing and to those of the labouring classes. Even clergymen and lawyers have begun to understand the necessity for more vitality and energy in social life, and that in all civilised nations. It is agreed also that in order to increase productivity we shall have to rearrange some of our social system. New methods of banking, new devices of business management, a better articulation of the world of supply and demand—these are all advocated as increasing productivity. But these are all superficial and inadequate corrections of social organization. We must strike deeper if we are to make any real difference to our control of social forces. A little deeper the new methods of education would take us, since education remains the most effective

power for transforming a social situation. It would be immensely important if the new generation could be given more exact knowledge, greater skill and a freer outlook upon life; for then the race might cast off at last its musty clothing of inherited loyalties to incompetence, of admiration for wealth and of desire for domination. But it seems that the urgency is too great for us to depend upon the effects of education. A starving world in which fewer every day can find opportunity for free and noble life, in which a light-hearted plutocracy drives over the bodies of the poor and the oppressed—such a world is not one which will wait in patience till the new generation is taught a new road to happiness. Different observers will differ in their opinion as to the urgency of the need for some fundamental social change, but the opinion of the majority of thinkers is steadily hardening. Revolution is in the air. Not only the poor are impatient. It is becoming generally felt that we have had enough of tinkering at feudalism and plutocracy in order to diminish their evil consequences while continuing their existence.

And therefore we must face the undeniable fact that it is not the banking system or the property system or the old education only that is at fault but the fundamental and all-powerful system of the relations of man to man. Suppose that we agree to increase productivity, we have at our elbows, first, the gospellers of "scientific management." They will tell us how to use muscle (other men's muscle) more effectively: they will show us how much more may be made if you can use up all the vitality of your workmen. You will give him "welfare" and good food, of course, expecting to get it all back from him in his work for you. Still cruder and more insolent is the assertion that productivity is hampered by "ca-canny" and restriction of output among workmen: for those who make such assertions do not see that the devices of the old trade unionism are defences against exploitation and attempts to secure a new power in which exploitation will be less easy. These simple suggestions as to the increase of productivity will

not lead to any radical action important enough to make a difference in the crisis we shall have to face. We must go still deeper to find the new sources of productivity. The need is urgent. The only adequate source of a new productivity is a transformation of the position of all who work to live. For when we look more deeply into the problem we see that productivity was hampered before the war not so much by "restriction of output" as by (1) lack of food for workers and their consequent inability to work or even to buy, by (2) industrial friction, both between capital and labour and between contending capitalists, and (3) ignorant and incompetent management.

Generation after generation has wasted its strength by a division of food, shelter and the amenities of life which gives a barren culture to the few and refuses to ninety per cent of the race the opportunities for a full human life. Such a division of our resources is partly the result of inherited and obsolete custom, partly it is due to the working of "natural" and inhuman economic tendencies. There is nothing sacred or unchangeable in the system; and the loss which might be entailed in its abolition would clearly be as nothing if compared with the immense productive forces which would be thereby released. The transformation must be based upon allowing to productive forces a larger share in the results of their labour. We should admit, of course, that accumulated wealth or coal-mines are productive forces in the widest sense of the words; but we must distinguish vitality and energy from such stores of wealth. At present we increase our stores at the expense of our energy, like a man who saves up his muscular strength by not using it. But in order to make up for the waste of war we must give a larger opportunity for all men and women to develop to the full their productive capacity of muscle and of brain.

With a proper supply of the means to live given to those who bear up the world by their labour of hand or brain, the friction of class with class, of trade with trade, and perhaps even of nation with nation might pass away. Men

who are happy do not easily hate and rage: but a world in which most are underfed and all are over-tired is a world of strikes and wars. This we can modify, if not abolish. And again, the new order must give place to greater imaginativeness in the management of trade and investment. Before the war it was piously believed by many students of history, politics and economics, that "business" men had a grasp of practical issues. That myth is exploded. The majority of business men appear to have the imaginations of cows, when any problem arises beyond the hedges of their own field; and he who cannot see beyond his own field has no practical grasp even of the business with which he is dealing. There are immense resources of imagination and organising ability which have never yet been tapped by our bankers, our merchants and our manufacturers. The devices which have been forced upon us by the war have proved that.

The ultimate source for increasing our productivity, therefore, is moral: and this moral source will influence all our politics, economics and social custom. For the possibility of transforming the relations of man to man depends on the moral imagination. The obstacle we have to contend with is not ill-will but the belief that "it cannot be done"; and there is no sacred or unfailing method for dealing with a lack of moral imagination. We may not be able to transform the outlook of employers or of workmen. On the other hand the moral imagination is susceptible of sudden and astonishing changes. Society during the Middle Ages, for example, was shaken to its foundations by the Friars' movement; and the advent of Christianity in the Roman Empire created a new social outlook even though it did not much affect social custom. We must not, therefore, despair of a transformation of outlook which will destroy or replace the old social order of domination and subservience. It may come suddenly.

It must, however, be confessed that such a transformation is not very probable. The period following the war will probably be too full of distracting problems of detail

for any wide vision to inspire the action of great masses of people. And a social transformation cannot occur unless the imagination of great numbers is inflamed by a definite desire, such as that for citizenship was in the French Revolution. If the claim is made by great numbers that workers shall have control of the conditions of their work, it cannot be resisted; but probably it will not be made by any but a few and disagreement as to immediate methods will probably render the enthusiasts ineffective. Nevertheless, action can be taken which will inevitably, if slowly, undermine the restrictions placed by our inherited social structure on the productivity of man; such action, for example, as is implied in a new education, the ninety per cent taxation of inherited wealth, the state-control of land and transport and the control of all conditions of labour by the actual workers. These do not imply any immediate social upheaval; but they lead to economic independence and a finer social life and they are all measures which can be adopted in any civilised state. Visionaries and poets must seek to inspire the moral imagination and so to transform radically the structure of our society. But those who are dealing with practical and immediate political and economic problems must carry into effect measures of compromise and moderation which will lead ultimately in the direction of freedom and finer social life. There should be no rivalry between the visionary and the reformer. Both look to the same sunrise: both have to endure without despair the same false signs of a dawn too long delayed.

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A METHOD OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

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IN THE present paper my purpose is to consider a familiar proposal for bringing about a more equitable distribution of the products of industry, which seems to me on the whole best to meet theoretical demands, while also it shows a reasonable chance of practical success. Limits of space will make it impossible to deal other than by implication with competing methods; and for the general principles which my argument presupposes I shall have to refer to an article in the previous number of this Journal.

It is of course just possible that men may on both sides so grow in wisdom and charity that, without further industrial changes of importance, they will come to a working agreement, and accept some percentage of division as equitable. But it is much likelier that for this to come about, a far more visible identity of interest will be called for than at present obtains. It is all very well to appeal to economic commonplaces to justify a belief in a common interest,—to say that when business is prosperous every one is better off, and so that the more money the employer makes, the better it is for his workmen. But when the laboring man sees his employer buying yachts and automobiles, and giving banquets, and going to Europe, and himself hard put to it to afford a new overcoat or take a week at the seaside, somehow the point of the contention seems to him obscured. It is too much to expect theoretical proofs of identity of interest to count for much in bringing about a better feeling; what is needed is a form of evidence plain and simple enough for the average man, and his wife, to see and estimate.

The most natural direction in which to look for this is already suggested in the statement of the problem. What we need primarily to do is to promote harmony of action, as against the waste and friction of present militant condi-

tions. Accordingly the nearest issue would be some definite form of co-operation which should extend the control of the laborer over the conditions of his life, while increasing substantially his income through some form of sharing in the added profits of the business that may be expected to result. This plainly would create a tangible proof of community of interest in the form of a larger bank account. It would offer the individual incentive in which modern industry is sadly deficient. And, if rightly managed, it might satisfy measurably those other claims of the worker which have lent force and bitterness to the labor controversy. But of course it is essential that the thing should be conducted on right lines; otherwise the failure which has so often attended well-meant enterprises of the sort will be assured.

It may be taken for granted that no profit-sharing scheme will be a success unless it removes the psychological causes in the workingman which promote discontent. It is not enough to give an employee larger wages; this may easily be done in a way to make him more insistent. The whole motive for profit-sharing involves getting the worker into a friendly state of mind; unless it does this, it is a waste of money from the employer's standpoint. And this does not mean what *you* think *ought* to satisfy him, but what does leave him measurably content. Accordingly it will be necessary, on the negative side, to go to all the pains necessary to allay the suspicion in the workingman that the scheme is a mere device to exploit him more effectively. It must be made decisively clear that there is not the least intention of putting it to the use to which it has sometimes been put,—of making it, that is, a means of discovering how much more the laborer is capable of doing, and then forcing everybody up to the same standard by manipulating wages. To the same end, the division ought not to be arbitrary, but should stand in some acknowledged and discoverable relation to the total profits, large enough not to offend the natural sense of fairness, and under conditions of full publicity. A specially indefensible end, which puts

a stop at once to the peace-making power of the scheme, is to use it as a club for enforcing submissiveness in the employee, by making the latter's claim dependent on conditions that give first place to the will of the company. Even when the purpose is not intentionally to get the whip hand of the working body, any disposition to make the benefit conferred less than a strict right will be unfortunate. Workingmen have had altogether too much experience of the benevolent employer, who is willing to do things for them so long as it is a matter of the voluntary goodness of his heart, which leaves him, however, free to resent the absence of that grateful recognition which he conceives his due, and to change his mind when he feels like it. The academic person, if he finds it hard to sympathize with this feeling in the worker, might translate it into terms of a pension board to whom it is open at any moment to alter the published conditions of its provisions for him, while reading him a moral lesson at the same time on his unworthiness.

The difficulties in the way of taking such an industrial régime as a satisfactory solution of the industrial problem are of course numerous and weighty, and I can only deal with them in rather general terms. Objections might come in the first place from the side of economic theory. Here a plausible difficulty is that which rests upon the general conditions of wage payment. Any general rise in wages, it might be maintained, is impracticable, since the increase would have to be drawn from capital; and this would mean a lessening of production, and so the growing inability to pay wages. I do not pretend to enter here upon the intricacies of economic doctrine, for which in any case I am incompetent; but there are certain suggestions that are obvious even to the layman. In the first place, if the same number of workers, with the same capital, were to produce more goods, a bettered condition would result in which the laborer might share. And to this result the proposed scheme, if successful, would be conducive. Since its first object is to remove the psychological obstacles which now

exist to enlisting the full productive power of labor, its outcome ought to be clearly a very considerable enlargement directly of the product of industry.

But there is another way in which the supposed evil results of wage raising might be avoided. There is one form in which, if it could be brought about, profits might be reduced, and the amount added to wages, without any bad economic effects,—if, that is, the increase could be taken not from what is now invested, but from what is spent by the employer on himself and his family. And this would be widely felt to be a gain all around. It is recognized almost universally that extravagant expenditure among the rich has gone too far; if luxury could be curtailed, and a more sensible standard of living adopted, everybody in the end might be better off. And it seems not improbable that here too such a policy as I am considering would exert an influence. There are two instrumentalities by which luxury and unnecessary expenditure could be checked,—by the growth of different standards in society, so that conspicuous waste would no longer be thought the best way of making oneself favorably or enviably known, and by diminishing the amount of money a person has to spend; the last being probably the more direct and certain method. It is not impossible that the healthier human element introduced into the industrial situation would have a salutary effect on prevailing standards; certainly the closer the relationship between the richer and the poorer class, the more the heartlessness, and the bad taste, of much of present expenditure would be apparent. And in so far as the result was an actual reduction of profits to the owner, there would of course be less money to spend, and a fair chance that this might show in a reduction of personal expenditure rather than in decreased savings. Naturally the latter might also be the result. But as this would ultimately be a suicidal policy for the employer as well as for the workingman, since, if his capital were continuously depleted, his means would also lessen, it is not a very violent assumption to suppose that the ultimate tendency

would be to reinforce ethical motives favoring a more sensible way of living for the rich.

Meanwhile there is a further possibility. Supposing even that a part of profits that might have functioned as capital is transferred to the worker, no harm is done in case the worker also saves this, and invests it. Now that he will do so, or indeed that he is as likely to do it as the capitalist, cannot very well be claimed with confidence. One cannot even make an entirely clear case for urging it upon him as an obligation. Thrift is not so plainly a virtue as it was in the days when the relative poverty of the world made careful saving necessary to provide for an even then too scanty capital. The increased capacity of modern industry has eased the strain somewhat, and may be expected to do so still more in the future, so as to justify a decreased emphasis on the duty of saving, and a greater one upon the positive claims of life and enjoyment. We no longer listen with so keen an approval as formerly to moral exhortations to the poor to give up any thought of getting the most out of life as it passes, and to lay up their money by close economy for a rainy day; it strikes us that this advice, coming from the most part from the well-to-do, who would not for a moment think of following it themselves, rather unduly emphasizes the negative and prudential virtues, and not enough the positive demands of the good life. But it still remains true that capital will not grow unless some one saves; and without the growth of capital wealth will not be increased, and so the material conditions of a good life will simply not exist. That this is a fatal obstacle, however, it would need a good deal of further experience to demonstrate. Even at present small savings form a considerable source of capital; and with appreciably greater prosperity for the masses, these would naturally be increased. And it is to be noted, especially, that co-operation may very well take the shape of an accumulation of the workingman's profits in the form of a share in the business; and in this way the need for capital is automatically met. Both the motive and the opportunity for saving are

provided here in a degree much greater than at present. Much of the complaint against the improvidence of the poor is true in point of fact; but it also is almost wholly ineffective and irrelevant. It is foolish to expect the industrial virtues, or any other virtues, in the absence of adequate motivation; the only sensible remedy lies, not in preaching to the workingman and telling him how bad he is, but in seeing to it that it is to his self interest to change. The laborer is scolded because he is shiftless and indifferent to the interests of his employer—that gives away the whole case. Why *should* he be expected to be so careful of his *employer's* interest? and yet it is this plainly which looms largest with the employer himself when he makes the indictment. It is said indeed that in this way the laborer will rise in the ranks, and better his own condition. Perhaps he will to an extent, though merit has been known to go unrewarded. But at any rate this is an argument based upon the good, not of labor, but of the special and picked laborer. It does not even pretend that labor as a whole is going to be benefited, but is frankly an appeal to the competitive instinct for the best jobs. So regarded, it has a little the aspect of a lottery; everybody is encouraged to put in his money on the chance that he will be the lucky man, though a moment's reflection will show that all but a few are bound to be disappointed. The only individual who is sure of benefit is the man who runs the lottery. We are still misled here by the tradition of America as the place where everybody has a chance of getting ahead, and fail to notice that the tradition applies to a very different America from that of to-day. When conditions were such that if a man did not like his job he could at any moment turn independent farmer or prospector, the general level of wages was raised by this possibility, and all labor benefited; now, when "opportunity" means chiefly the chance to compete for the better paid positions within the business itself, the level remains unaffected.

The chief drawback to the instalment of co-operative profit-sharing of any thoroughgoing sort does not, however,

depend on theoretical scruples, but on the unwillingness of the employing class. There are various proposals for benefiting the condition of the workingman which the far-sighted employer will welcome as equally for his own good. It is now generally admitted, for example, that it is not for a man's own advantage, in any normal state of the labor market, to overwork his men. He will get less out of them in the end; and so a more generous policy in connection with hours of labor is also good business. Wherever the result is an increase in the product, it is always possible that after granting something to the men, enough will be left to increase profits as well. This is naturally, therefore, the popular business receipt for settling the labor problem, —to increase productivity so that labor can be better paid without any sacrifice by capital, and even to its advantage. Or, if this is not the case, and an increase of wages is so much added to the cost of production, then the common notion of business fairness is to pass this on, and let the consumer pay.

Now nothing of this sort by itself is, I am convinced, going to make any very appreciable difference to the general industrial discontent. The employer has not simply the congenial task before him of making more money through more enlightened methods; he is bound to grant real concessions also. This means two things in particular. First, and beyond question, it stands for the frank recognition, foreign to the natural temper of the business man, that instead of his business being something that belongs to him alone, to be run precisely as he pleases, and his helpers a part merely of its necessary machinery, it is in some genuine sense a co-operative enterprise, in which all concerned are partners, and have, to the extent of their interest, some hand in the management. The typical well-intentioned employer still has a quite different ideal in mind; and it need not be denied that the ideal possesses certain specious charms. The class-conscious workingman of the present day is not a wholly attractive personality; one may be excused if in some ways he prefers the older

type of the hard-working, frugal employee, faithful to his master's interest and proud of the concern, but an individualist in his relations to his fellow workmen, and properly scornful of the tricks of the "agitator." But if anything resembling this type is ever to come back, it must certainly be with a difference. Loyalty to the "business" must include, not exclude, loyalty to his fellows; and a share in its success must come not as a favor, but as an admitted right, for the exercise of which adequate co-operative machinery is provided. It is this which the union has set as its implicit ideal,—to make labor a real partner in the business. What it has been fighting for is less this or that wage adjustment in particular, than the right to meet the employer on equal terms, and arrange by consultation the matters which mutually concern both parties; and what the hostile employer has as consistently been determined on is to refuse this claim, to treat the business as his private affair, and the workmen, individually and collectively, as outsiders with no voice in the settling of conditions, who can take what he offers or leave it. And until such an attitude is given up, and given up without reserve, industrial peace is inconceivable.

But also there is something more to be added. Supposing that the workers in a plant have collectively secured the right to help determine the policy of the business, the most difficult question still remains to be settled: on what basis are the profits to be divided? I have held that there is no *a priori* principle of justice to answer this; but it certainly looks as if this much at least were true, that nothing will meet the growing ideal of fairness which simply gives the worker a portion of the increase which he is now, by hypothesis, ready to bring about, and which does not also actually decrease the chance of profit for the employing class. This is something which it is hard for well-to-do people to get into their heads. Not long ago I noticed the report of a sermon by a prominent clergyman in which he read a moral lesson to the laborer, who, so he was told, was quite right in wanting to see his wages raised, but who

ought not to commit the palpable injustice of expecting this unless he was willing to earn the increase by harder or longer work. In a similar vein, a leading newspaper opens an editorial with the proposition, supposed to be self-evident, that the public, if it chooses to sympathize with a current strike to increase wages, must of course be ready to pay the bills, it being unthinkable, apparently, that the employers should be expected to stand a loss. This naive assumption that labor is getting its fair proportion now, and that this supplies a standard by reference to which the justice of all change is to be measured, shows at any rate an incapacity for getting on common ground with the workingman. What he maintains is precisely this, that labor is *not* getting its fair share. It is just the employer's share, in principle, that should stand the loss for the more general benefit; change should move in the direction of a greater equalization.

It is idle, therefore, to ignore the fact that any system which works on a large scale to reduce industrial discontent, must almost certainly be, not merely a device for getting more out of the men, and so increasing the income of everybody alike, but an occasion for an actual decrease in the profits of the employing class. Certainly the more successful employer now reaps a reward which it is very difficult to justify to the social conscience. To be sure, it may be pointed out that the margin of profit for the average business man is relatively modest, while he may even fail to make a profit at all; and this constitutes a difficulty to be considered. But in reply there are at least two things to be said. While the point would undoubtedly be pertinent if we were proposing simply to raise the rate of wages all around, it is partly taken care of by the particular scheme of co-operative profit-sharing. For of course where there are no profits, the workmen cannot share in them; and since the guaranteed wage under such conditions is likely to approach a minimum, the necessary expense of the business need not be any greater than at present. It is true some complications would be introduced for the in-

efficient manager. He would doubtless find it harder to get good workmen; and he may be expected to put forward the plea that it is unfair for men to share in profits who do not also take their share of the losses. But *why* should it be considered unfair? To say nothing of the fact that the men *do* in a sense share the losses, since they are compelled to forego the gains that better management brings to their fellow workmen in other concerns, there is a more general answer which seems sufficient. The greater chance of loss is a price the manager ought in justice to pay for the chance of greater gains. And when it is said that there are employers who right now are on the ragged edge, and whom any new demand would push over into bankruptcy, I do not see that it is not competent to reply: If they cannot succeed on terms which are called for by the best interests of the industrial situation, let them fail, and other more efficient business men take their places. When it is the laborer that is in question, we have not been accustomed to be so tender of inefficiency. If we are called upon to pay the leaders fancy prices for their brains, they should take the consequences of failure to use them successfully, and not try to pass these on to their subordinates. Meanwhile there are other advantages to the employer which would offset his money loss to some degree; in particular, he would have a real increment of business security, and this might particularly appeal to the less successful employer. If the workmen were actively interested in advancing the concern, the consequent immunity from labor risks, along with the increased product, would be bound to put the business on a firmer basis. And probably there are many business men who would think this added security a desirable substitute for the chance—the mere chance as it is now—for a larger income.

However, I should hardly be optimistic enough to expect, in spite of these last considerations, the average business man voluntarily to accept a scheme which he knew beforehand was likely to reduce both his power and his profits; if the policy becomes at all general, the chances are that it

will have to be due not in the first instance to free choice, but to necessity. This might come conceivably from collective or governmental action; but for reasons which I have not space here to enlarge upon, this seems to me both unlikely and undesirable. The alternative is through the present method of class conflict. It has, I grant, a somewhat alarming sound at first to suggest that the only way out of the present very bad situation is to let the rivals fight the thing to a conclusion. And yet if the circumstances are examined, it does not after all seem hopeless. Nor is it without precedent to look, for the settlement of a quarrel, to the new light that sometimes comes to a man after he has got a sound beating in a fair fight.

First, however, there are two plain conditions to be met before we have any right to expect the chance, even, of a permanent peace. On the one hand, no issue can possibly be satisfactory which does not promote efficiency in industry, and production on a scale large enough to provide the material for a widely extended human good. It must therefore find a place for, and stimulate, every available power of hand and brain. A state of general warfare does not do this; and unless, therefore, the conflict takes a form which actively looks toward, and has some influence in furthering, co-operation, the outlook seems rather hopeless. If we have to wait until organized capital or organized labor is brought to its knees and forced to unconditional surrender, we have plainly a long and weary road ahead of us.

This last hope is, however, precisely what the newest philosophy of labor sets before itself as its goal. The ideal of syndicalism is, if my thesis is correct, in its large features not incapable of being justified; but it is tied up to a method which the impartial observer must regard as most unlikely to succeed. Indeed, even apart from practical difficulties, on one fundamental point its method, and its end, seem inherently inconsistent. This is due to its reliance on secret violence. Such a policy has in the nature of the case to be decided on by a few leaders without public

discussion, and executed by tools; and the inevitable issue is an amount of irresponsible power in a limited number of hands which would be one of the surest ways to wreck the cause of labor. Meanwhile the syndicalist's vision of the outcome toward which he is pointed is extremely sketchy, where it is not plainly absurd. The immediate future is all that lies clearly within his view,—to worry the capitalist, and do him all the injury possible; but what is to happen afterwards is vague to a degree, and where it loses vagueness it becomes rather puerile. How the desired issue—the disappearance of the employer and the taking over of his business by the workmen—is to be mediated, very little attention is paid to disclosing; it is assumed that it will happen without mediation, and as a matter of course. And the further assumption that, when it happens, all industrial trouble is over, that a business has only to be owned by those who do the actual work for antagonisms to cease automatically, as if the mere recognition that one was dealing with fellow workmen would dispel quarrels and insure universal charity,—that "among producers the golden rule will obtain"—is marked by an entire disregard of human nature.

A second condition which syndicalism repudiates is more capable perhaps of being disputed. But to me it appears nearly as plain as any proposition can well be, that no issue to the conflict is conceivable which does not satisfy the ordinary human instinct of good sportsmanship and fair play. For one thing, neither party to the dispute is likely to quit so long as he feels himself a victim of plain injustice. He will prolong the fight as much as possible; and to this end he will be forced to combine with his fellows, and organize his opposition on as large a scale as he can. It is to such inclusive and country wide organizations that we are already approaching; and as the combination is completed, and cemented by the bitterness and hatred out of which the immediate need for it springs, we shall have just the situation most likely to issue in a deadlock, with all its consequences of permanent industrial insecurity.

But also there is another rôle which justice plays. When for any reason public opinion is quiescent, it is possible for the antagonists to persuade themselves that the good will of the outsider is unimportant; but this is a bad mistake of judgment. No cause is likely to succeed in the face of a really aroused public sentiment. And experience shows that approval turns almost invariably to the side which can make out the strongest case for itself in terms of equity and reason. But this granted, the conclusion which I have already drawn seems to me to follow, that the final issue is bound to be, relatively, a gain for the laborer rather than the capitalist. For it is the laborer who is at present at a disadvantage, whose interests are obviously not very well attended to by the existing order, and whose basic demands a natural sense of fair play is pretty sure to accede to as justifiable. The right to a reasonable measure of control over one's own life, work, and destiny, no one when he questions his own breast can disregard; and to secure this means of necessity a diminution of the power that traditionally has lain in the hands of the owner of the business. So too, in terms of a standard of living, it is plainly much more important that the workingman should have his income substantially increased, than that the comfortable and wealthy classes should avoid a slight or even a considerable loss. Provided, then, that it does not abuse its privileges, the working class has the natural advantage of position, and can count on carrying the sympathy of the majority for the ends which it sets before itself in the class struggle.

If then we find the laborer so often forfeiting the advantage belonging to a just cause, it is hardly to be sufficiently explained as a consequence of the selfishness and obtuseness of the bourgeoisie. Public approval has gone out too often and too spontaneously to the employee to enable the charge of a general lack of sympathy to be sustained. And it will be worth while asking for what reasons this sympathy is found to fail.

The conditions which, in a labor dispute, lead the public to interest itself most unreservedly on the side of the men,

are plain enough; it is in proportion to the relative weakness of the employee, the lowness of his wages, the length of his hours, and other things that appeal unambiguously to a natural preference for the cause of the under dog. Such a comparison is bound, however, to be a very relative one, after we leave the level of extreme poverty and suffering. It is more difficult to interest the public in a move to increase the wages of workmen who are already, as it is called, well paid; and unfortunately the common notion of what constitutes a fair wage is apt to be determined by the higher reaches of the customary wage, whatever rises much above this being looked on with suspicion. If a skilled workman wants to get his pay increased from four to five dollars a day, the average man is likely to be quite convinced of the extravagance and unreason of his demands, and to interpret it as a clear case of over-pay now rather than of under-pay before. The familiarity of the existing scale leads him to take this as the standard of equity; and he seldom stops to ask himself how adequate even the new standard may be to the demands of a satisfying life, or whether he would be satisfied with it himself. Accordingly any disposition of the public to judge questions of justice in terms of existing standards is apt to fall short of the demands of the industrial situation, and cannot be taken therefore as a permanent limit to the feasibility of the workingman's program, in so far as this depends on the existence of public sympathy for its success.

What does, however, constitute a much more permanent and defensible ground of objection, is the attendent disposition to promote even a justifiable claim in apparent disregard of the interests of others. The plainest case, in principle, is where advantage to a small group of workmen is sought without any heed to the welfare of other members of the laboring class. This selfish policy has done a good deal to moderate the good will of the public. The endeavor to make a trade a narrow corporation, powerful enough to enforce its demands by a policy accruing solely to its own gain, is indeed not a whit more reprehensible than similar

practices quite the rule in business, and even professional circles; and of course it may be attended with a considerable measure of success. But in the nature of the case, no solution of the labor question is going to be final which does not affect those who need help *most;* and these are the ones least powerful through an exclusive organization. Solidarity, therefore, among workingmen, is an essential element in a program that promises success; since anything that aims at a labor aristocracy not only fails to utilize the power that comes from numbers, and leaves to capital a powerful weapon in the reserves of labor material on which it can draw, but also, in proportion as it is successful, it dries up automatically the springs of sympathy on which labor, like any other part of the social whole, is ultimately dependent.

Closely connected with the disregard on the part of privileged labor of its less fortunate associates, is its equal disregard of the general public. Of course in an abnormal state of affairs we must expect some incidental unpleasantness; and in so far as it is unavoidable, the sensible man will take it calmly. The citizen who complains because he has to walk or pay cab fare for a time, if this is necessary to the removing of real grievances from which city railway employees are suffering, is himself displaying, perhaps in an aggravated form, the same selfishness which he decries in others. But if he has reason to suspect that the unionist on his part is refusing to take into consideration any one's point of view but his own, is ready to sacrifice even weighty interests in order to get his way, and in general is guilty of the same abuse of power that constitutes injustice elsewhere, he is at once inclined, and reasonably so, to take sides against him. Of course it is conceivable that necessity may be so great as to justify a very large amount of incidental evil; but this happens more and more infrequently. The working class has already got an advantageous start, while on occasion it has even acquired something of the power that formerly belonged to capital; in its own interest, therefore, it can afford to move without undue haste, if that would jeopardize success in the long run.

But now there is a third and more controversial form of the exercise of "fairness" in methods of industrial warfare. The bitterness of the conflict, in so far as the laborer is responsible for this, is mainly due to the fact that he has not on the whole had any too keen a sense of the need for applying the rules of fair play to the employing class as well. There have been many and honorable exceptions; but the temptation has been to regard employers as such as natural enemies, toward whom we are excused from the niceties of ethical conduct. And the result is unquestionably the promotion of hard feelings. If an employer finds agreements repudiated, and attempts made to take advantage of his misfortunes, if he sees himself lumped with other employers less willing than himself to be fairminded, and sacrificed as a tool to get at them when no grievances are held against himself, and if, in general, he is made to feel that his men have no disposition to respond to decent treatment, it would not be human nature not to develop a hostile temper. I do not intend implying that the situation is to be blamed wholly, or primarily, on the unions. On the contrary, it has been the inevitable accompaniment of their fight for recognition against prejudice and obstinate unfriendliness; and since at the beginning it was in the power of the employer, not of the workingman, to set the tone of the struggle, it is more to the former as a class than to the latter that the blame must be attached. But this does not mean much to the individual employer who now wishes to be reasonable; and consequently the unions cannot avoid responsibility for the policy they adopt, no matter what its historical excuse.

Of course I am not suggesting that the workingman has only to abandon methods that violate the general sense of fairness to gain his ends. But it does appear to me that a change of emphasis, of which this is an essential precondition, might very well hold out promise of ultimate success in all reasonable aims. The change of emphasis is this, that rather than make its fight primarily for small increments of wage increase, which holds out no promise of

other than hostile relations to employers as a class, the union should, instead, aim to attain its ends through making a sharp distinction between employers, and using its weapons first of all to discriminate against such as refuse to do their part toward bringing about harmony of action; and then—the second and essential step—through setting itself systematically, within the field in which the spirit of co-operation is able to supplant that of class warfare, the task, which so far organized labor has almost totally neglected, of experimenting constructively to meet the problem of increasing the efficiency of the industrial process—a task which it could not very well attempt under present conditions without jeopardizing its militant interests, and playing into the hands of the other side.

It is not to be supposed that this would mean giving up either militancy, or, within limits, legislative action. More and more the state is practically forced to deal with the extremer facts of poverty in the laboring class, as it has already dealt with the extreme cases of danger to life and health, on the general principle that uniformity of action is necessary to prevent competitive conditions from annulling the good will even of a majority of employers themselves, and that such uniformity cannot be insured without the power of the state to enforce it. It might be the heroic treatment to leave individuals to suffer till time and private experiment had found a way to remove the conditions responsible for their misery; but we find ourselves continually less able to take here the heroic course. I do not know how far the modern state is likely to go in the direction of palliative measures to relieve the pressure of dire need, or what forms of action it will settle on as least likely to do incidental harm. But what seems clear is that the particular sort of principled justification for legislative action that can be used here, applies primarily only in connection with the extremer forms of need; and unless, therefore, we hold that the labor problem is settled when acute poverty is relieved, and every one assured of a minimum wage and a pension just enough to keep him from the

work house, there is plenty of room for constructive effort on the part also of the laborer to better his own condition. And furthermore, I do not anticipate that labor organizations will have any lack of occasion to fight for their demands, since the principle of organized co-operation is exactly what calls forth the deepest hostility in a portion of the employing class. But in two ways their position might be strengthened. To begin with, good will would stand a much better chance of being elicited in the more enlightened employer. At present the employer is in a quandary. Though he may agree that the right to organize is indubitable, he yet, in the absence of anything but a fighting program in the unions, sees himself being pushed all the time toward disaster. With no positive goal of industrial construction ahead, his dealing with the union becomes a matter of one wage concession after another, with no limit in view. If he once were convinced of a willingness to turn to the problem of industry itself the energy that now goes into militancy, on terms which, instead of whittling down his margin of safety, gave him a place automatically made secure so long as he proved his worth as a manager, it is certain that with many of the employers the men could get together. Meantime they would also be enlisting economic forces that would make for the industrial survival of their friends, and the confusion of their enemies. If instead of preaching the gospel of the conflict between capital and labor, the union were to emphasize rather the need of co-operation between capital and labor, and a necessary conflict only between labor and those particular capitalists who refuse to accept this ideal, using their good will to help out those who on the contrary are disposed to be friendly by giving them an advantage over competitors, they might very possibly find that they had the situation in their own hands.

It may be said that this does not tell us after all how to settle the ultimate question in dispute—the proper division of wealth. But my point is just this, that, in the first place, while we can assume that the ideal is in the direction

of equalization, there is no conceivable basis on which to determine how far this equalizing process can safely go apart from indefinitely extended experiment, and, second, that the necessary preliminary for even making a start toward a stable solution is the creation of a human attitude willing to set aside fundamental hostility, and accept a co-operative basis. And to this end some form of non-paternalistic profit sharing, in which labor is willing to shift its immediate objective—except where intolerable wage conditions still rule—to the job of helping out to the extent of its power such portion of the employing class as is well disposed, and experimenting in co-operation with these in the direction of efficiency of production, offers what appears at the present time to have the fairest chance of success. What the final outcome would be, is of course only guesswork. It is quite thinkable that as workmen got more and more a share in the business, and as knowledge of its workings grew with experience, they might gradually come in an amicable way to take it over, paying such a price for management as the state of the market demanded. Or it may be that the owner would continue to justify himself even to his men, by enabling them to earn more than similar shops with less effective management. Quite probably both things might happen in different instances; it really would not matter much so long as economic efficiency had a chance to determine the result, without, as now, leading to the vast discrepancies of fortune that tend to depress one industrial class for the benefit of the other.

ARTHUR K. ROGERS.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

Authority, Liberty and Function in the Light of the War. A critique of Authority and Liberty as the foundations of the modern State and an attempt to base societies on the principle of Function. By Ramiro de Maeztu. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. Pp. 288. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Ramiro de Maeztu is a Spaniard and a journalist who has done the cause of the Allies much service by his writings in the press of his own country. In this book, the substance of which has appeared in the form of articles in the *New Age*, he discusses general questions of political theory raised by the war. His knowledge of European philosophical literature seems to be remarkably wide, and he shows a genuinely journalistic ability in turning the most various doctrines to the uses of his argument. He appears to be in general agreement with the Guild Socialism associated with the *New Age*, though there is little discussion of its economic side and none at all of its details. I think the book is very significant, both as a contribution to political thought and in the light it throws on the more recent developments of Socialist theory.

The basis of his political doctrine is the notion of function, but he draws from it conclusions quite different in some respects from those which have been traditionally associated with it. Practically it comes to this—he parts company with Plato and with all his modern followers like Hegel and Green by making the functional principle apply to the state itself as well as to the social groups or social institutions "within" it. This, of course, is a great deal more than merely to insist on the distinction between society and the state. It is common ground that society is the social whole. The difference is as to the state. For the traditional political doctrine the state is society regarded as a unit rightly exercising force on behalf of the best life. For Mr. de Maeztu it is only a particular organ of society charged with certain specific and limited functions—apparently chiefly the maintenance of order and the administration of justice. It has no necessary priority over the others and no authority outside

its own sphere. Like them, it is altogether subordinate to its function and its function to the thing it serves. This doctrine is not new as a criticism of the sovereignty of the state. In its general character it does not differ much from the ideas that historians like Maitland or Figgis have been working out. No doubt the historical material, mediæval or modern, controlling all these writers has a fundamental identity—the prominence, namely, with which appears the autonomy of the smaller—generally voluntary—group, whether this be the guild or the Teutonic community or the Church or a trade union. What mainly distinguishes Mr. de Maeztu is his attempt to relate his doctrines to very recent logical and ethical and juridical theories. He constantly acknowledges his debt to Husserl and Mr. G. E. Moore. The fundamental error which has haunted political theory is subjectivism, which imagines that goodness or right has an essential relation to some mind. The subjectivist view of law, *e.g.*, treats the location of the sovereignty in a state as the fundamental question, instead of discussing as it ought what the principles are which make the association possible. Objectivity is correlated with discharge of function: subjectivity is reference to autonomous will which need never lead beyond caprice and carries with it no guarantee of value.

This emphasis on the autonomous will gives Mr. de Maeztu the division of his criticism. To use as principle of explanation the will of the social group is the German heresy. The fundamental thing in social life is then the power that society possesses as a whole, and this is the state. From that follow sovereignty and the identification of good men with good citizens and patriots. With this Mr. de Maeztu connects the Hegelian tradition in English and German thought—I think he takes it right back to Kant—and as a species of it, Marxism. But it is also possible to pursue the same fundamental error in the opposite direction. Substitute the will of the isolated individual for that of the group and you have the principle of Liberty. Here Mr. de Maeztu has in mind the Philosophical Radicals and the whole Liberal tradition in England. He devotes a few chapters which reach a very high level of thinking to the political consequences of its hedonism. With it all he connects a most fascinating revival of the doctrine of original sin, obviously largely derived from Sorel. The real trouble, he argues in effect, is that people *will* believe in the goodness of human nature and think the universe friendly,

instead of looking with a decent Christian humility to the eternal values which lie beyond themselves.

The third section of the book is a discussion of function and values, and an attempt to indicate how society can be based on the functional principle. This applies both to internal and to international affairs. For just as no man has any subjective right to anything, so no state has any subjective right to govern a territory. The rights of states depend on the functions they perform in the development of human solidarity and the increase of values. The fact that there is at present no authority to enforce them is quite irrelevant. That a right is not realised does not affect its objectivity any more than a man's *de facto* legal possession of property shows that he performs any function which justifies him in it. Mr. de Maeztu follows Plato in finding the functional principle at work wherever there is a connected social life, and the attempt to organise life on this principle plainly depends on the growth of institutions corresponding to functions in the state and the self government of these, also on a functional basis. It is unnecessary to argue whether this is democracy. Mr. de Maeztu commonly calls it Syndicalism; he has in mind no more than a reference to what M. Lagardelle calls the "Socialism of Institutions," and this he takes rather differently from writers who have also been influenced by this side of the movement. He does not as I understand him pay much attention either to the autonomy of the corporate groups or to the division among them of the sovereignty of the formally unitary state. This brings him closer than he thinks to the idealist writers and also obscures his doctrine—if he has one—of liberty. Both points are, I think, worth brief discussion.

Mr. de Maeztu would hold that it is his doctrine of function and value that marks him out. This is not so. Idealist political theory has always insisted on function and correlated it with value; and it would agree largely with his criticism of authority and wholly with that of liberty. Further, it can be put in a form which protects it at least in the first instance from the charge of subjectivity. Value no doubt is a character which belongs only to conscious experience, but it is logically connected with objective features of that experience—its harmoniousness and comprehensiveness. In rejecting this latter doctrine Mr. de Maeztu agrees with Mr. G. E. Moore; and therefore his whole political theory lacks the attempt to place in an ordinal series the

different institutions of social life and to find in them all the one common general purpose differently realised in each, which the idealist calls the state. A divergence like this can be traced to disagreement on points of logical theory; but it implies also a fundamental difference in the content of the social experience used as material.

In the second place, Mr. de Maeztu's anxiety to dispose of the traditional English view of liberty and substitute for it "the primacy of things" brings him near to denying altogether its value. Formally, his doctrine is that values are fundamental and liberty only an instrumental end: even if we take the latter as participation in the government or citizenship (p. 239) it is not difficult to treat the realisation of this in particular individuals as a rather unimportant detail. I do not imagine that Mr. de Maeztu himself takes this view of it, but only that it would be easy for other people to do so on the pretext of maintaining the purity of his own doctrine. In this respect the case is parallel to that of the really characteristic German doctrine of nationality, which holds that the value of a nation is to be judged by its contribution to culture: for which the interesting corollary follows that since German culture is superior to that of other peoples it has a right to impose its culture and its nationality on them. Hence, *e.g.*, neither Polish nor Irish nationality can possibly matter. But the fact is that a nation is constituted primarily by its historical unity and its basis of common sentiment, and other nations should respect and encourage its desire to become autonomous, because only thus will it be possible for it to develop its peculiar contribution to culture. Nationality in fact is not merely an instrumental value; it is itself a source of values. The case is similar with political liberty, which is also a potential value, recognised because it will give birth to others.

The real defect of Mr. de Maeztu's view is, that having set its face sternly against romanticism and its pandering to human self-satisfaction, it has not remembered that values are after all realised in persons and that any general attempt to state what they are does not tell us who are their bearers, and cannot do so. And because this is so even in seeking not after the things which are seen but after those which are eternal we must depend in the first instance on the development and recognition of voluntary groups within society: for this is the principle of toleration and the source of all progress towards the desired end. Original sin

may be the essence of religion, but we must treat men as if they were made in the image of their Maker, lest peradventure their rulers who always imagine themselves the elect think themselves justified even in this world.

The significance of the book as a product of present-day socialist thought is that it may serve as an indication of the direction in which Syndicalism may develop itself as a theory. The conflict with the older (especially English) Collectivist doctrine may be taken as complete, and the agreement of Guild Socialism with several vigorous elements in recent political thought is no doubt one source of its strength, though whether the latter will always feel quite comfortable with its new ally is doubtful. On the other side, we are a long way from Marxism, and this is not altogether an advantage. No one probably could regard with much satisfaction the more recent orthodox Marxian political philosophers like Dietzgen and some of his American disciples with their use of all that is least intelligible in the Hegelian dialectic. But it is difficult to see why any doctrine should be called specifically socialist which neglects the class-struggle. This is a symptom of Mr. de Maeztu's difficulties in dealing with the historical. Similarly with his treatment of the economic interpretation of history. He asserts that the economic and military powers are identical and finds in the doctrine as the Marxists formulate it a confusion with the historical interpretation of economics To say this is to confuse economic theory with economic conditions, a heresy which Marx himself could scarcely have understood, much less fallen into.

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Christianity and Sex Problems. By Hugh Northcote, M.A. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis and Company. (English Depot: Stanley Phillips, 23, Creighton Road, Queen's Park, London, N. W.) Second edition, revised and enlarged. Pp. xvi, 478. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

Mr. Northcote's book is a valuable contribution to the small number of those which deal with sex problems from a point of view at once definitely Christian and scientific. The spirit in which he approaches his subject is suggested in the following paragraph, where he comments on "the broad assertion" made by the Lambeth Conference of Bishops that "a life of chastity for

the unmarried is not only possible, but is commanded by God." Mr. Northcote writes: "A life of chastity possible for the unmarried! A mere categorical assertion of this kind does little service to the cause of purity, and one could almost comment with some vehemence on the lack of sympathy displayed. No doubt it is the duty of the Christian Church to uphold the ideal possibility of chastity in single life; but should not men who have special opportunities of studying how to render fruitful in their practical application to human life, the lines of ethical thought developed in the Bible, recognize (as St. Paul does) the frequent practical impossibility? Too often we have listened in vain, in the voice of the assembled Church, for the tone of deep fraternal sympathy, for the kind word of encouragement to the young unmarried man who, in his hard circumstances, accepts the obligation to sexual abstinence, but whose nerve-power is strained to the uttermost beneath its weight; who dreads the overhanging cloud of insanity, as he morbidly broods over his boyhood's troubles, and passing through the streets where the prostitutes pace the pavements at dusk, thinks in his lonely, miscalculating ignorance, to mend the error made in solitude by a desperate, debasing venture in fornication."

We make no apology for so long a quotation, for it is characteristic of Mr. Northcote's whole line of approach, and those who are touched by it will wish to read the book itself. It is concerned, as the quoted passage suggests, mainly with sex problems as they relate to men, but very much of what is said is true of women also, and of value to them as human beings subject to the same fundamental laws as men, even in matters relating to sex. The keynote of the book is to be found in Mr. Northcote's conviction that "a vital, progressive Christianity cannot long be out of harmony with any part of science," and that "a science of sex is" therefore "positively necessary to the understanding and appreciation of Christian sexual ethics." To those to whom the supreme reasonableness and sanity of the Christian ethic is its most profound attraction, the progress of scientific discovery and thought must always be welcome, for such discovery continually reillumines for them the noblest and also the most difficult sayings of Christ. But in general the attitude of the Christian student of science has been one rather of terror than of joy! Perhaps this is why there are so few books like *Christianity and Sex Problems*.

Readers would be well-advised to read the Epilogue immediately after the Introduction—it will not suffer from being read twice over—and it will convince them that the book is better worth reading than is suggested by the sudden outburst of violent and not very successful imagery with which Chapter I unfortunately begins. There is another equally unexpected outburst in Chapter XXIII of this really sober and scientific book. The subject is sufficiently tragic, but its treatment makes it almost grotesque.

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THEOPHRASTUS AND THE GREEK PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY BEFORE ARISTOTLE. By George Malcolm Stratton, Professor of Psychology in the University of California. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917. Pp. 228. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

This volume is the first complete translation into English of the fragment *De Sensibus* of Theophrastus. Considerable portions have of course been translated and discussed both by Professor Burnet and Professor Beare; but this volume is nevertheless very welcome. The fragment is certainly the most important single source of our knowledge of early psychology, and to attack Diels's text of it unaided was a severe trial for those of weaker capacity. Moreover, the portions which neither Burnet nor Beare had occasion to discuss in detail form a very compact criticism from the Aristotelian point of view of earlier theories of elementary cognition and throw a good deal of light on the Peripatetic attitude toward psychology in general.

Professor Stratton prints the text, adds an English translation and furnishes also introductions and notes. In the introductions he discusses the general value of the *De Sensibus* and the method and standpoint of Theophrastus' criticism of the opinions in which he is interested. In addition he devotes a good deal of space to the exposition of Theophrastus' own doctrines on the main topics of the *De Sensibus*, drawing incidentally on his other writings such as the *De Odoribus*. Within the limits he has set to himself, Professor Stratton seems to me to have fulfilled his purpose very well. But I am inclined to think that he has been a little too much influenced by the notion that these theories can be regarded as psychology without metaphysics, owing to the ex-

treme generality of the metaphysical ideas of the Pre-Socratics. No one would deny that there is a great deal of truth in this: but it can be carried too far. In the case of fifth century writers, for example, it is impossible to dissociate their psychology—such as it was—from their physiology and indeed from the whole history of the growth of the medical schools; and these, there is every reason to believe, were greatly affected by Pythagoreanism. Recent advances in our knowledge of Greek Science have come precisely from attending more closely to the interrelations of very general "metaphysical" ideas with what is known of the history of mathematics and natural science. This is true in an intensified sense when you come to the fourth century. Theophrastus' failure to see the point of a good deal of the argument of the *Timæus* (to which Professor Stratton rightly draws attention) is due to the general conflict of his point of view with that of the Academy. Similarly the discussion of Theophrastus' own doctrine would have been made clearer and much more pointed had a brief outline been given of the Aristotelian view of the soul and the nature of sensation. There is no reason to think that Theophrastus diverged to any great extent from his master's views on these matters.

The notes are directed solely to elucidating the meaning of the text. There is a pleasing absence of merely grammatical discussion. Professor Stratton has had the benefit, as he fully and generously acknowledges, of the advice and criticism of Professor A. E. Taylor, whose remarkable learning in every department of Greek Philosophy is constantly apparent. I should like especially to draw the attention of other students to the discussions of the well-known passage on the theory of sense-perception of Empedocles (*De Sensibus 7–9*) and of Theophrastus' criticism of the Platonic doctrine that "heavy" and "light" are relative terms.

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Self-Government in Industry. By G. D. H. Cole. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 330. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Cole's new book carries further the argument of his earlier *World of Labour* and, although it is planned with reference to the problems of labour which will arise immediately after the war, it is a contribution to the much more fundamental discussion of social and political theory. The book is specially valuable because it

combines detailed programmes of action and clear statement of contemporary English social forces with a large and inspiring vision of ultimate ideals. The first two chapters deal with the control of industry by the state and the possibility of restoring after the war the Trade Union customs which have been abrogated during the crisis. Even here, in issues which may appear to be merely English, there is an important principle involved. It is absolutely certain that business men assisted by some government officials will aim, after the war, at increasing production at all costs. They may therefore argue that any protection of the worker hampers their full use of his skill or strength. On the other side are those who demand human freedom, even if it endangers the increase of production. Two philosophies of life, two systems of economic thought are thus opposed. And Mr. Cole is rightly insistent upon the practical importance of destroying, once for all, the antiquated economics of business men. The restoration of full power to the Trade Unions is absolutely necessary for the realisation of a humane, as opposed to a material, civilisation. The long chapter which follows deals with the nature of the state: we shall criticise later, but for the present we must explain Mr. Cole's general thesis. "A state," he says, "is nothing more or less than the political machinery or government in a community." "In every community there are many forms and instances of common action in which the state has no part." We may take it as agreed among all who can analyse present social experience without undue regard to Hegel and Plato that the state is not to be identified with society or with the community. State administration provides for the needs of those who live in the same geographical districts. It expresses their interests as consumers or enjoyers. Trade Unions on the other hand are vocational institutions of producers. Thus there may be many forms of social organisation each existing in its own right, and there may be many kinds of social allegiance, not all subordinate to state-loyalty. The individual is ultimately the judge and the link between the institutions which subserve his full development (p. 91). Ideally there should be national guilds, growing out of the present trades unions, which in a Congress of producers would counterbalance the Parliament of consumers in the state. In such a society the wage system would disappear not only because each industry as a whole would bear the burden of any trade depression from which it suffered, in-

stead of putting the burden upon the hand-workers, but because a man and not his labour, abstracted from his humanity, would be felt to be important. The state might own the instruments of production and control the producers in the interest of the consumers; and men whose manhood was recognised would not be easily enslaved to any Guild. So short a summary does little justice to Mr. Cole's admirable contribution to political thought and practice; and the criticisms which may be offered do not diminish its value.

In the first place with regard to the relation of administration to economic forces, Mr. Cole is not clear as to the policy which should be adopted in an ideal state towards finance. He recognises that "the financier is the supreme power behind the capitalist throne" (p. 178). It appears that the state is to control exchange: but how? It does not appear that Mr. Cole has thought out the function of a class who will be financiers without being fraudulent gamblers and it may be that some element of prejudice survives in him when he thinks of the manipulation of capital. Again Mr. Cole has not sufficiently acknowledged, in his theory of the state, the relation of the state to other human interests as well as industry. Obviously he implies the existence of such interests, but without deliberate reference to the forms of social organisation for other purposes than trade, one cannot do full justice to the "architectonic" quality of politics. The state is not simply administration; it is the force or the feeling or the prestige upon which administration depends for its effectiveness; and this seems to be what the idealists call the Soul of the State. But Mr. Cole tends to forget its existence. These criticisms, however, are perhaps unjust, because no book can contain everything that is to be said, and in relation to industry Mr. Cole's theory is clear and consistent.

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London.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of John A. Selbie and Louis H. Gray. Volume IX: Mundas—Phrygians. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. Pp. xx, 911. Price, 32s. net.

We have become so accustomed to expect every year or so a volume of a thousand pages or thereby from Dr. Hastings and

his collaborators that it is difficult to realise the enormous labor that must go to the production even of one of them, if the standard of the earlier volumes is to be maintained. Yet all the usual features appear in this the ninth of the series—its international character, the almost unfailing judgment exhibited in the choice of contributors, the subdivision of the greater subjects, a remarkable typographical accuracy, and so on. Not less striking than before are the number and fulness of the anthropological articles. Religion and ethics have this in common: both are rooted in anthropology: and there will probably exist nowhere a more complete summary of the evolution of moral and religious ideas than in these volumes when completed.

Since religion on its theological side expands into metaphysics and even into logic, we have two connected articles by the late Professor Royce on Negation and Order, the latter of which contains an attempt to bring out the importance of the study of types of order in the moral and social world. For the rest it follows quite closely the ideas put forward in his paper in the Windelband-Rüge Encyclopædia. On another side there are several biological articles—Pangenesis, Ontogeny and Phylogeny, and others. The long composite article on Nature treats it almost exclusively as object of worship: nothing for example, could be more to the point than Dr. L. R. Farrell's contribution on Nature (Greek). The extreme catholicity and impartiality of the work are sufficiently evidenced by the very reasonable article on Occultism (Mr. G. R. S. Mead), the exposition on New Thought (Mr. A. L. Allen), and the subdivision of many modern religious subjects.

Curiously enough there happens to be little in this volume of purely ethical interest, but the articles on general philosophical subjects are ample compensation. Dr. M'Taggart's discussion of Personality is a distinctly original contribution to philosophy and will attract the attention of all students. Admittedly a development of certain suggestions of Mr. Russell, it attempts to prove that each of us perceives himself, perception being used in the sense of awareness of an existent. The chief argument is that since "I" cannot be known by description there must be knowledge of it by awareness, otherwise no statements containing "I" as a constituent are justifiable. Amongst other points, it is also argued that the inclusion in selves of other selves or their parts is impossible. The article on Ontology by J. Turner

is realistic in tone and contains an interesting sketch of a treatment of the categories which to me is rendered difficult to follow by an extremely obscure theory of relations. Dr. Tennant's article on Natural Law is excellent: but Rev. W. D. Niven's on Naturalism suffers from too narrow a use of the term for critical purposes.

As usual the Encyclopædia is particularly strong on the historical side. Among the larger articles in history of philosophy may be mentioned that on Neo-Platonism (Dean Inge) and on Peripatetics (Mr. R. D. Hicks). Mr. J. W. Scott discusses the Neo-Hegelian movement in England and lays just stress on its relation to the state of culture in the first half of the century. The composite article Philosophy contains of course a good deal of historical material, especially in respect of Non-European thought. Church History gets its full share of attention. The most notable articles on the history of dogma are those on Nestorianism (Dr. A. J. Maclean) and Pelagianism (Rev. R. G. Parsons). The controversial topic of The Holy Office is carefully discussed by Father Herbert Thurston: that of the Papacy from a distinctly hostile point of view by Rev. A. Fawkes.

The general articles are of great value, each of them, however short or relatively unimportant, being in the hands of a specialist. There is a long composite article on Music. Dr. E. Graf, to whom the section on Greece and Rome is allocated, has surely allowed the statement that the Greeks knew nothing about shortening the string of a lyre by means of bridges to remain by an oversight, in view of what he says about Pythagoras. Dr. Percy Gardner goes delicately among the controversies on Greek Mysteries and produces a model article. Special mention should be made of the brilliant discussion of Mysticism (Christian, Roman Catholic) by Father Chapman, with its account of the Scholastic theory of the nature of mystical knowledge. In view of some tendencies in recent psychology with reference to the significance of certain symbols whenever and wherever they occur, nothing could be more salutary than Mr. E. S. Hartland's article Phallism. It is refreshing to have these aspects of primitive religion discussed by a writer who really knows something about the subject. Amongst the biographical articles the most interesting is that on Neitzsche by Dr. Havelock Ellis, which contains a most discriminating discussion of his ethical doctrine.

Omissions are almost unknown in Dr. Hastings' work; in this

volume the only point that has occured to me is that when Natural Law has an article Natural Right deserves at least a cross-reference.

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In addition to the above notice it may be convenient to note the chief contents of this volume under the five headings of Philosophy, Ethics, Religion, Logic, and Various.

In Philosophy, the article on Philosophy is good and long and subdivided into thirteen parts dealing with different systems, principally ancient. It may be noticed that Scottish Philosophy will have a special article of its own, but that English and German Philosophy and French Philosophy (if this last can be said to exist) are not mentioned as such. However, there are articles on Neo-Kantianism and Neo-Hegelianism. Other philosophical articles are the long and excellent article Nature, and also Mysticism, Object, Ontology, Occultism, Natural Law, Occasionalism, Personality, Neo-Cynicism, Peripatetics, Neo-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, Perception, and Nietzsche.

In Ethics we may count such articles as Nationality, Neutrality, Peace, Pessimism and Optimism, and Philanthropy. In particular the article on Nationality contains references to quite modern states of affairs.

In Religion may be reckoned the articles Penance, Persecution, Passivity, Nonconformity, Papacy, Old Catholicism, Oxford Movement, Newman, Pascal, Pantheism, Mysteries, Naturalism, Perfection (Christian), Obscurantism, Nihilism (Buddhist), Mythology, Orthodoxy, and Paul.

To Logic seem to belong more particularly Royce's two articles on Negation and Order, and the article Paradox.

As various may perhaps be classed the long, learned, and detailed article by many scholars on Music, in which religious music has of course a leading place; and the articles Names, Perseverance, Organic Selection, Oath, Personification, Negroes, Old Age, Ordeal, Ontogenesis, Pangenesis, Parthenogenesis, Obedience, Patience, and the long article on Numbers.

The last article mentioned is principally devoted to numbers as they appear in Aryan and Semitic literature, and the somewhat obscure ethical and philosophical implications of numbers with the Pythagoreans are only rather briefly referred to (p. 406).

It would perhaps have been pleasing to many people to see rather more about this subject, and also more about the modern theory of number and infinity than is given in the very able article by Prof. A. E. Taylor on Continuity in one of the earlier volumes, and which seems to have aroused philosophical and religious interest. For the rest it may be noticed that there is not even a cross-reference to other articles for people who are anxious to find out something about Oratory, Pederasty (or Paiderasty), Pedagogy, and Philolans.

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Fleet, Hants, England.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE MAKING OF WOMEN: OXFORD ESSAYS IN FEMINISM. By A. Maude Royden and others. Edited by Victor Gollancz. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 217. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

The best of these Essays is the careful and discriminative estimate and forecast of "Education" by Elinor Burns. The Editor also makes some timely comments, *e.g.* that "except in a free society women cannot be free." Why is it that in spite of the knowledge, ability, and enthusiasm of individual contributions, the whole collection suffers from an academic blight of unreality and incompleteness? I think Miss Maude Royden's essay on "Modern Love" supplies the answer. She claims the right of women to full human individuality with the graceful eloquence and ethical idealism which one has learnt to associate with her name.

With much that Miss Royden says, both in this essay and in that dealing with "The Future of the Women's Movement," all feminists must entirely agree, but she obstinately ignores and evades the full conclusion of the line of argument she adopts. A little clear thinking on these lines is worth much eloquence about "purity."

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

London, England.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX. By S. Herbert, M.D., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. London: A. & C. Black, 1917. Pp. xvii, 148. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

An admirably clear and frank attempt to "give the elementary facts of the physiology and psychology of sex in a simple yet scientific manner." Dr. Herbert adopts the "biologic approach" recommended by another distinguished eugenist, Miss Norah March, and gives a terse and carefully illustrated account of the processes of reproduction throughout organic life. In his treatment of the ethical and psychological side of sex, he is careful to emphasise the need for a new social order, if sexual disharmonies and abuses are ever to be even partially abolished. The two most valuable chapters are those dealing with "The Sexual Norm," and "Aberrations of Sex," respectively. They are open-minded, definite and dignified, and entirely free from Christian cant. The author's treatment of emotional sex differences seems to me much less satisfactory; such a phrase as "The

female, always more a mother than a wife," is misplaced and mischievous dogmatism, out of keeping with the general tone of a valuable book, but against this, must be balanced the admission that "there exist innumerable gradations of sex, and we must recognise intermediate mental types."

On the whole Dr. Herbert's book is a welcome oasis in the wilderness of ignorant ecclesiastical twaddle and furtive pornography, which constitute the bulk of what is written about sex, and it would bring help and enlightenment to many perplexed people.

F. W. Stella Browne.

London, England.

Woman's Effort: a chronicle of British women's fifty years' struggle for citizenship (1865–1914). By A. E. Metcalfe, B.Sc., with an introduction by Laurence Housman. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1917. Pp. xxiv, 381. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Woman's Effort presents a mass of documentary evidence relating to the feminist movement of the early twentieth century in a compact and convenient form; and (apart from the still further summarised earlier history) is, as the writer claims, a plain unpretentious narrative of actual events connected with the movement down to the outbreak of war. Refraining from argument and theory, this chronicle in headed paragraphs, year by year, presents, in this concentrated form, a picture both of sporadic lawlessness on the part of militants and government incompetence. An unnecessary amount of space is given to the suicide of Miss Davison on Derby Day, 1913, and her funeral pomps.

F. S.

London, England.

Nationalism. By Sir Rabindranath Tagore. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 136. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Sir Rabindranath Tagore is a Chrysostom, and his book, which is chiefly concerned with political theory, is a prose poem. Especially beautiful are the passages describing the secular life of India under her rulers and conquerors. "But her thrones were not her concern. They passed over her head like clouds now tinged with purple gorgeousness, now black with the threat of thunder." But all this was as it were "a drift of cavalry and foot soldiers, richly caparisoned elephants, white tents and canopies, strings of patient camels bearing the loads of royalty, bands of kettle-drums and flutes, marble domes of mosques, palaces and tombs like the bubbles of the foaming wine of extravagance; stories of treachery and loyal devotion, of changes of fortune and of dramatic surprises of fate." But with these earlier conquerors he has no concern; his book is an arraignment of the Western state organised for power. He causes his readers some discomfort by his peculiar use of the word "nation" for "state," and we have constantly to translate "nation" by "state" before it is possible to get at Sir Rabindranath's meaning of the state organised for power.

India's most intimate experience is with the British nation, and "as far as government by the nation (*i.e.* by the organised state) goes, there are reasons to believe that this is one of the best." But the aspect of any one of the western states organised for power is anathema to him, driving as it does its tentacles of machinery deep into the soil; and to him therefore what he calls nationalism is "a crude epidemic of evil." Like Ruskin, he passes judgment upon our commercialism, with its barbarity of ugly ornament, and the standards of value of the western industrial state and its

mechanical progress in which "the civilization of humanity has lost its path in the Wilderness of Machinery." "The nation has thriven long upon mutilated humanity. Suddenly, all its mechanism going mad, it has begun the dance of the Furies, shattering its own limbs, scattering them into dust. It is the fifth act of the tragedy of the unreal." He hopes, it would seem, for a Utopia such as Samuel Butler's, where men have destroyed the machine they had made.

M. J.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IDEALS IN THE ENGLISH POETS. A lecture delivered in the John Rylands library, 4th January, 1916. By C. H. Herford, M.A., Litt.D. Manchester: The University Press; London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1917. Pp. 24. Price, 1s. net.

Mr. Herford illustrates from English poets the three types of national ideal: "simple" patriotism; the patriotism of the German type, which is extraordinarily fervent and self-conscious, but on a very low plane in regard to the well-being of other nations; and the third phase, which regards the nation chiefly as a member of a community of other nations. Mr. Herford does not quote one of the most definite expressions of international idealism, Tennyson's "Parliament of Man, the federation of the World," but he brings into due prominence that remarkable characteristic of the greater English poetry of the nineteenth century, imaginative fellowship with nations such as France and Italy. It is enough to mention the names of Byron and Shelley, Swinburne and Meredith.

M. J.

THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE. By L. S. Woolf. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 154. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Woolf has gathered together the various schemes for securing a lasting peace for the purposes of comparison; and No. VII, the draft treaty of a Dutch committee, translated from the original French, is also included. The point that strikes any reader is the essential similarity of these schemes, and Mr. Woolf's introduction, in which he does not "propose to drive another furrow through this field" already broken up by the ploughing of many competent thinkers, does well in emphasising this most hopeful feature. Mr. Woolf admits that political institutions alone cannot eliminate war, but very truly points out that "the absence or presence of international organisations is *part* cause of the existence of the will-to-war or the will-to-peace."

Another delusion he makes short work of is the idea—born of disappointment—that there is, and will be no more international law.

M. J.

THE WORLD OF STATES. By C. Delisle Burns, M.A. (New Commonwealth Books). London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1917. Pp. 143. Price, 2s. net.

Mr. Burns' short study of the state is written in his usual lucid and interesting manner. Like Mr. Lowes Dickenson, he lays stress on the fact that there is really not very much difference between the world of states and the nation of individuals. We must see them and not "states" as the fundamental interest of politics; and certain delusive beliefs must be done away with, such as that "mystical belief concerning nations which implies that they are large bodily organisms." The future of the World of States

must lie in the establishment of political humanism,—about which Mr. Burns might be a little more illuminating. The present world of states he describes forcibly as a "formless world, a chaos, a nebula half-formed and insecure," and to make it a world in the sense of a cosmos or orderly system, each state must take its part as an integral portion of the whole. To this the best of modern political thinkers have been tending. Like these, Mr. Burns proposes as a stage in the world organisation, international conferences and a League of States; and as an initial step he suggests that the British Empire and the United States (which had begun to move towards "political humanism" by the arbitration treaty of 1914) should lead the way in the formation of an inter-state polity. The thoughtful book is independent in its testing of political problems which are now especially of general interest.

D. R.

London, England.

OLD WORLDS FOR NEW: A STUDY OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL STATE. By A. J. Penty. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 186. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Mr. Penty believes that we should improve our social structure and increase the general well-being by going back to a Guild system. He connects his Guilds with the National Guilds of Mr. G. D. H. Cole and others; but he appears to be more influenced by the historical tradition than by the organisation of industry at present. He tilts against quantitative production. He rightly condemns the gospel of output: and holds up for contrast a production in which quality of the product shall be the chief interest of the producer. Repetition seems to him to be of the essence of machine production; but his chief instance of the value of quality as against quantity is the production of furniture. That industry is surely in a very exceptional position. There are some confusions even in the history, as the late sixteenth century is treated as mediæval, Aquinas and Ambrose are jostled together, and the Guild Merchant is spoken of as though it existed throughout the Middle Ages. But the book is on the whole stimulating, in spite of strange statements such as that "morality is a negative thing, whilst art is positive and can tell us what to do." Mr. Penty seems to be better at expressing a sentiment than at clearing up a confusion.

C. D. B.

IDEAS AT WAR. By Patrick Geddes and Gilbert Slater (The Making of the Future Series). London: Williams and Norgate, 1917. Pp. xvii, 256. Price, 5s. net.

This book, the second of a series which aims at gathering together existing elements and reconstructive doctrine and presenting them as a body of truth is prepared from lectures given at a summer meeting at Kings' College in 1915. The authors discuss the facts of European history and the causes of the war, and the aspects of the "mechanical-financial age," the future of art and education, and the revival of regionalism. As in *Cities in Evolution*, by Professor Geddes, a popular presentment of civism, stress is laid upon the city as "the crown and fulfilment of regional life." The book smacks too much of the informal but arresting lecture in its inclusion of simple jokes, such as that "Petersburgia was Retrogradia" (p. 144).

M. J.

A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War. By Jean Jacques Rousseau. Translated and edited by C. E. Vaughan. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 128. Price, 2s. net.

Mr. Vaughan, the editor of the *Political Writings* of Rousseau has given an excellent translation of Rousseau's *A Lasting Peace*, written in 1756, and *The State of War*. The former professes to be no more than an abstract of the earlier work on the same subject of the Abbe St. Pierre, but is actually a fairly free treatment of the prolix original; and the introduction is pure Rousseau. The second part is an independent essay criticising St. Pierre's scheme, which he declares to be not Utopian, indeed perfectly practical and beneficial, yet the selfishness of kings and ministers controlling the destinies of Europe will, Rousseau believes, stand in the way. "To be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness." Rousseau's solution was a federation of Europe, with a representative court, whose decisions were to be enforced by a federal army;—the latter a not very practical measure, especially to-day.

M. J.

Some Aspects of the War, as Viewed by Naturalized British Subjects. By A. Cohn. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1917. Pp. 20. Price, 6d. net.

A pamphlet issued by the Council of Loyal British subjects of German, Austrian or Hungarian birth (founded in May 1915) with a view to confuting allegations of German publicists. It emphasises the complete lack of any anti-German feeling in England before the war; and states that one of the members was permitted to see and study every one of the German diaries published in the appendix to the Report of Lord Bryce's Committee, and "can bear witness to the scrupulous fairness and meticulous care with which those diaries have been used."

M. J.

The Gods in Battle. By Paul Hyacinthe Loyson. Translated from the French by Lady Frazer, with an Introduction by H. G. Wells. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917. Pp. xxx, 290. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

M. Loyson was before the war a pacifist, "a good democratic Socialist," and the Editor of the *Droits de l'homme*, a man whose chief aim was to secure some measure of friendship between France and Germany. His record makes this series of open letters the more significant. To some extent the letters relating to America (XIX–XXIII) are out of date, and the *chasse* of M. Romain Rolland too detailed and too vindictive; but no one can read the book with its characteristic French rhetoric, directness and fire, without enjoyment. One of the most telling of his open letters is that addressed to Brandes, who when asked why he had not protested over the violation of Belgian neutrality, replied: "If I were obliged to draw up protestations every time there happens in the world an event of which I disapprove, I should have nothing else to do." As M. Loyson points out, Brandes had "had a mania for making protestations every time anything happened of which he disapproved. He spent all his time in doing that and nothing else." The translation reads like a translation; and while allowing for the difficulties of translating French rhetoric into

English prose, such phrases as "the tawny aggressors," the "German staff-officers who unmuzzled the hyenas of the sewer," are not happy.

M. J.

IN THE WAKE OF THE WAR: PARLIAMENT OR IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. By Harold Hodge. London: John Lane, 1917. Pp. x, 226. Price, 5s. net.

Mr. Hodge's book is a tract for the times, full of pungent criticism of the parliamentary system. He is out of patience with parties and the demoralisation of party politics and he proposes as a remedy to withdraw matters of imperial concern from Parliamentary control and hand them over to a council of ten, nominated by the king. The council would be obliged to refer certain fixed questions to the whole body of electors every year and other questions involving changes. The scheme is not a workable one; the referendum solution is cumbrous, and it seems improbable that anyone would propose to add to the powers and functions of kingship.

M. J.

HIGHER LIVING. By Smith Baker, M.D. Boston: Sherman, French and Company, 1917. Pp. x, 404. Price, $1.75 net.

This book consists of a series of brief essays which offer a kind of inspirational guidance on many problems of personal and family life—marriage, homemaking, the training of children, and others. Each chapter is prefaced by a page of "inspired" quotations. Some typical chapter headings are: "The Joyous Outlook," "The Wedding Day," "The Sweet New Life," "Unforeseen Dangers," "Personal Freedom."

E. A.

HEALTH AND THE STATE. By William A. Brend, M.A., M.D., B.Sc. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 354. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

A valuable study and criticism of English state efforts to promote healthy conditions of living. Here, in spite of the large sums spent with this aim, the value of these efforts is lessened by the division of administration among a number of uncoördinated and overlapping authorities. An excellent scheme for complete reorganisation of the public health service is sketched, and the foundation of a Ministry of Health urged (p. 313), which should undertake sociological medical research; and wide discretionary powers are suggested for local authorities in public health administration. The central ministry would prevent the present overlapping and determine policy while the advantage of stimulating hygiene reforms by saddling each locality with a part of the cost of their health services is obvious.

M. J.

HUMAN IDEALS. By Frederick A. M. Spencer. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. viii, 280. Price, 6s. net.

This book is an attempt to indicate some of the ways in which humanity may be expected to develop itself—moral, religious, social, industrial, intellectual and domestic—in the near future, a future in all probability brought nearer by the present world war. To those who believe that a return to the eighteenth century outlook over life, reinforced by the knowl-

edge, but untouched by the reactions, of the nineteenth, is greatly to be desired it will be welcome. It is conceived in the spirit of Rousseau's *Emile* and of Thomas Day's *Sandford and Merton;* the writer being an up-to-date Mr. Barlow, who, however, has devoted more attention to the New Testament than that excellent man.

A. F.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, 1815 AND 1914. By H. R. Hodges, B.Sc. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 91. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

This book, originally written under the title of the "Economic Condition of the People of England in 1815 in comparison with the Present day" won the Paul Philip Reitlingen Prize in the University of London in 1915. It is a summary, elucidated with many clear and useful tables and diagrams, of the century's progress in England from the close of one great war to the inception of another. The author remarks that as the past has been devoted to the accumulation of wealth, the future is devoted to its more equal distribution.

M. J.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By Walter S. Athearn. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1917. Pp. xi, 394. Price, $1.50.

The author of this book puts forward a plea for a system of church schools under co-operative, non-ecclesiastical control, reaching from the cradle roll to graduate schools of religion, and correlated at every point in the matter of academic credits with the public school system. The book abounds in classified bibliographies and outlines, almost to the exclusion of all discussion, though perhaps for the audience of church readers for whom the book is intended no discussion is necessary. The author rejects the Dewey theory of education, all of his references to it being in connection with Bagley's review of *Democracy and Education* in *School and Home Education*, 36: 1. His point of view with regard to a critical study of the Bible is that "there is certainly a place for this critical study, but that place is in the graduate school and not in the undergraduate years. The undergraduate needs the results of research, not the methods and processes" (p. 320).

E. A.

WHAT IS QUAKERISM? By Edward Grubb, M.A. London: Headley Brothers, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 244. Price, 1s. 6d. and 2s. 6d. net.

This compact statement of the position and history of Quakerism is extremely useful. There are chapters on the "Inward Light," the "Testimony for Peace," Philanthropy and Social Reform, and the present outlook, written from the point of view of an English Quaker by the author, who has in other books dealt with the theological aspect of the subject, and was for many years Editor of the *British Friend*.

M. J.

LA GUERRA ETERNA E IL DRAMMA DEL ESISTENZA. By Antonio Aliotta, della R. Universita di Padova. Napoli: Francesco Perrella. Lira 4.

Professor Aliotta's book has a topical title, but except for a patriotic passage at the end he confines himself to philosophical issues. His task is

a popular presentation of a species of Humanism. Sig. Aliotta comes out of the idealistic tradition, and has developed a relative idealism, with a strong propension toward Pure Experience. His Empiricism stops at the subject-object relation, beyond which he believes we can penetrate no further. He begins by an assault upon naturalism and positivism ("freedom is an inner experience"); and no less forcibly attacks absolute idealism (*e.g.* Royce's absolute will, p. 43), and the "Spirit" of neo-Hegelians (a "spirit" which is not the spirit of any concrete person). "The primitive fact" in his own words "is the experience of an individual subject in time." From experience "it is impossible for us to escape; we must not grieve thereat, because this is the concrete reality, the living model of any and every conceivable form of existence" (p. 59). "The object is only real in its relation to the subject, and vice versa . . . outside of this relationship the two terms are mere abstractions."

I have not been able to trace the links between this thesis and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which Professor Aliotta holds with equal emphasis. Nor is the theory of Evil—as a conflict of wills which is disappearing in the "progressive co-ordination" of the world—altogether satisfactory. Is the ideal of civilisation *merely* organisation? Professor Aliotta seems to think so (pp. 163, 185). And there is perhaps a little trick of passe-passe in his argument for vitalism versus mechanism (p. 187). But the book is vigorous and entertaining, and is not intended as a technical treatise of the bullet-proof sort. It is pleasant to find that Croce and Gentile are spoken of as "polluting (at least *contaminando*) Hegel with Bergson."

T. S. E.

BRAHMADARSANAM, OR INTUITION OF THE ABSOLUTE. Being an introduction to the study of Hindu Philosophy. By Sri Ananda Acharya. London: Macmillan and Company, 1917. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

A good brief introduction to Indian philosophy is still much to seek. Such a work ought to be both historical and comparative. It ought to draw the line very clearly between the religious intuition, which the various schools of philosophy all assumed, and the interpretations, which are widely diverse; it ought to make quite clear to the Occidental mind the difference between the Vedas and the Upanishads, which are properly religious texts, and the earliest philosophical texts of the primitive Sankhya. There is, though native writers are apt to obscure the fact, as certainly a History of Indian philosophy as of European; a history which can be traced in the dualistic Sankhya, for instance, from the cryptic early couplets through the commentary of Patanjali to the extraordinarily ingenious and elaborate thought of Vachaspati Misra and Vijnana Bhikshu. There is, moreover, extremely subtle and patient psychology in the later writers; and it should be the task of the interpreter to make this psychology plausible, to exhibit it as something more than an arbitrary and fatiguing system of classifications.

Sri Ananda has written a small book which is better than most attempts of the kind; and as there is so little in this field that is worth a layman's attention, his book is to be recommended. The historical method is hardly developed, and the author is too much concerned (as is perhaps natural) with refuting some of the European scholars' dates. He places Kapila, for instance (who may or may not have existed) as early as 3000 B.C., and Buddha himself much earlier than the seventh century. These are unimportant points, however; it is more important that we are not

shown the real *development* of Indian thought. Sri Ananda devotes most attention to Vedanta; but it is good to get a book which discusses the Sankhya at all. It ought to be made clear that Prakriti (Pradhanam) is not equivalent to Matter, but sometimes is almost the sense-data of the Realists. The lectures (for such is the origin of the book) are interestingly written.

T. S. E.

DEMOCRACY AFTER THE WAR. By J. A. Hobson. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 216. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

This is a valuable book. It contains not merely a warning of the struggle which democracy will have to enter if the war ends, but a statement of the growth of antidemocratic tendencies in a war period. The analysis of the "Enemies of Democracy" is admirable. Militarism is connected with Capitalism; and both with Protectionism and Imperialism. The various political and intellectual reactionaries are noted; and the author then turns to the possible defences of democracy. The chief effort should be to capture the state, which is at present in the hands of the enemies of democracy, even if their phrases are democratic. The few democrats who are connected with administration or legislation are easily overcome or persuaded into impotence in a war period. The effects endure long after the war. On the other hand, democracy is disunited. Different groups aim at different social or political reforms. What is most essential, therefore, is some unity of all progressive minds based upon fundamental principles. The book should be read by all who are not yet reduced to mental inertia; and it may even prove to be a protection against such inertia. If war becomes a permanent institution it may be necessary for a few to preserve the ability to think for themselves, in case that ability may at some time be again valued by their fellows.

C. D. B.

THE COMING DEMOCRACY. By Hermann Fernau (translated). London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. viii, 320. Price, 6s. net.

Herr Fernau's book, of which the original German edition was published at the end of February, before the Russian Revolution, is touched with the same sort of vigorous patriotism as *J' Accuse*. The defects of the German Constitution were well known to thinking Germans before the war, but he is quite justified in his hard-hitting and effective recapitulation of them. Of his fellow Germans' electoral rights, he has to confess that they are only a pretence. "We have neither ruling statesmen nor responsible ministers, neither a legally guaranteed position as against our government, nor soldiers sworn to uphold our constitution. Thus we are not free citizens of a constitutional state, but the subjects of a God-appointed ruler," and a ruler who could pronounce, in 1901, that "an art that disregards the laws and limits I have laid down is no longer an art." His personal activities, as laid bare in the recently published Willy-Nicky telegrams, are a confirmation of Herr Fernau's thesis that absolute dynasties are bad in the long run; but it is not perhaps reasonable to regard them as the root of all evil in international relations. Democracy must be organised by a League of Nations before the danger of war is practically eliminated. The independence of the author, hammering away at his thesis in exile, is everywhere apparent in this honest and effective book.

M. J.

Broadwinsor, Dorset.

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